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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the question of whether it is possible to construct a 
generic explanation for the current modernization of many armed forces in 
the Asia-Pacific, specifically in the naval domain. It argues that the concept 
of “arms race or arms racing,” although widely employed and the subject of 
a voluminous literature, is in fact a rather weak analytical device for 
explaining these armament dynamics. Consequently, the thesis sets out to 
explain the factors driving the modernization of naval and associated air 
capabilities in key Asia-Pacific countries between 2001 and 2016. The 
primary motivations behind these armament dynamics ranged from a fear of 
US withdrawal from the region, the rise of China, enhancing self-defense 
requirements, and maritime territorial disputes. Due to the assumption that 
these armament dynamics are competitive it has become tempting for 
scholars and the media to label such strategic behavior of the use of force as 
an “arms race,” broadly understood as a progressive and competitive increase 
in armaments by two or more states resulting from conflicting purposes or 
mutual fears. 
 
The analysis of the case studies demonstrates that “arms race” theories are of 
limited utility as they strip states of any purposeful involvement in the 
armament process. The dissertation argues that a new set of propositions to 
understand interactive armament dynamics is needed. Responding and 
interacting to one or more opponents’ armaments implies that decision-
makers have deemed an armaments policy necessary to secure state survival 
in response to a perceived threat. As states are reacting to their broader 
strategic environment rather than a single adversary, interactive arming must 
involve two or more actors, and both qualitative and quantitative changes 
must be present. Interactive arming dynamics also exhibits highly 
competitive security behavior that does not directly involve the armed forces. 
This can take the form of enhanced strategic partnerships, intelligence-
sharing, and defense technology transfers. This is often a response to a 
perceived asymmetry in a relationship, in which a country acknowledges that 
its armed forces will never be equal to a potential opponent’s.  
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation addresses the question of whether it is possible to construct 
a generic explanation for the current modernization of many armed forces in 
the Asia-Pacific, specifically in the naval domain. It argues that the concept 
of “arms race or arms racing,” although widely employed and the subject of 
a voluminous literature, is in fact a rather weak analytical device for 
explaining these armament dynamics. Consequently, the thesis sets out to 
explain the factors driving the modernization of naval and associated air 
capabilities in key Asia-Pacific countries between 2001 and 2016. This is 
relevant since around 2000 a sustained and rapid build-up of naval and 
associated air platforms has been underway in the Asia-Pacific, particularly 
in Northeast Asia. Due to the assumption that these armament dynamics are 
competitive, the scholarly debate has intensified around whether the region 
was subject to a destabilizing “arms race.” 
 
The notion of an “arms race” has remained a constant and vivid narrative in 
the current debate since the mid-1990s. In 1993, Michael Klare in Foreign 
Affairs, declared the “next great arms race” was underway in Asia. In 1995, 
Amitav Acharya advised that Southeast Asia was already undergoing an 
“arms race.” Much of this commentary reflected the “astonishment at the 
rapid increase in Asian defence expenditure, anxiety about China’s growing 
capabilities, and bewilderment about some of the major acquisitions in the 
region.”1 By the 2000s, this narrative continued. In 2005, Robert Hartfiel and 
Brian Jobs argued that the Asian arms build-up was not just a process of 
military modernization, but that there existed evidence of deep security 
imperatives.2 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
has also repeatedly warned of an “arms race” when describing the extensive 
                                                
1 Desmond Ball, “Arms Modernization in Asia: An Emerging Complex Arms Race,” in The 
Global Arms Trade: A Handbook, ed. Andrew T. H. Tan (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 31.  
2 Robert Hartfiel and Brian Jobs, “Raising the Risks of War: Defence Spending Trends and 
Competitive Arms Processes in East Asia,” Working Paper 44 (Institute of International 
Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, March 2005), 3-4. 
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and on-going modernization of capabilities in the region.3 In 2012, Geoffrey 
Till’s Asia’s Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making?, argued that 
there clearly was an interactive element in the naval modernization of China, 
India, Japan and the United States, and that this could potentially evolve into 
an “arms race.”4 
 
In early 2014, the then-Commander of United States Pacific Command 
(USPACOM), Admiral Samuel Locklear, told reporters that the seas and 
skies of the Asia-Pacific were rapidly evolving into “the most militarized 
region in the world.”5 He added that it was not only the quantity of weapons 
being stockpiled by China and other nations in the Pacific, but also the 
advanced type of weapons systems that was causing concerns for American 
military planners. The Wall Street Journal in February 2016 argued that “the 
rapid rise in Chinese military spending and greater assertiveness in its 
territorial claims is fueling an arms race in the Asia-Pacific region even 
though many of the countries involved have been hit by an economic 
slowdown.” The Economist on the other hand explained that the region was 
not witnessing a “classical arms race between two great powers, of the sort 
Britain and Germany engaged in before the first world war, or a cold-war 
contest like that between America and the Soviet Union. But certainly, Asian 
countries are competing to modernize their military forces.”6 The article’s 
byline further argued that “the Asia-Pacific region is at peace—but it is 
buying a lot of weapons.”7 
                                                
3 See Paul Holtom et al, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2009,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, 
March 2010, January 18, 2017, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1003.pdf; Sam 
Perlo-Freeman, “Deciphering China’s Latest Defence Budget Figures,” SIPRI Newsletter, 
March 31, 2014, https://www.sipri.org/node/377; and Herbert Wulf, “China, India and the 
Three Cs,” SIPRI Commentary, March 6, 2014, 
https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2014/china-india-and-three-cs.  
4 Geoffrey Till, Asia’s Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making?, Adelphi 52 
(Routledge and IISS: London, 2012), 12.  
5 Carlo Munoz, “Locklear: Asia-Pacific is Becoming ‘Most Militarized Region in the 
World,’” US Naval Institute News, January 23, 2014, 
https://news.usni.org/2014/01/23/locklear-asia-pacific-becoming-militarized-region-world.  
6 “Taking Arms,” The Economist, February 27, 2016, 
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21693619-asia-pacific-region-peacebut-it-buying-lot-
weapons-taking-arms.  
7 Robert Wall and Doug Cameron, “Chinese Military Spending, Ambitions Fuel Asian 
Arms Race, Studies Say,” The Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-military-spending-ambitions-fuel-asian-arms-race-
studies-say-1456095661.  
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In this context, it has become tempting for both scholars8 and the media9 to 
label such strategic behavior10  an “arms race”—broadly understood as a 
progressive and competitive increase in armaments by two or more states 
resulting from conflicting purposes or mutual fears.11 The assumed primary 
motivations behind this dynamic range from the threat of China to enhancing 
self-defense requirements in response to South China Sea territorial 
disputes.12 However, no significant effort has been made by proponents of 
“arms races” to distinguish the phenomenon from military modernization or 
strategic competition. This study defines military modernization as a country 
committing to harnessing the capability gains that flow from regularly 
updating the systems on its existing platforms. This involves procurement, 
upgrades and enhancement. Capability is understood as the “ability to 
succeed at an assigned mission.”13 Strategic competition “lies midway on a 
spectrum whose [political] ends are defined by conflict and cooperation.” 14 
Competition is seen as a bipolar relationship between strategic actors who 
possess aims relative to each other, and formulate a strategy to achieve them. 
It is not synonymous with interaction. Interaction on the other hand is not 
                                                
8 Examples include Desmond Ball, Asia’s Naval Arms Race; Alessio Patalano and James 
Manicom, “Rising Tides: Seapower and Regional Security in Northeast Asia,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 37, no. 3 (April 2014): 335-344; and Andrew T. H. Tan, The Arms Race 
in Asia: Trends, Causes and Implications (London: Routledge, 2014). 
9 See “A New Arms race is Exploding into Asia, with an Expensive and Extensive 
Shopping List of New Weapons. Who’s Buying What — And Where does Australia 
stand?” news.com.au, February 13, 2014, http://www.news.com.au/technology/a-new-
arms-race-is-exploding-into-asia-with-an-expensive-and-extensive-shopping-list-of-new-
weapons-whos-buying-what-and-where-does-australia-stand/story-e6frfrnr-
1226825644654; Vaishali Gauba, “Asia Defense Spending: New Arms Race in South 
China Sea,” CNBC, May 21, 2015, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/21/asia-defense-
spending-new-arms-race-in-south-china-sea.html; and Bruce Einhorn, “Submarines: Asia’s 
Underwater Arms Race,” Bloomberg Business Week, April 24, 2015, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-23/submarines-china-leads-asia-s-
underwater-arms-race.  
10 Strategic behaviour is defined as “behaviour relevant to the threat or use of force for 
political purpose.” See Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation 
of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (January 1999): 50. 
11 Samuel P. Huntington, “Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results,” Public Policy 8, no. 1 
(1958): 42. 
12 See Till, Asia’s Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making?, 31-64. 
13 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 5.  
14 Thomas G. Mahnken, “Thinking about Competitive Strategies,” in Competitive 
Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 5 
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tightly coupled in a didactic pair like competition, and decisions are only 
partially influenced by other actors’ actions.15 
 
All too often these dynamics are grouped together and labeled an “arms race.” 
Relatively little attention is paid to the critical questions of when and why 
armament dynamics become interactive, and if it augments strategic 
competition. Media reporting often fails to recognize that the term “arms race” 
is based on academic understandings and political advocacy debates 
regarding the bipolar relationship between the US and the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War. Yet, the transparency of the bilateral relationship 
between Washington and Moscow was unique due to the extreme 
implications of the use of nuclear technology, and because both sides 
recognized that they were indeed “racing.” For instance, in 1967, John F. 
Kennedy’s State of the Union address argued, “The deadly arms race, and the 
huge resources it absorbs, have long overshadowed all else we must do.” 16 
In 1974, upon Richard Nixon’s return from the Soviet Union he described the 
arms limitation agreements as “another major step towards bringing the arms 
race under control.” 17  Finally, in 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev vowed to “undo the logic of the arms race by working together in 
good faith.”18 The “arms race” paradigm was thus founded on a historically 
unique relationship that we are unlikely to see again.  
 
Moreover, previous scholarly debates on conventional naval “arms races” 
have focused on at least one of these three cases: the construction of 
Dreadnought battle ships in the early twentieth century between Britain and 
Imperial Germany; the development of Japanese, British and American naval 
forces during the 1920s and 1930s; and the build-up of capabilities in the mid- 
to late 1980s in the Asia Pacific, which some analysts called the “new Asian 
                                                
15 Mahnken, “Thinking about Competitive Strategies,” 8. 
16 John F. Kennedy, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 
30, 1961, The American Presidency Project, University of California Santa Barbara, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8045&st=arms+race&st1=.  
17 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on Returning From the Soviet Union,” July 3, 
1974, The American Presidency Project, University of California Santa Barbara, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4288&st=arms+race&st1=.  
18 David K. Shipler, “Reagan and Gorbachev Sign Missile Treaty and Vow to Work for 
Greater Reductions,” The New York Times, December 9, 1987, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/09/politics/09REAG.html?pagewanted=all.  
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arms race.”19 Similarly, military budgets and policy have long been explained 
by the same logic of interest groups and institutions: where rationalists view 
Imperial Germany’s decision to build a powerful navy in the run-up to World 
War I as part of a systemic rivalry with Britain, others regard it as a response 
to domestic lobby groups seeking to link a steel industry facing weak demand 
to military groups wanting bigger budgets.20 These cases, therefore, raise the 
question of whether “arms race” theories can identify “abnormal” strategic 
behavior. Colin Gray, for instance, has argued that the “arms race” is of 
limited theoretical utility since it implies that military modernization has 
gained momentum to the point where policy has lost control. Similarly, Barry 
Buzan and Eric Herring have pointed out that the application of “arms race” 
theories to cases including peacetime military relations between nations 
further weakens the concept’s ability to characterize “abnormally intense 
military competition.” 21  Consequently, in their view, the search for a 
universal “arms race” theory to understand the phenomenon of when 
armament dynamics become competitive, has effectively robbed the concept 
of analytical and practical utility.22 The term “arms race” no longer points to 
a form of strategic behavior with a set of characteristics on which there is 
broad agreement. 
 
Against this background, although this thesis will assess the value of “arms 
race” theories, it is not primarily concerned with whether the process of 
sustained modernization of naval and associated air capabilities in the Asia-
Pacific constitutes an “arms race.” Rather, it focuses on a different set of 
                                                
19 “Asia’s Arms Race,” The Economist, February 20, 1993, 21; Tai Ming Cheung, “Loaded 
Weapons: China in Arms Buying Spree in Former Soviet Union,” Far Eastern Economic 
Review, September 3, 1992, 21; James Clad and Patrick Marshall, “South-East Asia’s Quiet 
Arms Race,” Chicago Tribune, May 23, 1992, 21; Jonathan Sikes, “Asia Put Its Wealth in 
Military,” Washington Times, February 12, 1990, 7. 
20 See Eckart Kehr, Battleship Building and Party Politics in Germany, 1894-1901: A 
Cross Section of the Political, Social, and Ideological Preconditions of German 
Imperialism, trans. Pauline R. Anderson and Eugene N. Anderson, rev. ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1973); James R. Kurth, “The Political Consequences of the 
Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes,” International Organization 33, 
no. 1 (Winter 1979): 1-34; Glenn H. Snyder, “Review: Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” 
International Organization 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 121-142. 
21 Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and 
International Relations (Basingstoke and London: IISS and Macmillan Press, 1987), 72. 
22 This is what Giovanni Sartori defines as “conceptual stretching.” See Giovanni Sartori, 
“Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics,” The American Political Science Review 
64, no. 4 (December 1970): 1033-1053. 
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interrelated questions regarding the arming dynamics in the Asia-Pacific 
between 2001 and 2016. First, why do states choose to react to a perceived 
arms build-up? Second, what are the conditions and catalysts for the sustained 
modernization of capabilities to transition into an interactive dynamic in the 
Asia-Pacific? How does interaction become competitive? 
 
Accordingly, this research investigates the sustained modernization of naval 
and associated air capabilities in the Asia-Pacific (2001-2016) to assess the 
efficacy of “arms race” theories for explaining arming dynamics. It is 
important to note that all military modernization constitutes arming. 
Modernization involves arms acquisitions 23  and/or technical upgrades 
(enhancement or modification) to arms. A country commits to harnessing the 
capability gains that flow from regularly updating the systems on its existing 
platforms because a modern and modernizing defense force can be more 
readily expanded than one operating dated equipment and systems. It is 
within a country’s sovereign right to secure its survival through armaments, 
and this necessitates a process of modernizing its armed forces and reacting 
to changes in the strategic environment. The empirical investigation pays 
particular attention to naval and associated air defense platforms as most arms 
dynamics focus on a single military domain.24 The geography of the Asia-
Pacific, and the related significance of sea-lanes and maritime borders have 
meant the rapid modernization of regional navies over other services. The 
region is largely a maritime theatre, and regional flashpoints involve maritime 
                                                
23 “Acquisition” is interchangeable with the term “procurement” and refers to “more than 
just the purchase of an item or service; the acquisition process encompasses design, 
engineering, construction, testing, deployment, sustainment, and disposal of weapons or 
related items purchased from a contractor.” Moshe Schwartz, “Defense Acquisitions: How 
DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process,” Congressional 
Research Service Report, RL34026 (May 23, 2014): 1. The US Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) states that “acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are 
established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, 
solicitation and selection of source, award of contracts, contract financing, contract 
performance, contract administration, and those technical and management functions 
directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract.” US Department of 
Defense, “Subpart 2.1—Definitions,” Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), No. 2005-94, 
2005-95, last modified January 19, 2017, https://www.acquisition.gov/?q=browsefar. 
24 Sean Bolks and Richard J. Stoll, “The Arms Acquisition Process: The Effects of Internal 
and External Constraints on Arms Race Dynamics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 
5 (2000): 587. 
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territory, features and resources. 25  Moreover, navies have been the 
predominant way to project military power well beyond the borders of a state, 
particularly in maritime Asia.26 Through examining the complexity of the 
current capability developments in the region, this investigation will then 
analyze to what degree the arming dynamics in the region are interactive. 
 
Significance of Research and Objectives 
The primary research question is: how can the sustained modernization of 
naval and associated air capabilities in the Asia-Pacific (2001-2016) be 
explained? The investigation will also address several supplemental questions: 
• Which regional states have invested the most resources in naval and 
associated air capabilities? Which states have achieved significant 
qualitative and quantitative changes in these capabilities? 
• What are the explanations for the increase in naval and associated air 
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific maritime theatre? Are there gaps in 
explanations? 
• Is there a concept or theory that comprehensively explains the 
qualitative and quantitative advancements in capabilities in the Asia-
Pacific? 
 
In addressing these questions, this dissertation aims to make a significant 
theoretical and practical contribution to understanding armament behavior. It 
does not seek to invalidate “arms race” theory, rather it aims to assess the 
utility of “arms race” theories for explanations of the current modernization 
of many of the armed forces in the Asia-Pacific. By understanding the 
motives behind interactive arms dynamics, it pairs the cognitive and 
ideational decision-making processes and rationales of state elites in choosing 
armament policies with their material incentives to secure state survival. 
 
The objective of the dissertation is not theory construction or methodological 
innovation. While it acknowledges the importance and difficulty of these 
                                                
25 Adam P. Liff, “Whither the Balancers: The Case for a Methodological Reset,” Security 
Studies 25, no. 3 (2016): 433.  
26 Bolks and Stoll, “The Arms Acquisition Process,” 589. 
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exercises in the international relations discipline, the dissertation takes a 
strategic studies approach (as outlined in the next section). The results and 
outcomes of the analysis intends to be “useful to the society within which it 
is practiced and possibly to all humankind. It is not a fine art.”27 It further 
acknowledges Hedley Bull’s charge leveled against some strategists that in 
their pursuit of “technical rigor and precision,” many have “lost touch with 
political variety and change,” 28 and strives to do the opposite.  
 
Therefore, the dissertation proposes that a new set of propositions is needed 
to explain the phenomenon of the modernization of an armed force. That 
process encompasses: (1) a state’s decision-making process which in turn, is 
likely to depend on its own goals and its assessment of its potential 
adversary’s goals; (2) the probability that a state’s adversaries can and will 
respond to a buildup; (3) the impact of a mutual buildup on the state’s ability 
to achieve its own objectives (to deter, defend and/or attack); (4) the impact 
of a strategic competition on a states’ relationships, whether it achieves its 
objectives or simply adds tension; and (5) how the anticipated changes over 
time in a state’s ability to compete, influences its current arming behavior.29 
In addition, the dissertation makes a practical contribution to understanding 
naval and associated air modernization in key Asia-Pacific countries, and the 
factors that make these programs interactive. Stemming from understandings 
of the 19th and 20th century naval competition and the Cold War nuclear “arms 
race,” arming dynamics are often labeled as “lethal,” “dangerous,” and 
destabilizing to a security order. However, often the decision to arm is a 
decision to maintain a favorable balance of power, and not to maximize a 
state’s power and achieve absolute and/or relative gains. To label the 
contemporary arming dynamics in the Asia-Pacific as an “arms race” is 
inaccurate and misleading, and could be damaging if policy-makers embrace 
it. 
 
                                                
27 Colin S. Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture” (Report 
Prepared for the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts 
Office, October 31, 2006), 3.  
28 Hedley Bull, “Strategic Studies and Its Critics,” World Politics 20, no. 4 (July 1968): 
600. 
29 Charles L. Glaser, “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 3, no. 1 (2000): 266. 
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Theoretical Approach 
The dissertation adopts a strategic studies approach as it investigates both 
material and ideational influences on decisions to arm, which is essentially a 
strategic behavior (defined here as behavior relevant to the threat or use of 
force for political purposes).30 Strategic studies deals with “how states and 
other political actors utilize force to advance their wider objectives, how their 
interactions become heated, and how these violent confrontations might be 
shaped”; 31  with particular emphasis on “the interaction between self-
interested actors engaged in the politics of force.”32 This approach traces back 
to the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum on the enduring 
political nature of war, and thus the “political origins, applications, and 
implications of organized violence in times of both war and peace.” 33 
Although the unit of analysis is the state, a state’s strategic assessment to arm 
involves the intersection of international and domestic processes. The focus 
on politics underlines the importance of also understanding the domestic 
preferences and institutions that shape state behavior. The study recognizes 
that the balance of power and intensity of substantive disagreements between 
political and military leaders can differ significantly across and within states, 
over time. Therefore, geostrategic concerns and internal dynamics are not 
mutually exclusive—states and leaders do not exist in a vacuum—and both 
influence strategic behavior. 
 
This approach adopts several assumptions from the broad realist school of 
thought. However, the author acknowledges Hedley Bull’s argument that the 
discipline of international relations (“behavioralists”) has “done a great 
disservice to theory in this field by conceiving of it as a construction of and 
manipulation of so called models.” 34  The state is a unitary actor in an 
anarchical system but is also influenced by domestic political forces such as, 
                                                
30 Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” 50.  
31 Robert Ayson, “Strategic Studies,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, 
ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 558. 
32 Ayson, “Strategic Studies,” 558. 
33 The nexus between politics and war is a key assumption of the strategic studies approach. 
See Ayson, “Strategic Studies,” 559. 
34 The strategic studies approach does not seek to create a theory through formal models, 
but to understand international relations through detailed observation and interpretation, 
similar to the English School. See Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a 
Classical Approach,” World Politics 18, no. 3 (1966): 375. 
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public opinion, the legislature and privileged interest groups.35 The analysis 
thus “incorporates both external and internal variables,” arguing that state 
behavior is driven “first and foremost by its place in the international system 
and specifically by relative material power capabilities … however the impact 
of such power capabilities on foreign [and security] policy is indirect and 
complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening 
variables at the unit level.”36 It is understood that decision-makers of foreign 
and security policy are “Janus-faced, existing at the intersection of the 
international and the domestic,” and such a condition can either constrain or 
enable decision-making and state behavior.37 More importantly, it recognizes 
that “there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material 
capabilities to foreign [and security] policy behavior.” 38  As Aaron L. 
Friedberg argues, “there would seem to be strong logical and historical 
reasons for questioning the explanatory and predictive power of theories that 
move directly from international structures to state behavior.”39 Ideas and 
values matter as much as interests, therefore the actions of states are not fully 
“rational” and utility-maximizing.40  
 
The decision to arm involves the preparation for war and assessments of the 
state’s relative capabilities. States are unitary actors in an anarchic system, 
resorting to self-help and the accrual of power to ensure state survival. Power 
may comprise anything that “establishes and maintains the control of man 
over man … [and] covers all social relationships which serve that end, from 
physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind 
controls another.” 41  States are motivated by fear, self-help and power 
                                                
35 Norrin M. Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” in 
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. 
Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 170. 
36 Gideon Rose, “Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World 
Politics 51, no.1 (October 1998): 146. 
37 Steven E. Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical 
Realist Model” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. 
Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 43.  
38 Rose, “Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 146-147. 
39 Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 
1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 7.  
40 Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist 
Model of Grand Strategy Formation,” Review of International Studies 36 (2010): 122-123. 
41 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. 
(Boston: McGraw Hill, 1993), 11. 
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maximization in their search for survival42 and states’ knowledge of others’ 
motives is based on the information communicated by their international 
policies. Moreover, the decisions to acquire or enhance arms are considered 
one of a state’s three basic options to achieve its objectives in an anarchic 
international system, aside from winning allies and cooperating with the 
adversary to reduce threats.43 As Nicholas Spykman has argued,  
 
…in a world of international anarchy, foreign policy must aim above all at the 
improvement or at least the preservation of the relative power position of the state. 
Power is in the last instance the ability to wage successful war, and in geography lie 
the clues to the problems of military and political strategy.44 
 
Here, the security dilemma is significant—that is, the assumption that the 
measures one state takes to increase its own security decreases the security of 
other states—as it explains how states can have fundamentally compatible 
political goals yet can still end up in arms competition.45  As John Herz 
observed,  
 
…striving to attain security from … attack, [states] are driven to acquire more and 
more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, 
renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since 
none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power 
competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is 
on.46  
 
States are concerned about the distribution of material capabilities in other 
states, relative to their own, and this creates uncertainty over whether a 
potential adversary is motived by security concerns or by more expansive 
aims.47 This environment creates uncertainty, and the incentives to bluff and 
                                                
42 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York and London: W. 
W. Norton, 2001), 32.  
43 Glaser, “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races,” 252. 
44 Colin S Gray, “Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 6 (2015): 873-897; and Nicholas J. Spykman, 
America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power, rev. ed. 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 41. 
45 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 
(1978): 169. 
46 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, 
no. 2 (January 1950): 157.  
47 Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 
192. 
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exaggerate capabilities or resolve, increases the risk of competition as 
anarchy makes it difficult for states to compel honest answers from one 
another except through the threat or imposition of harm.48  
 
The key variables that influence whether a state can use force to achieve its 
political objectives, is not only power but also domestic factors that determine 
the nature and magnitude of the security dilemma. Despite systemic pressures 
on states to seek survival in an anarchical system of self-help, state behavior 
and interaction is also motivated by domestic determinants.49 Domestic and 
international variables are interdependent. As Robert Putnam has put it, 
statesmen are strategically positioned between two “tables”: one representing 
domestic politics and the other international negotiation—strategic behavior 
is constrained simultaneously by what other states accept and what domestic 
constituencies will ratify. 50 For instance, the armed forces and the defense 
industrial base in a number of Asia-Pacific countries are both symbols of 
national prestige, as well as major employers of local workforces, which 
further complicates and amplifies the influence of domestic politics on the 
military modernization process. These bureaucratic-politics processes also 
encompass psychological factors, notably the misperceptions that occur at 
both the individual and national levels. 51  Cognitive errors and 
misinterpretation of the international system (due to for instance, incomplete 
information), can lead to reactive or competitive behavior. 
 
To further understand the decision-making process behind the use of force, 
the approach is further informed by understandings of strategic culture. That 
the strategic behavior of states is deeply informed by culture, ideas, values, 
beliefs and emotions has been a prominent idea since the political thought of 
                                                
48 Eric Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 
(January 2007): 173.  
49 See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 4, no. 1 (2001):  391-416. 
50 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,” 
International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-460. 
51 See Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, rev. ed. (Columbia: 
Columbia University Press, 1989); and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
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Herodotus, Thucydides and Machiavelli. 52  As Bernard Brodie argued, 
“Whether with respect to arms control or otherwise, good strategy presumes 
good anthropology and sociology. Some of the greatest military blunders of 
all times have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department.”53 Here, 
strategic culture is defined as 
 
the sum total of ideas, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual 
behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through 
instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to [nuclear] strategy. 
In the area of strategy, habitual behavior is largely cognitive behavior.54 
 
This informs the preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific 
to a strategic environment—that is, a particular geographically based security 
community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience.55 This 
enables examination of the dominant ideational frames of reference that are 
prevalent in key Asia-Pacific states.56 As Colin Gray argues, in understanding 
Clausewitz’s dictum57—that “war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy 
to do our will,”—“will” must also be defined. Clausewitz defines “will” as a 
“moral quality.”58 As the objective of war is 
 
not usually to destroy the enemy physically, rather is it to subordinate his will to 
ours … coercion and deterrence, are all intercultural struggles. They are contests 
between independent wills, the content and strength of which are very much, though 
not exclusively, the products of culture … Rational choice has difficulty with 
powerful feelings. Culture, cultural understanding or its lack, is apt to be the key to 
deterrence success or failure.59 
 
                                                
52 Ashley J. Tellis, “Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific,” in Strategic Asia 
2016-17: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison 
Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Washington DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 
2016), 7.  
53 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 332. 
54 Jack L. Snyder, “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear 
Operations,” RAND Project Air Force Report R-2145-AF (September 1977), 8.  
55 Strategic culture is a significant concept for the interpretation of state behavior in the 
strategic studies approach. See Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” 51.  
56 Tellis, “Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific,” 11. 
57 Gray, “Out of the Wilderness,” 16.  
58 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 184. 
59 Gray, “Out of the Wilderness,” 16.  
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However, this does not mean the material and geopolitical dimensions are 
subordinate to understandings of strategic culture. Rather, the approach pays 
attention to both the subjective political and ideological purposes that 
motivate the use of organized violence, as well as understanding material 
capabilities and the operational demands placed on them.60 Peter Paret has 
noted that “strategic thought is inevitably highly pragmatic. It is dependent 
on the realities of geography, society, economics, and politics, as well as on 
other, often fleeting factors that give rise to the issues and conflicts war is 
meant to resolve.”61 Strategic studies allows examination of the strategic 
behavior that drives interactive arming and what causes states to compete in 
the realm of force, and thus can evaluate the basic assumption that states 
strengthen their armaments purely because of perceived threats from other 
states.62 
 
Methodology 
The dissertation acknowledges as indispensable existing quantitative studies 
assessing the distribution of weapon platforms and capabilities across states 
in the Asia-Pacific. However, it argues that earlier studies have not only 
neglected internal impulses, but also the motivations that derive from states’ 
strategic and political objectives. In this study, explanations for armaments 
are examined using a comparative case-study analysis of existing datasets 
supplemented by new empirical material. First, the empirical study analyzes 
data available on naval and associated air modernization to build a 
comparison, and to assess general trends from 1995-2016 of the largest and 
most technologically sophisticated navies of the Asia-Pacific.Although the 
study examines the period since 2001, the period of 1995-2000 has also been 
included to enable comparison of the effect of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial 
Crisis on the modernization of regional navies. Data is extracted from primary 
sources on defense budgets and expenditures, as well as the International 
Institute of Strategic Studies’ annual The Military Balance, the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute’s Military Expenditure Database and 
                                                
60 See Robert Ayson, “Strategic Studies,” 567. 
61 Cited in Ayson, “Strategic Studies,” 567. 
62 Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder: Lynne 
Reiner, 1998), 83. 
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Arms Transfer Database, and the US Department of State’s World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers. 63  A dataset specific to this study is 
compiled based on these sources to provide as objectively as possible, the 
evolution of naval-air capabilities of regional states.  
 
A comparative analysis of military expenditure data and counts of weapons 
platforms allows a broad comparison capabilities and assess general trends. 
This uses a combination of two metrics to illustrate and understand regional 
trends. First, weapon platform counts—accounting for the types of surface 
combatants, submarines and aircraft that states possess—as a measure of 
naval power. Second, this is compared with military expenditures to 
determine and compare the modernization cycles of regional countries. Using 
military expenditure data to track weapons stocks provides a broader picture 
of trends. However, it is important to remain aware of the limitations of using 
data on military expenditure.64 It is obvious, for example, that significant 
parts of military expenditure are allocated to areas other than procurement, 
operations and maintenance (O&M), and research and development (R&D). 
Moreover, the activities covered by official military expenditure data can vary 
significantly; there is no internationally agreed definition.65 Other problems 
with the use of military expenditures as a measure involve the comparison of 
expenditures among different economic systems or economic policies, and 
the question of whether states engage in deliberate deception about the level 
of their expenditure.66 Using total military expenditures implies competition 
occurs across the whole military domain, whereas most arms competitions 
feature only a single service—the type of military force with which they are 
best able to harm each other.67 Unfortunately, reliable data on how military 
expenditure is distributed across the various functions—salaries, fuel, 
                                                
63 See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, (London: IISS & 
Routledge), http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance/issues; Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Project (Stockholm: 
SIPRI), http://portal.sipri.org/publications/pages/expenditures/splash-expenditures; and 
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers, Washington DC: US Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/. 
64 Charles H. Anderton, “Arms Race Modeling: Problems and Prospects,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 33, no. 2 (1989): 352. 
65 Bolks and Stoll, “The Arms Acquisition Process,” 586. 
66 Bolks and Stoll, “The Arms Acquisition Process,” 587. 
67 Huntington, “Arms Races,” 55. 
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procurement, research and so on—is virtually non-existent for most states. It 
must also be noted that military expenditure and economic data are provided 
for indicative measures only, and is used to ascertain general trends of the 
region. It does not imply causation. Additionally, military expenditure data—
for instance, levels, trends and share of GDP—can trigger or support useful 
inferences about what has been going on inside a particular country. On the 
other hand, to rely on such data to make international comparisons is a good 
deal more problematic. It should not be surprising that there has yet to be a 
single study using military expenditure data that has proven the existence of 
an “arms race” in the sense of the phenomenon characterized in the 
international relations arms race theory. 
 
Second, a comparative case study analysis is conducted to test the theoretical 
predictions, investigate the causes, and explain the trends and the 
development of the largest and most technologically sophisticated navies in 
the Asia-Pacific as demonstrated in the data analysis. Due to the breadth of 
the region, cases were chosen on the basis of which actors have been (most 
widely identified as) participating in a regional “naval arms race”; and where 
this could be most readily corroborated in terms of the acquisition of 
sophisticated quantitative and qualitative naval and associated air capabilities. 
This process suggested five essential case studies: the US, China, Japan, 
South Korea and Vietnam. Case study analysis uses the comparative-case 
method and process-tracing, which is well-suited for studying complex 
phenomena over a set timeframe—specifically, the decision-making process 
regarding military modernization—where the number of cases is small and 
existing theories are not well articulated.68 This is the basis for investigating 
the empirical puzzle of the key driving factors for these armaments, and how 
they have interacted to produce the regional phenomenon labeled as an “arms 
race” in the Asia-Pacific. The empirical investigation follows the style of a 
                                                
68 See Alexander George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of 
Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and 
Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 95-124; James Mahoney 
and P. Larkin Terrie, “Comparative Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political 
Science,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, eds. Janet M. Box-
Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 737-755; and Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1985). 
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narrative, which Lawrence Freedman has called, “compelling story lines 
which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be 
drawn,” with the intent of “structuring the responses of others to developing 
events. They are strategic because they do not arise spontaneously but are 
deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are 
already current.”69 
 
It must be noted that the research does not aim to build a universal theory of 
an “arms race” or build a measure of “naval power.”70 It does not employ 
formal modeling given that past studies have exposed the weak explanatory 
power of this approach.71 Rather, it aims to develop a new framework for 
understanding interactive arming premised on investigating the specific 
conditions of the Asia-Pacific since 2001. This is because a quantitative 
analysis examining correlations between the dependent and independent 
variables is not conducted. A quantitative analysis is premised on the 
assumption that all, or a sufficiency, of these variables can be adequately 
quantified, and the author’s judgment is that this is not the case. 
 
Understanding Military Capability 
Significant to understanding arming is the evaluation of military capability, 
which is the more pertinent indicator of a state’s strategic objectives and 
interests than defense spending data. The term has been used liberally in the 
academic discourse72 since Kenneth N. Waltz emphasized that states in an 
anarchic system are distinguished by the gradation of material capabilities, 
and that power is estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units 
                                                
69 Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 379 
(London: IISS and Routledge, 2006), 22.  
70 See Brian Crisher and Mark Souva, “Power At Sea: A Naval Power Dataset, 1865-2011” 
and “Naval Data Project,” http://www.briancrisher.net/naval-data-project/.  
71 See Colin S. Gray, “The Arms Race is about Politics,” Foreign Policy 9 (1972), 121; 
Colin S. Gray, “The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing,” World Politics 6, no. 
2 (January 1974): 207; and Kendall D. Moll and Gregory M. Luebbert, “Arms Race and 
Military Expenditure Models: A Review,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 
(March 1980): 160-161. 
72 See for instance, Charles L. Glaser and Chairn Kaufmann, “What is the Offense-defense 
Balance and How Can we Measure It?” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 44-82; and 
Frank W. Wayman, J. David Singer and Gary Goertz, “Capabilities, Allocations, and 
Success in Militarized Disputes and Wars, 1816-1976,” International Studies Quarterly 27, 
no. 4 (1983): 497-515. 
18 
 
(states).73 The results of the empirical study reveal that the indices of military 
capabilities is often an index, numerical count or comparison of the numbers 
of weapons platforms. Much of the work on “arming” acknowledges the 
significance of understanding military capabilities because they can be 
understood as an index of power. Military capabilities are the best yardstick 
to gauge the level of threat from other states and can contribute to inferring 
intentions. David Baldwin, for instance, argued that “any statement about a 
state’s capabilities is based on a prediction about which other actors can be 
affected in which ways.”74 Robert Jervis observed that “the most obvious way 
for states to judge whether others are a threat would be by monitoring their 
capabilities.”75  
 
However, there is little understanding of what exactly defines military 
capabilities. How to assess quantitative and qualitative capabilities? Which 
criteria are best to assess the respective merits of platforms? Understanding 
military capabilities requires an understanding of what a state can do with its 
weapons platforms, as opposed to simple indices of military expenditure and 
weapons counts. As Harold and Margaret Sprout argued, “such data acquires 
political relevance and significance only when related to some frame of 
assumptions as to what is to be undertaken or attempted in what operational 
contingencies.” 76  Adam P. Liff has further argued that many studies on 
China’s rapid growth and military modernization rely on the “often inaccurate 
belief that military power is best measured by the most easily quantifiable, 
conspicuous metrics: that larger numbers necessarily indicate greater 
warfighting capability, and fewer, less.”77 
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Moreover, according to Waltz, “states have different combinations of 
capabilities which are difficult to measure and compare, the more so since the 
weight to be assigned to different items changes with time.”78 Stephen Biddle 
has defined “military capability” as the “ability to succeed at an assigned 
mission.”79 Capabilities are an index of a state’s national power, and because 
states exist in an environment where both internal and external threats to 
security are common, the ultimate measure of power is the effectiveness of a 
state’s armed forces and its coercive abilities. 80  Therefore, military 
capabilities cannot be separated from questions of intent, but must also be 
assessed with regard to the economic and political potential of the state. 
Military power on the other hand “expresses and implements the power of the 
state in a variety of ways within and beyond the state borders, and is also one 
of the instruments with which political power is originally created and made 
permanent.”81  
 
Measuring military capability therefore focuses on which elements are 
necessary for the creation and employment of an effective force—it is 
premised on the understanding that a state’s military organization receives 
national resources and transforms them into warfighting capabilities. The US 
Department of Defense outlines military capability as consisting of four 
pillars:82 
1. Readiness: the ability of the military forces, units, weapon systems 
or equipment to deliver the output for which they are designed in 
peacetime and at the outset of hostilities. It is measured in terms 
of manning, equipping and training the force, and is defined to 
include the force’s ability to mobilize, deploy and employ without 
unacceptable delays. 
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2. Sustainability: the staying power of military forces, or how long 
the forces can continue to fight. It involves the ability to resupply 
engaged forces during combat operations and is sometimes 
measured in terms of the estimated number of fighting days for 
which supplies are available. 
3. Modernization: The technical sophistication of forces, units, 
weapon systems and equipment. It can include new acquisitions 
and/or modification, depending on the service. Assessments of 
modernization may compare new types of equipment with the 
items they replaced, or may compare equipment in one state’s 
inventory with that of potential adversary forces. 
4. Force structure: the numbers, size and composition of units 
constituting the military forces. It is usually described as numbers 
of divisions, ships, air wings and the like. 
 
Effective military capability is derived from the ability to translate national 
resources (for instance, fiscal, and manpower) into military power. This is no 
easy task. For instance, a state may have generous budgets and a large surplus 
of manpower, but if the doctrine is misguided, the training ineffective, and 
leadership missing, military capability suffers.83 Therefore the measures of 
military capability outlined here are what Biddle calls “input measures”: they 
focus on understanding what goes into making an effective military capability, 
and how such effectiveness can be compared across states without a 
predictive analysis of how hypothetical force-on-force encounters would turn 
out in practice.84 
 
However, this does not make military capability easily quantifiable. With 
regards to readiness and sustainability, it remains a question of how much 
logistics, manpower, maintenance, training and testing is needed to obtain a 
desired level that produces the greatest amount of capability. With regard to 
force structure and modernization, states have to choose which weapon 
systems and platforms to modernize, how many to buy, as well as deciding 
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on the optimal force structure to develop an integrated force to enhance 
capability.85 Assessing the number and respective merits of platforms is only 
one part of assessing capabilities, and is not easily understood through pure 
indices of military expenditure. For instance, the capability of a navy does not 
depend simply on the volume of ship construction, acquisitions or 
enhancements. The time ships remain in the fleet also has significant 
implications for force structure and overall capability. Studies examining 
military modernization often do not take the life cycle of weapons platforms 
into account. For instance, a 2013 CSIS report on The Evolving Military 
Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia lists key force upgrades, 
modernization plans and procurements. However, these aggregate totals for 
each year do not detail when weapons platforms have to be upgraded.86 When 
countries acquire and modernize aircraft, submarines or surface combatants 
to maintain a certain level of capability, this often creates the impression of 
an increase in armaments, and even that a state is competing both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. However, it must be recognized that most 
developed countries with established militaries sustain a continual cycle of 
military modernization not only to avoid disruptive surges and troughs in the 
state budget but also to protect the status of being a country that is serious 
about defending its sovereignty and other core interests. 
 
Tracing military modernization is even more difficult. If technology and 
innovation remained static, military services would face the straightforward 
task of simply replacing old weapons only when they wore out. Yet, due to 
the complex technologies involved, any modernization process also takes a 
temporary, but potentially significant, toll on readiness and sustainability, as 
well as on the procurement budget.87 For instance, purchases of important 
systems or components which may easily cost tens of billions of dollars will 
set in motion a series of ripple effects as operators, maintenance crews, and 
logistic pipelines attempt to integrate something new and different to provide 
a coherent force structure.  
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Moreover, as technologies mature, performance improvements occur more 
slowly and at higher cost, therefore states could feel tempted to modernize 
less frequently. Modernization must therefore balance the need to move 
quickly in order to capture a technology’s full benefits with the need to move 
slowly in order to make strategic decisions. Uncertainty at the strategic level 
makes it essential to modernize systematically and judiciously—a balance 
between neither rushing the process on the premise that a threat demands it 
which can prove costly, nor passing up the chance to modernize until 
information confirms the wisdom of doing so.88  
 
Structure 
The research is conducted in three parts. First, the study examines the key 
literature on “arms racing,” military competition and military modernization. 
It investigates both the qualitative and quantitative literature on the “arms race” 
phenomenon and evaluates whether it is a useful paradigm for understanding 
armament dynamics. It then provides a new framework for understanding 
arming dynamics, that goes beyond the “arms race” and “arms competition” 
theories, called “interactive arming.” Second, it conducts a comparative case 
study analysis which evaluates the motivations, overall scale and principal 
characteristics of the modernization of naval and associated air capabilities of 
the largest and most modern navies in the Asia-Pacific: the United States in 
the Western Pacific, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the 
Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam (Vietnam). It identifies the significant causes that have contributed 
to country-specific build-ups and modernization of weapons platforms, and 
to what degree these programs interact with external factors. This empirical 
section draws from primary sources—such as defense policies, declaratory 
statements and military expenditure—to understand the multitude of material 
and ideational explanations that contribute to military modernization. It also 
ascertains how military modernization programs become interactive, and 
which key drivers of military modernization influence and augment strategic 
competition. The final part of the study summarizes the results of the 
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empirical investigation into the explanations behind armaments in the Asia-
Pacific (2001-2016). In doing so, it argues for the significance of the strategic 
studies school of thought in understanding armament decisions, and the use 
of force. It then provides cases and avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2: 
Arms Racing Theory 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in detail the scholarship on the 
“arms race” concept to determine its utility for analyzing contemporary 
arming in the Asia-Pacific region. First, it begins with a short history of the 
concept’s evolution in strategic debate before introducing different 
definitions and characteristics of what might constitute an “arms race.” This 
is followed by, second, a critique of the concept’s use in both the qualitative 
and quantitative literature. The third section argues that the “arms race” label 
in current debate has often impeded clear analytical thinking about the 
relationship between a state’s strategy and its armament decisions.1 This 
critique supports the rationale that a more comprehensive analysis of the 
drivers behind armament dynamics is needed, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. 
Therefore, lastly, informed by the critique of the “arms race” literature, the 
chapter proposes six key hypotheses to be tested across the case studies. 
 
A Short History 
Throughout history, states secured their survival by means of military 
strength. The concept of military competition in which the military 
preparations of two states are directly related and interact has been a constant 
aspect of interstate rivalry. It is as Thucydides stated several millennia ago in 
his classic account of the Peloponnesian War, “the real cause, however, I 
consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth 
of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war 
inevitable.”2 
 
The term “arms race” has its roots in scholarship attempting to understand 
arming dynamics between states and coalitions leading up to the First and 
Second World War, as well as the Cold War bipolar US-Soviet relationship. 
                                                
1 Buzan and Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, 75. 
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“Arms racing” has come to serve two primary functions: first, as an analytical 
concept to explain and identify abnormal strategic behavior between states. 
Second, as a political advocacy tool to influence political debate and 
armaments decisions. The conventional arms build-up by France and the 
British Commonwealth between 1840 and 1866 is widely considered the first 
competition in armaments in the modern era.3 Continuing into the 1880s, both 
France and Great Britain continued to improve their arsenals of revolvers, 
rifles, machine-guns, guns and howitzers, engaging in a qualitative 
competition to increase the speed of fire, the accuracy of aim, range, weight 
and explosive force of the projectiles. From 1884 onwards not only did the 
number of warships increase, but crucial qualitative characteristics—size and 
speed, the caliber and range of guns and protective belts of armor—also 
evolved rapidly. Yet, the first recorded use of the term “arms race” dates to 
March 20, 1894 in the British House of Commons, when Radical MP, 
William Randal Cremer, decried large increases in the navy’s budget as a 
“mad race of naval expenditures.” 4  Victorian liberals and their socialist 
counterparts in Western Europe “saw excessive arms expenditure as a tragic 
diversion of wealth away from social goods and productive investments and 
as symptomatic of the twin evils of militarism and authoritarianism and the 
excesses of capitalism and imperialism.”5 
 
By the early twentieth century the term “arms race” became popular in the 
media and scholarly debate to describe competitive naval arming dynamics 
between Britain and Wilhelmine Germany, particularly the frenzied 
construction of the Dreadnoughts, and later super-Dreadnoughts, which 
continued until the outbreak of World War I in August 1914. 6 Although the 
British were the first to commence building of Dreadnought battleships, it 
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was German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s perceived intentions that led to 
strategic competition between Germany and the British Empire.7 The German 
construction of Dreadnoughts was rendering obsolescent the seventy-five 
pre-Dreadnought British battleships and armored cruisers, which in turn led 
to England constructing Dreadnoughts to restore its primacy at sea. In 1908, 
the Kaiser wrote to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Tweedmouth: 
“Admiral Fisher and the Press had at once announced that [the Dreadnought] 
was capable of sinking the whole German Navy. These statements had forced 
the German government to begin building ships of a similar type, to satisfy 
public opinion.”8 The First and Second German Navy Laws that doubled 
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s fleet was constantly defended by Tirpitz and the 
Kaiser as not building against Britain, but necessary to guard the German 
Empire’s coasts and colonies. 9  The British Empire, responded to the 
challenge by launching a naval build-up to restore the balance in its favor.10 
As well, the introduction of the submarine and the appreciation that it would 
have a major impact on the exercise of naval power meant that both the Triple 
Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) and the Triple Entente (the 
United Kingdom, France and Russia) expanded their submarine fleets as 
swiftly as possible.11 
 
In the retrospective search for the causes of World War I, Lord Grey of 
Fallodon highlighted what is now called “the security dilemma.” He argued, 
 
The moral is obvious; it is that great armaments lead inevitably to war. If there are 
armaments on one side, there must be armaments on other sides … While one nation 
arms, other nations cannot tempt it to aggression by remaining defenceless. 
Armaments must have equipment; armies cannot be of use without strategic 
railways. Each measure taken by one nation is noted, and leads to counter-measures 
by others. The increase of armaments that is intended in each nation to produce 
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consciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. 
On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a 
sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till 
each government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to 
take every precaution, while every government regards every precaution of every 
other government as evidence of hostile intent. 12 
 
Thus, naval development focused on tactical improvements and hardware—
high-technology machines of war—as opposed to relying on “tried and true 
strategies and tactics of the past.”13 The result was a growing adherence to 
so-called “technological determinism,” for instance, the belief that weapons 
determined strategy rather than the reverse and that lessons learned from 
historical experiences were of limited value. Quantitative measures rather 
than qualitative considerations defined naval policy: numbers, sizes, speeds, 
tonnage, defensive armor, range, accuracy and striking power of guns. 
Dreadnoughts, Super-dreadnoughts, cruisers, destroyers and submarines 
increased in both power and numbers. Technology transformed warships so 
rapidly that navies had to keep pace through constant discussion, evaluation, 
and changes in weapons, ship design and training. 14  This technological 
determinism led to a reactive process of developing “miracle weapons” that 
presumably could neutralize the force of battleships—notably underwater 
mines and automotive torpedoes. 15 
 
Major advances in aircraft technology in the interwar period transformed the 
air arm into a much more potent weapon of war. Aircraft made naval vessels 
easier to detect and destroy, and resulted in the replacement of the battleship 
with the aircraft carrier as the key to naval power and sea control. Air power 
enabled states to inflict significant damage from a distance. In the early years 
of World War II, the German Wehrmacht combined land mobility and air 
power highly effectively in the context of its “blitzkrieg” tactics. The 
spectacular success of blitzkrieg for gaining a tactical advantage intensified 
the quest among all war parties both for qualitative improvements in weapons 
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and related equipment and for decisive new synergies between these 
capabilities.16 This also meant that qualitative and quantitative increases in 
armaments focused on joint operations and contingencies. That is, to retain 
dominance over the maritime theatre, both naval and associated air power was 
required. The two treaties of the 1921-1922 Washington Naval Conference—
primarily focused on the navies of the US, the UK and Japan (although China, 
France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Belgium were also participants; 
and the USSR was not invited)—aimed to avoid conflict in the Asia-Pacific 
through battleship and carrier tonnage quotas and gun restrictions. 17  It 
attempted to “freeze” the geostrategic balance of power in the Pacific: Britain 
in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific; the US in the Hawaiian, Philippine 
and Aleutian Island groups and Guam and Wake; and Japan in the Central 
Pacific Islands and Formosa (Taiwan).18 Although an arms control agreement 
was reached, it did not alleviate mutual suspicions and tensions. To the 
contrary, the US, the UK and Japan increasingly sought technologically 
sophisticated ships to replace obsolescent ones.19 Particular emphasis was 
placed on developing and building aircraft carriers, which the American and 
Japanese navies converted from battle cruiser and battleship hulls —
modernization which remained within the terms of the treaties.20 The US, 
Great Britain and Japan also continued to develop defense doctrine and fortify 
their respective spheres of influence.21 
 
Yet, despite the conventional arms build-up in the 19th and 20th century, “arms 
race” theories are most strongly and widely associated with the Cold War 
bipolar conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. The evolution of 
armaments dynamics on both sides between the late 1940s and late 1980s led 
to the “arms race” concept as an analytical explanation for both the increases 
in arms and changes in the levels of technological sophistication.22 The study 
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of the nuclear build-up “became more systematic [but] without losing any of 
the passion and sense of urgency” that characterized the explanations of the 
arms build-ups in World War I and World War II.23 By the 1950s, both 
superpowers on average spent eight percent or more of their Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) on armaments. Between 1982 and 1986, the Soviet defense 
expenditure had increased to some 14 percent of GDP.24 Yet although the US 
was also spending approximately six percent, it was consistently more 
effective in leveraging new technology. This arming dynamic was unique in 
that both Washington and Moscow also identified that their nuclear weapons 
programs were “racing.” 25  This resulted in the superpowers exchanging 
information about their nuclear forces, installing the Hot Line, accepting 
strategic surveillance by national means, and eventually negotiating arms 
control agreements that codified and secured the strategic balance even 
more.26 This period of “strategic stability”27 was unique—it was a form of 
parity based on the acknowledgement of both sides’ strategic forces having a 
function of war prevention.28 The notion that a stable military balance would 
result in a safer world and that quantitative increases in the level of missiles 
added nothing to deterrence, constituted a great leap forward in the world of 
the strategist. 29  With regards to nuclear capabilities, a stalemate was a 
reasonable objective. 
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In the post-Cold War era, attempts to understand strategic behavior—in 
particular the link between arms and policy, and peacetime increases in 
military expenditure—led to the re-application of the term “arms race” to a 
number of cases and stripping the concept of its Cold War connotations.30 
However, this broad-sweeping application to include rather placid military 
relations—in a deliberate attempt to devise a universal theory of the “arms 
race”—meant that the concept even lost its ability to deal with “abnormally 
intense military competition.”31 Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
there was emphasis on the Asia-Pacific where superpower disengagement, 
the rise of China, booming local economies, the demand of Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) and a wealth of territorial disputes provided fertile 
ground for naval modernization.32 Indeed, since rapid growth in economic 
power of regional countries enabled investment in military potential and 
expenditure, many observers argued that a “new regional arms race” in the 
Asia-Pacific was occurring.33  
 
However, the emphasis on military expenditure as the key measure for an 
“arms race”—which became entrenched after World War II—meant that 
distinguishing characteristics, such as the changing balance of power and 
greater demands for self-reliance, were overlooked. Here, “self-reliance” 
means: 
 
Obviously, no country, including the superpowers, is truly self-reliant in the 
rigorous sense of the word. All countries are part of an increasingly interdependent 
global system. They require resources from outside their borders and are affected 
by external actions over which they have little direct control. Nevertheless, the term 
self-reliant … is far from meaningless. It indicates a national will to depend as little 
as possible on external decisions and resources in matters of national defense and 
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internal security. A self-reliant nation, regardless of its internal social organization 
or ideology, intrinsically contributes to a world order congenial with US interests. 
It does so not only by remaining independent of our potential enemies, but also by 
not being interested in becoming our client and thus a burdensome drain on our 
resources and often an albatross in the constantly changing international political 
community.34 
 
When the Asian Financial Crisis led to a temporarily halt of many military 
modernization programs it quickly became even more clear that there was no 
regional “arms race.” Yet by 2001, both quantitative and qualitative increases 
in armaments, particularly in Northeast Asia, had resumed and triggered a 
renewed debate about whether the region was now indeed witnessing a 21st 
century “arms race.” This was despite the fact that in many regional countries, 
military expenditure only rose modestly, if at all. For most regional countries 
(the PRC being the sole exception) raw military expenditure indices in the 
past two decades would deny the existence of competitive arming or an “arms 
race.” This highlights the danger of “solitary reliance on any single metric” 
and a tendency to “conclude from quantitative decreases (or increases) in 
numbers of personnel or weapons platforms that states must be first, reducing 
(or enhancing) their military capabilities and therefore; and second do not (or 
do) perceive an external threat.”35  Instead, military expenditure must be 
considered alongside “strategic context, [and] qualitative characteristics of 
the specific unit/platform in question.”36 
 
“Arms Racing”: Definitions and Characteristics 
How has scholarship approached the “arms race” theory? The first thing to 
note is that, as originally formulated, the qualifications for an “arms race” are 
extremely demanding. Samuel Huntington’s article, “Arms Races: 
Prerequisites and Results” is accepted as among the core expositions of the 
theory. has provided the most influential contribution. According to 
Huntington, an arms race is 
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Reliance: U.S. Security Assistance to the Third World Under the Nixon Doctrine,” A Report 
prepared for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, R-1092-ARPA (June 1973), 3. 
35 Liff, “Whither the Balancers?,” 433. 
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…a progressive, competitive, peacetime increase in armaments by two states or 
coalition of states resulting from conflicting purposes or mutual fears. An arms race 
is thus a form of reciprocal interaction between two states or coalitions. A race 
cannot exist without an increase in arms, quantitatively or qualitatively, but every 
peacetime increase in arms is not necessarily the result of an arms race. A nation 
may expand its armaments for the domestic purposes of aiding industry or curbing 
unemployment, or because it believes an absolute need exists for such an increase 
regardless of the actions of other states.37 
 
In similar vein, Colin Gray elaborates on the conditions for an arms race, 
emphasizing the political dynamics involved, and that multiple actors can be 
involved: 
 
There should be two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary 
relationship, which are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and 
structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, 
current, and anticipated military and political behavior of other parties.38 
 
He also points to a critical differentiation between quantitative and qualitative 
arms races since the former are “commonly held to be more dangerous to 
peace than are qualitative, or technological, races because the former can 
point to an advantage in numbers that may provide confidence in military 
victory, while in the latter the military postures of the rivals are in a state of 
perpetual anticipation.”39 
 
In addition, arms races depend on the existence of a distinct form of rivalry 
in the international system whose attributes are outlined by Huntington:  
 
A state system which facilitates the balancing of power by internal rather than 
external means; the preeminence of military force-in-being over territory or other 
factors as an element of national power; the capacity within each state to increase 
its military strength through quantitative or qualitative means; and the conscious 
awareness by each state of the dependence of its own arms policy upon that of 
another state.40 
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39 Colin S. Gray, Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy Strategy, and Military Technology 
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For him, this iterative “action-reaction” dynamic is the key driver of the arms 
races giving it its own momentum. Largely due to the relationship between 
the US and the Soviet Union, the term “action-reaction” emerged as a 
defining dynamic of “arms races.”41 It was argued that such a process has two 
principle features. First, a rapid rate of capability development, with the 
participants stretching their resources to go beyond parity and to ensure they 
remain ahead. And second, reciprocal dynamics in which developments in 
offensive and defensive capabilities become an interactive process in which 
the offensive arms requirements of one party depend upon the known, 
assumed or anticipated defensive capabilities of the forces of other parties.42 
There has also been a distinction made between two types of “action-
reaction”: “counter-reaction” (where a party responds to another’s 
capabilities); and “mirror-reaction” (where a party imitates another’s 
capabilities).43 However, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the 
two as any form of imitation involves “countering.” Also, with the nature of 
naval technology and the requirements of conducting operations in the 
maritime domain, a majority if not all armament patterns could be labeled as 
“mirroring.” 
 
Moreover, despite acknowledging domestic determinants, Huntington 
emphasizes the external pressures of a state’s strategic environment as the 
main driver for arms races. Seen in this light, an arms race aims to achieve a 
favorable distribution of power in an anarchic international system. Barry 
Buzan and Eric Herring also stress that arms races are reserved for rare 
occasions of states’ interaction. For them, an arms race is an extreme form of 
a more common phenomenon they call an “arms dynamic,” which is a broad 
continuum: 
 
The entire set of pressures that make actors (usually states) both acquire armed 
forces and change the quantity and quality of the armed forces they already 
                                                
41 See Buzan and Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, 83-100; and Glaser, “The 
Causes and Consequences of Arms Races,” 253-254. 
42 Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific region,” 
International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/4): 94. 
43 See Ball, “Arms and Affluence,” 94.  
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possess. … The term arms racing is reserved for the most extreme manifestations 
of the arms dynamic, when actors are going flat out or almost flat out in major 
competitive investments in military capability… Arms racing is still a significant 
phenomenon because it is an expression of intensified manifestations of the arms 
dynamic. Indeed arms racing is more likely to occur when states are engaged in full 
mobilization for total war, and such mobilization is more likely during war, or when 
the expectation of war is already high, rather than during peace. 44 
 
Consequently, they argue that there are no different types of arms races but 
rather varying degrees of arms dynamics that makes conflict more or less 
likely. The opposite of arms racing is the objective of “the maintenance of the 
military status quo”45—or what might be termed as “modernization.” Buzan 
and Herring observe that “maintenance can escalate into racing, and racing 
can subside into maintenance.”46 The middle ground between “maintenance” 
and “arms races” is occupied by “arms competition”: 
 
Relations between virtually all potential adversary states fall into the gray area 
between maintenance and racing. Military competition accommodates the way 
potential adversaries chip away at the status quo and constantly seek to improve 
their position, although having no confidence in gaining a decisive advantage. The 
outcome might be the maintenance of the military status quo, but that is not the 
intention of the participants—this is the familiar point that balances of power tend 
to form as the unintended consequence of advantage seeking.47 
 
Aside from the detailed elaborations offered by Huntington, Gray, as well as 
Buzan and Herring, other strategic scholars have not drawn a clear distinction 
between an “arms race,” “action-reaction,” and “military competition” 
between states. The explanations of the processes of the “arms race,” “action-
reaction,” and “military competition” all seem analogous. For instance, 
Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin simply defined an arms race as “the 
interaction between two or more adversaries’ military programs, to a 
tendency for each side’s programs to respond to what the other is doing.”48 
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Finally, according to Charles Anderton, an arms race is “a situation where 
two or more parties change the quantity or quality of their armed forces in 
response to perceived past, current or anticipated future increases in the 
quantity or quality of armed forces of the other party(ies).”49 Yet, as the next 
section demonstrates, the “arms race” itself is of limited analytical utility. 
 
The “Arms Race”: A Useful Analytical Concept? 
This section critiques the concept of “arms racing” from several angles. It 
demonstrates that neither qualitative nor quantitative approaches are 
completely satisfying to explain the complex phenomenon of how and when 
the interaction of actors’ arming dynamics occur. Definitions and associated 
metrics employed in the arms racing literature are often underspecified and 
inconsistent. The following critique of the literature demonstrates Adam P. 
Liff’s argument that, “the tendency to privilege a few relatively conspicuous 
and easily measurable—yet in some cases insignificant, obsolescent, or 
otherwise misleading—metrics coupled with loose standards concerning 
pinpointing causal mechanisms and causal stretching, is also not 
uncommon.”50 
 
Qualitative Approaches and its Limitations 
 Qualitative studies on arms races stem from Huntington’s effort to 
bring analytical precision to the study of armament dynamics. The most 
significant of these works are Colin Gray, Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, and 
Grant T. Hammond’s studies, which build on Huntington’s understanding of 
the “arms race” to offer typologies and frameworks on how to classify and 
identify cases of arms races. Hedley Bull’s The Control of the Arms Race, 
also built on Huntington’s analysis, offers valuable insight into restraining 
arms race dynamics through disarmament and arms control. As well, using 
game theory, Thomas C. Schelling conceived of the arms race as a form of 
tacit bargaining through the competitive deployment of forces. These studies 
highlight the difficulties in setting the preconditions and parameters of the 
                                                
49 Walter Isard and Charles H. Anderton, “A Survey of Arms Race Models,” in Arms 
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arms race. These theoretical understandings of arms racing diverge about 
whether they are caused primarily by pressures building up within states or 
by external forces produced by those states’ external interaction. The 
application of the term arms race is also problematic, because the metaphor 
is misleading: “races in athletics have clear start and finish lines, but arms 
races do not.” 51  The pejorative connotations to the term imply that any 
expansion in arms is dangerous and irrational, and is a momentum leading 
towards war, despite many instances of arms races ending peacefully. 
 
Moreover, there is disagreement amongst scholars over the preconditions for 
an arms race. For Colin Gray four factors constitute an arms race: 
 
1. There must be two or more parties, conscious of their antagonism. 
2. They must structure their armed forces with attention to the probable 
effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as deterrent to, the other arms 
race participants. 
3. They must compete in terms of quantity (men, weapons) and/or quality (men, 
weapons, organization, doctrine, deployment). 
4. There must be rapid increases in quantity and/or improvements in quality.52 
 
In response to Gray, Grant Hammond proposed eight criteria: 
 
1. Two or more participants, though the relationship is in essence a bilateral one. 
2. Specific designation of an adversary or potential adversary. 
3. Military and diplomatic planning based directly on the capabilities and intent 
of the other. 
4. A high degree of public animosity or antagonism between the parties involved. 
5. Political-military linkage of state actions between or among the rival forces 
structures and strategies. 
6. An extraordinary and consistent increase in the level of defense effort in excess 
of 8 percent per annum. 
7. The focus on a particular weapons environment or weapons system vis-à-vis 
the opponent with an explicit ratio goal. 
8. The purpose of the effort: seeking dominance via intimidation over the rival in 
political-military affairs.53 
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However, Hammond’s attempt to bring greater specificity to the concept of 
the arms race encountered criticism by Buzan and Herring who argued, 
 
…1 and 2 are fine, 3, 4, and 5 are hard to measure and therefore difficult to 
operationalize; 6 is arbitrary (why 8 percent?); 7 is unnecessary because it occurs 
too commonly; and 8 is unnecessarily narrow because an arms race could also be 
pursued for the purpose of deterrence, improving one’s ability to fight a war should 
one occur, or avoiding the attempt of another to achieve dominance.54 
 
This suggests that overall testing for an arms race through examining 
historical processes faces limitations. That is because the criteria set is based 
on subjective understandings and prior knowledge of the cases, and thus any 
test for the existence of the arms race phenomenon is inherently biased and 
arbitrary. As Gray remarked: “neither careful scholarship nor more casual 
judgment provides algorithms reliably capable of distinguishing between an 
arms race and defense preparation or modernization.”55 An arms race is either 
a specialized and rare phenomenon and thus does not help to understand the 
more common dynamic military relationships, or it simply cannot be isolated 
from this common dynamic. This implies that the arms race concept has 
limited analytical utility. 
 
A second key problem for the arms racing literature is empirics. 
Investigations into “arms races” rest on the assumption that there is some 
pattern of behavior which lends itself to description as a “race.”56 However, 
analytical explanations of arms races face the challenge that while definitions 
and ideas are based on the choice of empirical evidence,57 it is far from clear 
if the “arms race” is indeed an existing phenomenon or simply a misused 
paradigm for understanding strategic behavior. Huntington’s historical 
examples for arms races (Table 2.1), demonstrates the weaknesses of 
historical case studies:  
                                                
54 Buzan and Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, 79. 
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 Actors Type Year 
1 France vs. England Naval 1840-1866 
2 France vs. Germany Land 1874-1894 
3 England vs. France and Russia Naval  1884-1904 
4 Argentina vs. Chile Naval 1890-1902 
5 England vs. Germany Naval 1898-1912 
6 France vs. Germany Land 1911-1914 
7 England vs. United States Naval 1916-1930 
8 Japan vs. United States Naval 1916-1922 
9 France vs. Germany Land 1934-1939 
10 Soviet Union vs. Germany Land 1934-1941 
11 Germany vs. England Air 1934-1939 
12 United States vs. Japan Naval 1934-1941 
13 Soviet Union vs. United States Nuclear 1946-1989 
Table 2.1: Arms Races [Samuel Huntington]58 
 
There are several shortcomings with this choice of arms racing dyads. First, 
many of the states—such as France vs. Germany (1874-1894) and Japan vs. 
United States (1916-1922)—were not arming as peer competitors—France 
and Japan were conscious that the relationship was sharply asymmetric.59 
Second, despite the specific time frames given, it is difficult to determine 
when an arms race begins and ends. Huntington himself acknowledged that, 
“since an arms race is necessarily a matter of degree, differences of opinion 
will exist as to whether any given relationship constitutes an arms race and as 
to what are the precise opening and closing dates of any given arms race.”60 
 
Donald C. Watt’s important work on multilateral arms races demonstrated the 
value in modeling interactive competitive arming comprising more than two 
actors (See Figure 2.1), based on his understanding of the international system 
of the period 1818-1839.61 Watt demonstrated that competitive dynamics in 
principle involves more than two actors, and is also a two-way process. As a 
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state responds to a number of threats in its strategic environment, military 
competition can be trilateral or even quinquelateral (See Figure 2.2). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Example of Two-way Trilateral Arms Race [Donald C. Watt]62 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Arms Race 1918-1939 [Donald C. Watt]63 
 
Third, the Cold War case of the Soviet Union vs. United States (1946-1989) 
is also problematic. Albert Wohlstetter’s analysis of American and Soviet 
defense spending and arms programs during the first two decades of the Cold 
War demonstrated that there was only a partial connection between the 
actions of one side and those of the other.64 Since the early 1960s, the United 
States reduced its spending on strategic nuclear weapons in relative terms 
whereas the Soviet Union did the opposite.65 The American position was 
based on the realization that given existing arsenals even a significant 
variation in the relative number of warheads would have made no difference 
to either the outbreak or the outcome of a conflict. That is, a certain number 
of surviving nuclear warheads would have almost guaranteed “sufficient” 
destruction.66 Moreover, both sides also had different options available to 
compete in both the number of weapons platforms (quantitative) and the level 
of technological sophistication (quantitative). Therefore, even though there 
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was political rivalry and military competition between the two superpowers, 
there was no qualitative or quantitative “race.” The destructive potential of 
the nuclear weapons, and consequently its ability to influence policy at the 
highest level, makes the US-Soviet nuclear build-up unique and not 
applicable to conventional cases.  
 
In contrast to Huntington, Gray’s historical examples of arms races are more 
limited (Table 2.2). One reason for this was his criticism of the duel form of 
Huntington’s empirical support—bipolarity forms the base for Huntington’s 
“arms race” categorization.67 However, international relationships rest on the 
subjective judgments of the political leadership in individual states, and 
political decisions are not made in a vacuum. Gray’s cases are based on his 
four-point criteria: 
 
 Actors Type Year 
1 England vs. France and Russia, with Italian, 
German and Austro-Hungarian 
complications 
Naval 1884-1904 
2 England vs. Germany (Phase I) Naval 1898-1905 
3 England vs. Germany (Phase II) Naval 1906-1914 
4 England vs. United States vs. Japan, with 
many complications especially regarding 
France and Italy 
Naval 1918-1922 
5 Soviet Union vs. United States, with Chinese 
complications after 1964 
All categories of 
armaments 
1946-1989 
Table 2.2: Arms Races [Colin S. Gray]68 
 
Yet, despite providing historical examples for arms races, Gray later turned 
into a major critic of the concept itself. His article, “Arms Races and Other 
Pathetic Fallacies,” dismissed his “youthful forays into the arcane reaches of 
arms race analysis.”69 Instead, he argued that the arms race is actually an 
“unhelpful metaphor” for understanding strategic behavior. 70  His later 
reservations were both theoretical and empirical. He concluded that 
definitions of “arms races” are as “rare as they tend to be unconvincing,” and 
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that a great deal of the “difficulty with efforts at arms race analysis essentially 
is empirical.”71 Gray also criticized his own cases (and those of Grant T. 
Hammond, See Table 2.3) as based on the “assumption that there is some 
pattern of behavior which lends itself to ascription as arms race.”72 He argues 
that by self-selecting cases, Hammond equates an “arms race” to simply the 
“competitive component of an enduring rivalry.” 73  Clearly, a lack of 
understanding and rigor has not precluded “ad hoc or hit and run theorizing” 
on the topic. Gray notes the frequency with which Samuel P. Huntington’s 
seminal study on “arms races” is cited as a fair comment on the shortage of 
writings that address the issue in a systemic and rigorous fashion.74 
 
 Actors Type Year 
Arms Race   
1 Japan vs. Russia Naval 1895-1904 
2 Germany vs. England Naval 1902-1912 
3 France vs. Germany Land  1911-1914 
4 Japan vs. United States vs. 
England 
Naval 1916-1922 
Military Competition   
5 France vs. Germany Naval 1874-1894 
6 England vs. France and Russia Naval 1884-1904 
7 England vs. United States Naval 1922-1930 
Rearmament Race   
8 England and United States vs. 
Germany and Japan 
Naval and Air 1938-1939/41 
Space Race   
9 Soviet Union vs. United States Technology  1957-1969 
Table 2.3: Arms Races [Grant T. Hammond]75 
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Gray’s major objection referred to a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
relationship between armaments and strategy. He faults the scholarly 
literature that identifies “action-reaction” as the key driver of an “arms race” 
for assuming a dominance of a reactive process over political purpose and 
domestic decision-making processes.76  Armaments are part of a nation’s 
strategy, defined as the “art of distributing and applying military means to 
fulfill the ends of policy.”77 This implies that armament dynamics do not 
operate in a politics-free zone since “strategy is the art of the dialectic of force, 
or more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to 
resolve their dispute.”78 Therefore, any analytical explanation of “arms races” 
must pay attention to the Clausewitzian notion that “war is not merely an act 
of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, 
carried on with other means.”79 Although war and military competition may 
develop their own “grammar,” policy remains supreme.80  Following this 
logic, “arms races must and should be viewed as an arena of foreign policy 
manipulation.”81 In essence, any quantitative and qualitative changes in the 
levels of arms must have an interactive relationship with a state’s strategic 
policy settings since “military power derives its moral tone from the political 
purposes for which it is employed.”82  
 
Similarly to Gray, Hedley Bull observed that, “the term ‘arms race’, 
suggesting as it does a contest in which the efforts of the participants are 
limited only by their capacity to struggle and not at all by their will to do, 
provides in some ways a misleading description of the phenomena to which 
it is usually applied.”83 As opposed to a rational decision to acquire arms, 
“arms racing” implies that the acquisition of weapons can intensify to the 
point where participants lose sight of their political purpose and thereby 
                                                
76 See Gray, “The Arms Race Phenomenon,” 71-78; and Gray, “The Urge to Compete,” 
217. 
77 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 
335. 
78 Quoted in Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17. 
Emphasis added. 
79 Clausewitz, On War, 87. Emphasis added. 
80 Gray, Weapons Don’t Make War, 3. 
81 Gray, “The Arms Race is about Politics,” 120. 
82 Gray, Weapons Don’t Make War, 49.  
83 Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the 
Missile Age (New York: Praeger, 1965), xv. 
43 
 
abandon reason and judgment. In his historical analysis of military 
competition, British military historian Michael Howard emphasized the 
dependent character of armaments on the intensity of political rivalry, the 
breadth of factors contributing to competitive strategies, and the contribution 
of a competition in arms to political stabilization and peace rather than war.84 
Echoing Bull, Howard observed: “The history of Europe since the close of 
the Middle Ages, with the possible exceptions of the period 1870-1914, gives 
little ground for supposing that the tensions produced by rival armaments-
systems have been the sole, or even principle cause of international conflicts; 
and the history of North America, whose greatest war arose between two 
communities which at the outset were virtually unarmed, gives even less.”85 
In the view of these scholars, the “arms race” was not only an unhelpful 
metaphor but also non-existent as a strategic phenomenon. A “simple, 
apolitical, mad momentum model” triggering “arms racing” does not reflect 
empirical reality as it implies that modern technology, not states are 
responsible for an “action-reaction” process and a mindless war.86 
 
Thus, the military modernization process is unlikely to “spiral out of control” 
and can be expected to remain directed at achieving an overarching political 
objective, including, in extremis, prevailing in conflict in a manner consistent 
with the national interest. In this context, Thomas Schelling observed, 
 
…victory inadequately expresses what a nation wants from its military force. 
Mostly it wants, in these times, the influence that resides in latent force. It wants 
the bargaining force that comes from the capacity to hurt, not just the direct 
consequence of successful military action. Even total victory over an enemy 
provides at best an opportunity for unopposed violence against the enemy 
populations. How to use that opportunity in the national interest, or in some 
wider interest, can be just as important as the achievement of victory itself; but 
traditional military suicide does not tell us how to use that capacity for inflicting 
pain.87  
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This point was demonstrated during the Cold War when, after a prolonged 
phase of competition that resembled a genuine arms race, a new Soviet 
leadership realized that continuing to compete and build-up its military 
capabilities threatened its economic viability and was therefore no longer in 
its overall national interests.88  
 
In addition, much of the arms race literature displays little interest in 
explaining what actually triggers military modernization to become 
interactive, and how this could augment political rivalry.89 The decision to 
acquire or enhance arms (“internal balancing”) is simply considered one of a 
state’s three basic options to achieve a favorable position in the international 
system aside from gaining allies (“external balancing”) and cooperating 
(“bandwagoning”) with a potential adversary to reduce threats.90 Most studies 
of arms competition leave aside the questions why states engage in arms 
build-ups as a means to seek security. While they acknowledge that armament 
dynamics can become reciprocal due to a number of operational and tactical 
purposes,91  this interaction between actors is assumed to be competitive. 
States acquire arms to maintain parity or deter, as opposed to competing for 
indisputable sovereignty (avoiding war) or demonstrating that superiority in 
war.92 As argued by Sergey Radchenko in his analysis of the Soviet Union’s 
rationales for arming during the Cold War, labeling all arming dynamics as 
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competitive is superficial and does not explain reasoning behind key 
decisions.93 
 
Not only does the literature provide inadequate strategic explanations for 
military modernization, it also fails to give due weight to non-military factors 
such as ideational elements.94 Nationalism is re-emerging in the Asia-Pacific, 
and is a particularly strong force in China.95 Robert Ross has argued that 
“naval nationalism is one manifestation of prestige strategies, whereby 
governments seek international success to bolster domestic popularity. 
Prestige-seeking governments sometimes provoke war in the pursuit of a 
popular military victory. But governments also can seek greater prestige by 
developing defense policies and acquiring weaponry that do not provoke war 
but nonetheless destabilize great power relations.”96 As Edward Luttwak has 
pointed out, certain platforms are implements of “naval suasion,” influencing 
“allies, adversaries, or neutrals” through “the existence, display, manipulation, 
or symbolic use” of sea-based or sea-related forces.97 Therefore it has become 
essential to identify and examine not only the material influences on state 
elites in decision-making but also the nationalistic-ideational narratives 
within societies that provide additional motivation for states to pursue 
modernization and help shape the choices made. Decision-makers often do 
not deal with an objective strategic reality, but one that is defined by domestic 
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and international norms, institutions, cultural interactions, and other systems 
of meaning. If, as Alexander Wendt famously noted, “anarchy is what states 
make of it,”98 then it can also be surmised that the contemporary naval build-
up in the Asia-Pacific is not merely a product of geostrategic factors but also 
ideational and normative ones.  
 
Moreover, Barry Buzan argued that an arms race should not be considered a 
frequently occurring normal strategic behavior of states. Instead, in his view, 
arms racing is “an abnormally intense condition in relations between states 
reflecting either or both of active political rivalry, and mutual fear of the 
other’s military potential.” 99 Yet, he also noted that this would still leave the 
problem of “how to distinguish this abnormal condition from the norm of self-
defense behavior under the conditions of anarchy.”100  In the face of this 
criticism, other scholars have attempted to provide greater analytical clarity 
to the arms race theories. Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry argue that in 
the Asia-Pacific, “there is already some evidence of security dilemma-driven 
military competition in the Asia-Pacific, which could worsen significantly in 
the near future. These dynamics manifest despite the available evidence 
showing that the region is not now engaged in a full-scale arm race.”101 
Hammond also maintained that “the term military competition [is] a 
circumstance that is more than status quo and less arms race … It is a general 
effort at increased preparedness that is characteristic of prudent action in 
international politics.”102 Yet, in response to Hammond, Gray pointed out that 
if empirical findings establish that arms races do not cause wars, the 
occurrence of conflict could not be used to infer that the prior competition 
was a race rather than a managed enhancement of military capabilities.103  
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Quantitative Approaches and its Limitations 
There is a significant body of quantitative studies—predominantly in 
the international relations discipline—on the topic of military competition to 
prove the existence of an arms race and its potential consequences. Much of 
this literature is rooted in Cold War theorizing about arms races, and is 
devoted to debates on how to measure or formally model an arms race, the 
variables and their contributions to an arms race, and the question of whether 
arms races are the primary trigger for conflict. The most significant of these 
studies are Lewis F. Richardson and Anatol Rapoport’s interpretation of 
Richardson’s mathematical models of arms races, which inspired a generation 
of quantitative research into proving the existence of the arms race, why they 
occur, when they become unstable, and how they led to war. These 
quantitative approaches highlighted the limitations of using formal modeling 
and raw data, as they lacked sufficient comparable data on key indicators such 
as military expenditure and weapons procurement, as well as a large enough 
number and variety of instances to build a dataset for reliable modeling. 
Moreover, it highlighted the difficulty of pinpointing at what level military 
modernization crossed the threshold from routine upgrading of forces (to 
match organizational and technical needs) to full-blown competitive 
“racing.”104 Thus these studies often employed a very ambiguous definition 
of “arms races” to develop a universal theory, and to make the phenomenon 
applicable to as many cases as possible. 
 
Richardson105 and Rapoport106 produced foundational quantitative studies on 
arms races. Richardson developed a descriptive model of interactive arming 
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in which changes in a state’s military expenditures are influenced by three 
factors:  
 
1. Out of fear of military insecurity, country A will make increases in its 
armaments proportional to the level of country B’s armaments. B will respond 
in a similar way to A’s armaments. 
2. The burden of armaments upon the economy of the country imposes a restraint 
upon further expenditures. The restraint is proportional to the size of the 
existing force. 
3. There are hostilities, ambitions and grievances that drive nations to arm at a 
constant rate, even in the absence of a military threat from another nation. 107 
 
Richardson and Rapoport’s models comprise of a pair of linked differential 
equations, with constant coefficients for each of the three factors. In this 
model, states do not have explicit objectives and the model itself does not 
seek to account for strategic behavior. Rather, what determines the course of 
an arms race are the parameters of the model, for instance, the intensity of a 
state’s reaction to an adversary. 108  These models are thus useful in 
highlighting the interlocking nature of weapons decisions and the basic 
interdependence of defense expenditures in states with intersecting strategic 
visions. His models contend that nations increase arms expenditures when 
they perceive that a rival nation is capable of posing a significant military 
threat to their security.109 
 
Richardson’s model has had a profound and long-term influence on thinking 
about competitive military relationships.110 Stephen Majeski observed that it 
was “[Richardson’s] verbal, non-formal theory which is the foundation of the 
arms race literature.”111 Michael Intriligator and Dagobert Brito concurred, 
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arguing that “the Richardson model has been the dominant paradigm for both 
theoretical and empirical studies of the arms race.” 112 Lastly, Charles Taber 
formed the view that “the arms race literature, building from Richardson 
(1960), is probably the largest body of formal work in international 
relations.”113  
 
Nevertheless, Richardson’s model was not without its problems. His 
approach yielded a formulaic depiction of a complex political process. In 
addition, modern quantitative studies—which built on Richardson’s work—
neglect the existence of qualitative studies by scholars such as Huntington, 
Gray, Howard and Bull, which previously raised significant doubt about the 
usefulness of arms race theories. As well, despite a larger empirical base, the 
literature based on formal models and mathematical equations, which studied 
the process of the arms race largely through the prism of military expenditure, 
constructed formal models with seemingly arbitrary parameters. Theresa 
Smith’s parameters for an arms race provides a telling example: 
 
A race usually involves at least two parties—independent states in this analysis—
one may be far more committed to racing than another. … The competition must 
begin last a minimum of four years. An arms race then begins in a year for which 
military spending rises and hostility towards some adversary nation-state has been 
declared as government policy. A race ends for a given participant when military 
spending falls for two consecutive periods, the end point being the last year to show 
an increase.114 
 
Yet the danger of operationalizing abnormal military competition—labeled 
as an “arms race”—simply with military expenditure and foreign policy 
statements is that it leaves arms race applicable to any instance of arming. In 
addition, these formals models make the implicit assumption that all arms 
races are essentially the same, disregarding nuance and singularity. The 
propensity to broaden the applicability of the term “arms race” resulted in the 
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lack of distinction between a “race,” “buildup,” and “competitions.” 115 
Moreover, the use of defense spending to measure arms racing can be 
seriously misleading, particularly with regards to qualitative changes—
innovations in military forces may not result out of direct spending 
increases.116 As well, these studies see no value in distinguishing between an 
“arms race,” “action-reaction” and an “arms competition.” Both qualitative 
and quantitative studies also ascribe “military modernization” with a 
somewhat benign intent, despite it being inherently an activity involving the 
use of force. Nor do they exhibit any curiosity about the various external and 
internal pressures that affect increases in defense spending and associated 
policy statements. For instance, while William Caspary’s study of 
Richardson’s model noted that “one suspects that emotions are a dynamic part 
of the system, stimulated by weapons levels, and in turn stimulating weapons 
production,” 117 it failed to draw any conclusion for quantitative studies on 
arms racing. 
 
As a result, quantitative studies adopting a broad definition of an “arms race” 
to build a large n-size, defeat their attempts to study a unique phenomenon 
viewed as abnormal and purposefully intense military competition. As well, 
formal models only test dyadic pairs, as opposed to cases of three or more 
players. The objective to have a large sample (n) size to demonstrate 
correlation and the power of the model results in definitions of the arms race 
so broad that they are not sensitive to contingency. Any form of inter-state 
rivalry involving an increase in armaments—which could be mere 
modernization—and hostile declaratory policy—which could be simple a 
reflection of nationalist sentiment—is classified as an arms race. These 
studies therefore classify cases such as Chile vs. Peru (1869-1879), NATO-
Warsaw Pact (1949-1975), Israel vs. Arab Nations, South Africa vs. OAU 
(1961-1977) and Albania vs. USSR (1968-1977), as “arms races.”118 
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Surprisingly, many of these studies omit the US-Soviet case as an arms race 
because quantitative tests on spending patterns do not demonstrate the 
presence of a “nuclear arms race.”119 Kugler, Organski and Fox reached the 
rather paradoxical assessment that “it is obvious that the United States and 
the USSR are building nuclear arms, but are not doing so, as they allege, 
because they are racing or competing with one another.”120  The authors 
acknowledged that the results of their data contradicts conventional wisdom. 
They reasoned that their data did not demonstrate a “nuclear arms race,” was 
because the US and USSR were lying, and the increase in nuclear armaments 
was due to another unstated reason. Finally, Richardson’s model omits 
specificity regarding the relationship between military expenditure and 
accumulated arms stockpile, adding to the conceptual problem with the arms 
race formulation.121 The model’s lack of understanding of the type of weapon 
and its influence on policy demonstrates the lack of sensitivity to context in 
formal models.  
 
As a consequence, some quantitative approaches to naval arms races 
measured weapons stockpiles, the number and type of major capabilities 
and/or the level of firepower in order to assess the balance of military 
capabilities. 122  For instance, Ward examined stock-flow interaction to 
examine the scope and structure of naval armaments.123  Bolks and Stoll 
operationalized naval power through the type of warship(s) with the greatest 
amount of combat power, contending that in naval history states were focused 
on the number of hulls to weigh the balance of naval forces.124 Crisher and 
Souva examined relative naval power by measuring the aggregate tonnage of 
                                                
119 See Thomas R. Cusack and Michael Don Ward, “Military Spending in the United States, 
Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 3 
(1981): 429; and A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler with Daniel J. Fox, “Deterrence and 
the Arms Race: The Impotence of Power,” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 
105-138. 
120 Kugler, Organski and Fox, “Deterrence and the Arms Race,” 138. 
121 Rein Taagepera, “Stockpile-budget and Ratio Interaction Models for Arms Races,” 
Peace Science Society (International Papers) 29 (1979-1980): 67 
122 See for instance Brian Crisher and Mark Souva, “Power At Sea: A Naval Power Dataset, 
1865-2011” (Working Paper, Florida State University, 2012); Bolks and Stoll, “The Arms 
Acquisition Process,” 589; and Ward, “Differential Paths to Parity,” 298.  
123 Ward, “Differential Paths to Parity,” 298. 
124 Bolks and Stoll, “The Arms Acquisition Process,” 589. 
52 
 
active ships that have the capability of inflicting significant damage on both 
land and sea targets.125 However, assessing naval power through the measure 
of ship counts over-simplifies the complexities of decision-making processes 
behind arming dynamics. Instead, presumably to protect the integrity of their 
models the authors assume that “states use simple decision-making rules to 
make foreign and defense policy.”126 That is, they largely regard the state as 
a “black box” despite clear evidence in scholarship that domestic factors have 
a major impact on states’ foreign and defense decision-making processes, 
including military modernization.127 And despite the methodological rigor 
committed to objective analytical explanations, the mathematics also cannot 
take into account strategic interaction and concepts such as bluffing, 
cooperation, plotting of one nation against another, as well as uncertainty and 
misperception of other countries’ naval build-ups.128  
 
In response to these limitations, some scholars developed models based on 
behavior and social psychology methods to address complex issues such as 
maximizing behavior, bureaucratic decision-making, alliance formation, 
multi-country stability, the balance of power and proliferation. 129  These 
models and game-theoretic simulations attempted to operationalize the 
decision-making processes for acquiring arms to reach predictions about 
whether states will adopt a competitive arming policy. For example, Majeski 
developed an expectation model based on game theory to test whether 
expectations of an opponent’s military expenditure and prior expectation 
errors play an important role in arms race dynamics.130 Taber provided a 
simple expected utility model, based on prospect theory, to determine how 
states behave in the decision-making process for arms acquisitions. 131 
                                                
125 Crisher and Souva, “Power At Sea,” 3. 
126 Bolks and Stoll, “The Arms Acquisition Process,” 583. 
127 On decision-making processes see Richard Hermann, “The Power of Perceptions in 
Foreign-Policy Decision Making: Do Views of the Soviet Union Determine the Policy 
Choices of American Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 30, no, 4 
(November 1986): 841-875; Kalevi J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of 
Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 233-309; and Michael J. 
Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham, “Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-
Making,” International Studies Quarterly 17, no. 2 (June 1973): 147-174. 
128 Anderton, “Arms Race Modeling: Problems and Prospects,” 348. 
129 See Intriligator and Brito, “Arms Races,” 50. 
130 Majeski, “Expectations and Arms Races,” 241. 
131 Taber, “National Arms Acquisition as a Rational Competitive Process,” 424. 
53 
 
Intriligator and Brito employed a game theoretic approach based on the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma in order to predict whether an arms race becomes more 
or less stable when one actor in a dyad views its opponents weapons stocks.132 
Lastly, Lichbach developed a game theory model based on the Richardson 
equations to predict when an arms rivalry between two nations would result 
in an “arms race, arms control or arms domination.”133 
 
However, despite their reference to the psychology and behavior of states, 
these models are essentially based on rational actor approaches. They assume 
that the simple rules used to operationalize decision-making processes for the 
purposes of animating the model are in fact accurate reflections of reality. 
Moreover, their work, as Taber admitted, to some extent simply reconfirmed 
earlier research: “several of the results confirm long-standing theoretical 
explanations … arms races in the model resulting from the security dilemma 
tend to gain momentum as images become more extreme. This dynamic 
conforms with the predictions of the well-known, but never formalized, spiral 
model.” 134  Most importantly, these quantitative studies converted the 
literature on arms races into a debate on methodology: how to prove 
correlations, how to disaggregate the dependent variables and the 
expenditures of opponents, whether stocks are a better measure than 
expenditure, and what measures provide any particular model with the  most 
explanatory power. This approach, however, has come at the expense of 
dealing with the critical question of why and how states adopt armament 
policies, and when and how they interact at the international level. Indeed, 
recent arms racing literature has been preoccupied with methodological 
questions as opposed to conceptual ones.135 In the end, quantitative studies 
on arms racing engage in mathematical modeling of a highly complex 
political phenomenon, and shy away from the fact that many variables that 
contribute to interactive arming defy reliable quantification. Conversely, 
some quantitative studies have argued that arms racing is generally present at 
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certain junctures of an international rivalry. By equating an “arms race” with 
the “competitive component of an enduring rivalry,” the authors affix the 
term to any armament policy of a state.136 Such an approach, however, lacks 
a systematic and rigorous application, and falls more into the category of “ad 
hoc or hit and run theorizing” on the topic.”137 
 
The Decision to Arm 
The decision to arm is driven by both external threat perceptions and the 
behavior of external powers, the domestic interests such as economic growth 
and employment, and the level of activity in specialized sectors like research 
and development and ship-building.138 History suggests that internal political 
events are inherently tied to the strategic processes that assess the changes in 
the armaments of potential adversaries. 139  As Lawrence Freedman has 
pointed out: 
 
The trouble with most models of arms [competitions] is that they rarely provide a 
decent explanation of why nations buy the weapons they do. Defence policy is made 
up of a variety of elements of which an assessment of what is happening on the other 
side is only one. And even then, the nature of the assessment of what is going on on 
the other side is in part bureaucratically determined. … The determinants of defence 
policy are, therefore, much more than merely the activities of the other side; at the 
very least one has to take into account how these activities are comprehended by the 
national security apparatus, but there are also the other political, economic and 
military factors that shape defence policy.140 
 
Material dynamics derive from the structure of the international system—
above all, its anarchic character—creating an imperative for states to secure 
their own survival through material power. This imperative stems from 
factors external to the state. The general insecurity of international anarchy 
leads states to worry not simply about how well they fare themselves 
(“absolute gains”) but also how well they fare compared to other states 
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(“relative gains”). States that gain disproportionately in relation to other states 
may achieve a superiority that threatens the goals or even the security of their 
cooperative partners.141  States strengthen their armaments because of the 
threats they perceive from other states, and this can extend to a reactive 
process that leads to an endless escalation.142 Such a situation can readily 
acquire the characteristics of a “security dilemma,” where each qualitative 
and quantitative adjustment in arms by one actor is assessed by others as a 
diminution in their security requiring redress. An anarchic international 
system can see a group of states, all seeking to do no more than provide for 
their own defense, driven into a process of competitive accumulations of 
armaments in order to retain maximum confidence in their national 
security.143 
 
Two prominent historical examples include the arms dynamic between the 
British and German navies (1898-1912) leading up to the First World War, 
and the logic behind the nuclear arms build-up between the US and the Soviet 
Union. First, Germany’s naval challenge to Britain’s hegemonic position at 
sea—which Britain saw as essential to its security—led to competition 
between the two states’ shipbuilding, in particular the revolutionary 
Dreadnought. The British government perceived the German challenge as a 
threat to its relative power. The competitive naval programs were thus a signal 
of political rivalry—an increase in armaments to revise the power balance 
and a reaction in armaments to maintain it.144 Second, during the Cold War, 
the desire to preserve deterrence of an all-out attack led to increases and 
improvements in both the Soviet and American’s missiles. For the US, and in 
contrast to the USSR, the qualitative improvement of an essentially constant 
number of missiles was of decisive importance: this comprised the strategic-
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land based missile series of Minuteman, Minuteman III and MX, and its 
submarine-based missile series of Polaris, Poseidon and Trident. 145  In 
particular, the deployment of MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles) increased American strike capability by a factor of three, 
leading the Soviet Union to respond with quantitative increases and the 
development of its own MIRV capability by 1975 (intercontinental ballistic 
missiles [ICBM]) and 1978 (submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM]), 
respectively.146  
 
Material explanations came to dominate the post-Cold War era of armament 
policies and dynamics. Yet, these focused predominantly on the adversary’s 
weapons build-up, disregarding more comprehensive and compelling 
explanations of why armament programs exhibit more or less urgency.147 
Significantly, they ignored that these decisions to arm are based on 
perceptions and (misperceptions) of a potential adversaries’ capabilities. 
These perceptions of threat are based not just on strategic calculations but 
also ideas, beliefs and values inherent to a state and its political institutions. 
These cognitive and ideational factors cannot be disentangled from material 
ones, since the decision to engage in arming policies is shaped as much by 
political conditions in which threats arise and are dealt with, as by their 
material basis.148 Nevertheless, the ideas of states driving arms acquisitions 
and military competition has received considerable less attention than the 
explanation that states are locked in an “action-reaction spiral.” This is a 
major shortfall in the academic literature on arms dynamics since 
investigations into how states choose among the range of options in relation 
to their domestic structures and affairs sheds light on not only why states 
adopt arming policies, but also what the interaction of a number of arming 
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programs. The logic of strategic action and consequences149 increases the 
demands on the decision-maker, as these individuals must calculate what their 
opponents are likely to do in order to devise their own strategy. Therefore, 
explorations of how and why states will arm must go beyond narrow rational 
choice analysis and recognize such factors as emotions and cognitive 
limitations that affect choices and behavior.150  
 
In this regard, Buzan and Herring note that external factors of rivalry serve as 
the main engine for competitive arming dynamics but when reactions become 
anticipatory, “the state has, in effect, restructured itself internally on a long-
term basis to deal with the arms dynamic.”151 Additional domestic political 
factors include the link between a state’s economy and its military 
modernization as a major agent of scientific and technological progress. Both 
involve not only the material basis of state power but also the ideological 
concern for national prestige associated with a sophisticated armed force. 
Such ideational variables, however, are often specific to a case and often 
overlooked in strategic debate as they are not easy to prove and operationalize, 
and therefore difficult to correlate with competitive behavior. Yet, identifying 
only one distinct factor, or emphasizing structural over normative variables, 
results in the loss of understanding of specific causes as well as 
misunderstanding of the consequences of arms competition. As Kennedy 
points out, “ultimately, arms increases—and arms [competitions]—are the 
reflection of complex political/ideological/racial/economic/territorial 
differences, rather than phenomena which exist, as it were of themselves, 
uncaused causes.”152  
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Hypotheses 
The survey of the theoretical literature conducted for this study suggests that 
explanations for the modernization of naval and associated air capabilities can 
be encapsulated in six core hypotheses. These hypotheses are both material 
and ideational, encompass both qualitative and quantitative changes, and 
address the reality that reciprocal arming dynamics can be multipolar. 
Regional states build-up their armed forces based not only on an assessment 
of their strategic environment but also the interests and values of their internal 
institutions. Ideational and institutional factors influence the decision-making 
calculus of states, as decision-makers assessing and perceiving external 
threats must also assess the consequences of choosing between a competitive 
and cooperative policy.153 The six key hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H1: The process of military modernization is based on both external 
threats to national security and domestic pressures. 
If states are rational unitary actors, military modernization should 
follow a strategic calculus. Assessments of external threats to national 
security lead to capability requirements which are translated into 
acquisitions and/or enhancements in a cost-efficient manner to 
address these threats. However, the state must also balance its 
concerns for national security with domestic interests (such as budgets 
and fiscal balances) and ideas. Ideational factors feed into any 
modernization driven primarily by perceptions of threat and the 
assessment of deterrence. Thus, both material and ideational factors 
interact to impact military modernization.154  
 
H2: Interactive arms dynamics can be multilateral. 
According to Samuel Huntington, arms races can only be bilateral in 
nature. That is, they are a reciprocal interaction between two states, or 
coalitions of states, resulting from conflicting purposes or mutual 
                                                
153 On domestic variables influencing foreign policy decision-making see: Graham T. 
Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The American Political 
Science Review 63, no. 3 (September, 1969): 689-718; Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics 
and War,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 653-673; and 
Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.” 
154 Gray, “The Arms Race Phenomenon,” 77. 
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fears. 155  However, this argument assumes that the international 
system based on a balance of power consists of only a series of bipolar 
or bilateral antagonisms. Estimates of international relationships rest 
on the subjective judgments of the political leadership in individual 
states, and a state may regard more than one state as its potential 
adversary. Therefore, interactive arms dynamics do not involve only 
mutually exclusive pairs of states, but can also play out among three 
or more actors. 156  
 
H3: Interactive arms dynamics have both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects. 
States that modernize their weapons platforms should have a capacity 
for both quantitative and qualitative increases in military power. The 
former requires states to be capable of re-allocating resources from 
civilian to military purposes. The latter demands dynamic innovation 
and investment in technology. Both address the need to develop and 
maintain military capability. The notion of a Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA)157  is difficult because exploiting it involves going 
beyond new weapons and equipment to redesigning military units, 
changing when and where intelligence is inserted, and changing 
command, control and communication (C3) conventions. On the other 
hand, this preparedness to embrace revolutionary and disruptive 
change could help ensure cost-effectiveness, while also maintaining 
technological superiority of weapons platforms. Moreover, such a 
process is unlikely to involve only a single weapons platform. It 
involves not only reciprocal increments in armaments, but also a 
succession of generations of weapons (enhancement), competition in 
                                                
155 Huntington, “Arms Races,” 41-86. 
156 Watt, “The Possibility of a Multilateral Arms Race,” 375. 
157 The RMA is defined as “when one of the participants in a conflict incorporates new 
technology, organization, and doctrine to the extent that victory is attained in the immediate 
instance, but more importantly, that any other actors who might wish to deal with that 
participant or that activity must match, or counter the new combination of technology, 
organization and doctrine in order to prevails. The accomplishments of the victor become 
the necessary foundation for any future military activities in that area of conflict.” See 
Theodor Galdi, “Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts, Organizational 
Responses, Outstanding Issues,” Congressional Research Report for Congress 95-1170 F 
(Washington DC: Library of Congress, December 11, 1995), 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/rma/crs95-1170F.htm.  
60 
 
strategic doctrine, and changes in organization and force structure. 
This hypothesis tests whether interactive arms dynamics privileges 
qualitative over quantitative changes due to the increased 
sophistication of capabilities that now accompany new platforms. 
 
H4: The modernization of defense capabilities is influenced by the 
actions of potential adversaries. 
The process of force modernization by states—either to deter an 
attack by an adversary or to employ military power offensively—
requires devoting a significant share of the nation’s resources to 
accumulate and maintain a stock of weapons and human resources. 
Therefore, it is assumed that participants form expectations based, in 
particular, on their opponent’s prior, current and expected future 
military expenditure. This tests Lewis Richardson’s model of 
interactive arming, in which changes in a state’s military expenditure 
are influenced by three factors: (1) the military expenditure of the 
adversary, (2) the economic burden of previous modernization of 
military forces, and (3) the intensity of the state’s grievance against 
its opponents.158 
 
H5: The existence of an allied relationship or security partnership 
does not prevent the occurrence of interactive arming.  
Research on military alliances tends to emphasize a state’s desire to 
balance against security threats.159 Yet, states also pursue security 
independently by relying on their own military capabilities and 
acquiring additional arms. The two are not mutually exclusive and 
alliance support does not substitute for military capabilities or vice 
versa. Rather, alliances and arms are complementary in that states 
tend to increase their military spending, while also seeking (or 
increasing) cooperative arrangements and/or alliance ties.160 
                                                
158 See Richardson, Arms and Insecurity.  
159 See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
160 Paul F. Diehl, “Substitutes or Complements? The Effects of Alliances on Military 
Spending in Major Power Rivalries,” International Interactions 19, no. 3 (1994): 159-176; 
and Gerard L. Sorokin, “Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries,” 
International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 422. 
61 
 
 
H6: Interactive arms dynamics do not generate their own momentum 
towards conflict. 
Participants in interactive arming must maintain a general attention to 
the developing military posture of their rivals. The strategic actors 
provide vital, though possibly intermittent, flows of information that 
serve to trigger reactions that could possibly become strategic 
competition. However, the domestic processes of a state determine 
whether it should react, what is a relevant or expedient reaction, and 
the scale and timing of a reaction.161 These domestic processes are 
based on the perceptions of a state. According to Carl von Clausewitz, 
“the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies. As a rule, most 
men would rather believe bad news than good, and rather tend to 
exaggerate the bad news.” 162  Robert Jervis also argues that men 
generally perceive what they want to perceive.163 In a competition 
between states, these perceptions—or misperceptions—imply that 
arms dynamics can generate their own momentum towards conflict. 
However, this assumes that statesmen can lose control over policy. 
 
In the next chapter, the regional trends of arming in the Asia-Pacific are 
examined through a broad overview of economic performance and military 
expenditure data. These broad measures support useful inferences about 
regional stability, security perceptions among regional states and even 
possible explanations for military modernization in specific countries. These 
broad measures are less useful, however, for cross-country comparisons. This 
material has to be supplemented with an examination of the behavior of states 
in terms of all six of the core hypotheses set out above. It is the contention of 
this thesis that, taken together, these analytical tools can be applied to the 
empirical case studies to develop a new framework to understand military 
modernization and arms acquisitions, called “interactive arming.” 
                                                
161 Gray, “The Arms Race Phenomenon,” 77. 
162 Clausewitz, On War, 117. 
163 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 356. 
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Chapter 3: 
Arming in the Asia-Pacific 
 
An analysis of naval and associated air modernization of capabilities in the 
Asia-Pacific region can usefully start with  an examination of the available 
empirical data on military expenditure and procurement.1  There are both 
regional-specific similarities as well as country-specific differences. First, 
this chapter provides an examination of regional defense expenditure and 
current armaments, and a comparison of military modernization programs It 
aims to be a guide as to who is arming the most, and what are the major naval 
and associated air capabilities being developed. Second, it examines the 
possible motivations that have previously been raised as explanations for 
military modernization in the Asia-Pacific. Third, it proposes a preliminary 
framework of “interactive arming” for understanding military modernization. 
Lastly, it details how the five sets of cases will be explored. 
 
Regional Trends 
Compared to other regions, military expenditure in the Asia-Pacific seems 
modest. Only the PRC, Japan and the ROK rank in the top ten for defense 
spenders globally (Table 3.1). The US clearly remains the top defense spender, 
and in the context of East Asia, USPACOM remains a substantial element of 
the overall US military force structure. Indeed, the current objective is that by 
2020, 60 percent of American naval assets will be based in the Pacific. 
Additionally, when comparing regional defense spending, since 1995 North 
America had the highest expenditure in the world (Figure 3.1), and the US 
defense budget is almost five times more than the second highest defense 
spender, China (Table 3.1).What has maintained high levels of regional 
defense spending though is China’s increasing investment in military 
modernization.2 
                                                
1 See Tan, The Arms Race in Asia, 45.  
2 The primary source for military expenditure data was the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance database; the SIPRI Military Expenditure 
database, and the US Department of State’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and 
Compliance, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) database. All 
data is presented in constant 2015 US dollars. Economic data is taken from the 
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Rank Country Defense budgets in USD bn 
1 United States 606.23 
2 People’s Republic of China 225.71 
3 Russia 70.35 
4 Saudi Arabia 61.39 
5 France 55.68 
6 India 55.63 
7 United Kingdom 54.22 
8 Japan 41.57 
9 Germany 40.99 
10 South Korea 37.27 
Table 3.1: Top 10 Defense Budgets (2016) 
 
However, when comparing the real value amount, the trend is more 
concerning. When considering the constant dollars spent, and the notion that 
defense expenditure is being invested on sophisticated platforms of a certain 
type, the picture presented is more troubling. Post the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis, when most regions recorded dips in military expenditure, defense 
investments in the Asia-Pacific rose and overtook those in Western Europe 
(Figure 3.1). East Asia is the only region where aggregate military spending 
has increased every year since 1995. The sustained rapid growth in China’s 
military outlays has made a significant contribution to this trend. Considering 
that American military spending is allocated for global contingencies and not 
regional theatres, unsurprisingly, China accounts for the bulk of regional 
defense spending, with 42 percent in 2013 alone. Beijing bounced back very 
quickly after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and its defense expenditure 
resumed its rapid growth compared to the rest of Northeast Asia, where Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan have had only minimal increases in recent years 
(Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). In constant dollars, China has recorded two 
decades of double-digit increases in annual defense spending (See Figure 3.4). 
 
                                                
International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook. See US Department of 
State, WMEAT 2016, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2016/index.htm; IISS, The 
Military Balance (London: Routledge and IISS), 
http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance; SIPRI, SIPRI Military Expenditure 
Database 1988-2015, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex; and IMF, World Economic 
Outlook, http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28.  
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of Regional Military Expenditure (1995-2016) 
 
Figure 3.2: Regional Proportions of Asia-Pacific Military Expenditure (2016)3 
 
                                                
3 North Korea has been excluded from regional trends overview because estimates of its 
military expenditure are particularly unreliable.  The United States is also excluded from 
regional trends overview due to its military expenditure encompassing its global outlook 
and reach. 
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Figure 3.3: Breakdown of Asia-Pacific Military Expenditure (1995-2016) 
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It is also instructive to look at the proportion of GDP that countries spend on 
defense. When using this measure, it appears that most countries invest only 
a modest share of their GDP in defense and in some cases, in fact, there has 
even been a decline (Figure 3.4 and 3.5).  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Northeast Asia Proportion of GDP on Defense Spending (1995-2016) 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Southeast Asia Proportion of GDP on Defense Spending (1995-2016) 
 
At first glance, other Asia-Pacific regional countries do not come close to 
China’s investments, and, as with China, their spending as part of GDP also 
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appears rather modest. However, although this measure suggests that the 
security anxieties in the region are not acute, it is still the case that most states 
are at least sustaining the level of military expenditure in real terms. Coupled 
with the evident determination to invest in more sophisticated, higher 
capability platforms, produces a picture of maritime force postures in the 
region that is significantly more vibrant than much of the military expenditure 
data seems to suggest. South Korea’s defense expenditure was affected the 
most by the Global Financial Crisis whereas Japan and Taiwan’s had already 
declined before the event. But often overlooked, after the Global Financial 
Crisis neither defense spending nor the major equipment programs in 
Northeast Asian countries decreased or plateaued (Figure 3.6). 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Northeast Asia Regional Comparison of Platforms vs. Expenditure (1995-2016) 
 
The period between 1995 and 2006 in which military expenditure increased, 
and the levels of platforms also increased, indicating the beginning of a cycle 
of military modernization—obsolescent equipment being replaced or 
upgraded and expenditure increased to provide replacements. 4  However, 
                                                
4 This practice is similar to the “maintenance of the status quo” process described by Buzan 
and Herring, and the “structural disarmament” process described by Ron Matthews. See 
Buzan and Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, 80; and Ron Matthews and Curie 
Maharani, “The Defense Iron Triangle Revisited,” in The Modern Defense Industry: Political, 
Economic, and Technological Issues, ed. Richard A. Bitzinger (Santa Barbara: Praeger 
Security, 2009), Chapter 3, Google e-book. 
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when the number of platforms started to decrease in 2007, military 
expenditure still increased, suggesting the rapid replacement of obsolescent 
platforms with more expensive platforms of higher levels of technological 
sophistication. That is, a higher investment in qualitative armaments to gain 
a technological edge, and then “flatline” quantitative investments in 
maintaining a competitive number of these sophisticated platforms. This 
suggests that Northeast Asia military programs were not solely influenced by 
economic performance. Rather, because of changing strategic dynamics, the 
development of naval and air capabilities has gone beyond the level needed 
to replace obsolescent equipment. More capable navies have been developed, 
supported by land-based aircraft for maritime surveillance and strike 
operations.  
 
In Southeast Asia, budgets and ambitions have been more limited compared 
with neighbors to the north, and many countries have attempted to rid 
themselves of obsolescent equipment through various modernization 
programs.5 However, such processes remain haphazard and do not account 
for the long-term maintenance required for sophisticated platforms, which 
could result in imbalanced forces structures. Of course, when compared with 
Northeast Asia, the absolute amount of defense expenditure in this region 
remains modest. Real spending increases after the Asian Financial Crisis 
seem to have been driven by renewed economic growth rather than a response 
to a perceived adverse change in the regional security environment (See 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4). However, it is important to note that after the Global 
Financial Crisis (which impacted almost all Southeast Asian countries apart 
from Singapore and Indonesia), regional defense expenditure continued to 
rise. Singapore retained its top position, spending an average of five per cent 
of its GDP on defense and accounting for approximately 23 percent of 
regional defense spending. 6  But Malaysia and Thailand have also had 
significant increases in percentage terms, although this comes off relatively 
low bases. Indonesian spending is also increased, though again off a low base 
and the defense budget has remained below one per cent of GDP, as it is in 
                                                
5 Wendell Minnick, “Tighter Budgets Limit Southeast Asian Plans,” Defense News, April 
13, 2014, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140413/DEFREG03/304130015/.  
6 Based on figures from WMEAT database and IMF World Economic Outlook. 
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the Philippines (See Figures 3.4 and 3.5).7  
 
A comparison between military expenditure and major platforms across 
Southeast Asia (See Figures 3.3 and 3.7) demonstrates a steady increase in 
defense spending and plateauing numbers of platforms up until 2011, 
suggesting that Southeast Asian countries until then were focused on 
retaining minimum self-defense capability. However, from 2012 onwards, 
the number of platforms decreased whilst military expenditure continued to 
climb, indicating substantive efforts to modernize and invest in fewer but 
more capable platforms.  
 
 
Figure 3.7: Southeast Asia Regional Comparison of Platforms vs. Expenditure (1995-2016) 
 
Furthermore, a complicating factor when examining the number of naval 
platforms has been the rise of patrol and coastal combatants as a proxy for 
surface combatants. The majority of patrol and coastal combatants—under 
agencies of various euphemisms—are armed, funded, manned and equipped 
by associated navies. Although, the need to patrol EEZs and Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOCs) have driven the rise of these numbers, the numbers 
seem to indicate that such capabilities now extend beyond just maritime 
constabulary needs (See Figure 3.8). This is evident as EEZs and UNCLOs 
was formally adopted only in 1982, with the 1994 Third United Conference 
                                                
7 Richard C. Smith, “Asian Military Modernisation,” Lowy Institute Perspectives (October 
7, 2008), 2. 
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on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) increasing the requirements for 
surveillance and power projection over 200nm EEZs.8 Since 2010 there has 
been a surge in acquisitions for patrol and coastal combatants across the Asia-
Pacific. When viewed in total, most activity in the acquisition of armed patrol 
and coastal combatants has been in the frigate, corvette, and off-shore patrol 
vessel and patrol boat/craft platform categories, with all states acquiring these 
platform types since 2010.9  
 
 
Figure 3.8: Regional Comparison of Patrol and Coastal Combatants (1995-2016)10 
 
In addition, it is important to note that maintaining a competitive and 
innovative defense industrial base, not least to respond to export opportunities 
(See Figure 3.9), remains a significant driver of force posture upgrades, 
particularly in Northeast Asia. Typically, defense technologies are 
indigenously developed and then supplied to the respective countries’ defense 
forces before being primed for export.  
                                                
8 Sam Bateman, “Coast Guards: New Forces For Regional Order and Security,” East-West 
Center: Asia-Pacific Issues 65 (January 2003). 
9 See also IISS, The Military Balance 2016, 216. 
10 NB: Patrol and coastal combatants includes all naval and paramilitary patrol and coastal 
combatants e.g. Customs, Marines, Maritime Police, Marine Police, Fisheries Police; China 
Maritime Safety Administration established in October 1998, and China Coast Guard 
formed in June 2013; ROC Coast Guard established in 2010; and Vietnam Coast Guard 
established September 1, 1998. 
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of Value of Arms Exports for PRC, Japan, ROK and the US in USD 
billion (1995-2016) 
 
However, apart from providing general trends this data does not provide 
sufficient explanation for regional security postures or explanations for 
military modernization and arming. It is significant that in 2009, for the first 
time, East Asia as a region has displaced Western Europe—the core arena 
during the Cold War—as the second-highest regional defense spender. The 
exponential growth in Chinese defense spending is disproportionately 
responsible for this trend. However, it can be reasonably inferred that 
widespread anxieties in the Western Pacific, coupled with concerns about 
American commitments to its historical security obligations in Asia are 
sustaining absolute levels of military expenditure elsewhere, such as Japan 
and South Korea. As will be further explained, China’s military force posture 
aspirations lie unmistakably in the direction of power projection. Overall, 
regional trends suggest that there is no single-factor explanation for the naval 
and associated air capabilities development of the past decade in the Asia-
Pacific.11  Rather a multitude of variables have influenced—to greater or 
lesser extents, and in varying combinations—different countries at different 
times since 2001. 
 
                                                
11 Andrew Davies, “Asian Military Trends and their Implications for Australia,” ASPI 
Strategic Insights 42 (July 2008): 2. 
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Possible Explanations 
Regional countries in the Asia-Pacific demonstrate commonalities in the 
motivation to arm, but also country-specific differences. First, one of the most 
significant drivers of arming dynamics appears to have been the changing 
balance of power. That is, the growing concerns of regional small and middle 
powers about an increasing threat stemming from competition between major 
regional powers. The Asia-Pacific maritime balance of power began to 
fundamentally change around 2000 when China started to address what has 
been a historic strategic weakness—its vulnerability to military intervention 
from the sea.12 The perceived relative decline of US military power has led 
to increased regional concerns about the intentions behind the development 
of power projection capabilities on the part of not only China, but also Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam.  
 
Second, alliance commitments have influenced modernization decisions in 
the Asia-Pacific. Arms and alliances are (imperfect) substitutes for each other; 
either of them may be adopted as a means to advance a nation’s security. The 
presence of the alliance leader–the US—has often enabled regional allies to 
acquire sophisticated weapons. Additionally, when considering abandonment 
and entrapment dynamics, a policy based on arms or alliances translates into 
a matter of control over a country’s decisions. 13 A defense policy based on 
self-reliance theoretically allows countries to avoid the risks of abandonment 
and entrapment, whereas a policy based on alliances enables a country to 
minimize the cost of purchasing or producing arms. 14 Self-reliance, that is, 
the ability to operate independently when necessary, and with partners when 
                                                
12 Michael McDevitt, “Small Navies in Asia: The Strategic Rationale for Growth,” in Small 
Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace, ed. Michael Mulqueen, 
Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller (London: Routledge and Corbett Centre For Maritime 
Policy Studies, 2016), Google e-book, Chapter 6.  
13 Sorokin, “Arms, Alliances and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries,” 424. Here, 
abandonment is defined as a “fear that the ally may leave the alliance may not live up to 
explicit commitments, or may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is 
expected.” Entrapment “occurs when an alliance commitment turns detrimental to one’s 
interest. It is the entanglement in a dispute over an ally’s interest that one does not share, or 
values only partially.” Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical 
Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, 
no. 2 (2000): 265. See also, Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”; and 
Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 
2009): 86-120. 
14 Sorokin, “Arms, Alliances and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries,” 424. 
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required, is the base requirement for all military modernization programs. The 
1969 Guam doctrine and the post-Cold War context since 1989 created 
stronger expectations of enhanced self-reliance to better deal with regional 
contingencies on the basis of a country’s own resources. This involved a 
primary emphasis on the defense of maritime approaches, which translated 
into a re-orientation and re-prioritizing of naval and associated air capabilities. 
Additionally, a policy of “pure” defense self-reliance is simply unrealistic in 
the face of China’s rapid and comprehensive military modernization has 
made a policy of “pure” defense self-reliance is simply unrealistic for a 
number of neighboring countries. These states have therefore been drawn to 
policy settings that combine arms and alliance policies as a means to both 
lower costs and reduce the risk of entrapment and abandonment. 
 
Third, the salience of regional conflict increased, especially with regards to 
competing sovereignty claims arising from maritime territorial disputes in the 
East and South China Seas. Sovereignty, legitimacy and territorial disputes 
over maritime boundaries dominate many relationships in the Asia-Pacific 
(Figure 3.10): 
1. The unresolved dispute between the PRC and Japan to the Pinnacle 
Islands (Diaoyu or Senkaku), as well as the maritime boundaries 
around Okinotorishima (or Okinotori Islands). 
2. The unresolved dispute between Japan and South Korea over 
Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima or Dokdo) in the southern part of the Sea 
of Japan. 
3. The unresolved dispute between China and South Korea over Socotra 
Rock (Ieodo or Suyan), which both claim as part of its EEZ.  
4. Divided sovereignty on the Korean Peninsula, where some 1.4 million 
ground forces of the Republic of Korea and Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) remain deployed against 
each other across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and the dispute over 
their maritime boundary in the Yellow (or West) Sea. 
5. Competing sovereignty claims of the Chinese regimes on mainland 
China and Taiwan. 
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6. The unresolved dispute between China and Vietnam over the Paracel 
Islands (Xisha Quandao or Quan Doa Hoang Sa) in the South China 
Sea. 
7. The unresolved claims over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, 
disputed by China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and the 
Philippines. 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Asia-Pacific Maritime Disputes15 
 
Northeast Asian countries’ vigorous naval modernization programs suggest 
                                                
15 CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University. 
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not just the desire to balance or hedge16 against potential threats, but also 
protect sovereignty claims. Particularly for the PRC, Japan and South Korea, 
highly capable blue-water navies are being developed, including modern 
surface combatants (destroyers and frigates), aircraft carriers 
(euphemistically called “amphibious transport ships” or “sea control ships”), 
new submarines, as well as land-based aircraft for both maritime surveillance 
and strike. For Southeast Asia, sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea 
have dominated strategic explanations for developing naval capabilities, in 
submarines and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).17  
 
Related to this is the protection of EEZs, critical SLOCs, and fisheries and 
other marine resources. For instance, Japan as an island nation has been 
particularly reliant “on other countries for the supply of natural resources, 
energy, food, and many other materials which are indispensable to national 
existence.”18 Other countries have also become concerned about increasing 
illegal activity such as piracy and smuggling in the Malacca Straits and the 
surrounding access ways in the South China Sea. Additionally, the 1994 
UNCLOS III convention19 meant that many regional countries had to fulfill 
requirements to project capabilities over resource-rich maritime areas that 
were greater than their land areas. These maritime disputes and potential 
conflicts have become significant in shaping the naval modernization 
programs of the Asia-Pacific. They drive, for instance, the requirement for 
greater maritime surveillance capabilities and maritime constabulary 
operations, including maritime reconnaissance aircraft, such as P-3C Orions, 
ground-based signals intelligence systems, longer-endurance surface 
                                                
16 Here, hedging is defined as “an alignment choice involving the signaling of ambiguity 
over the extent of shared security interests with great powers,” which requires a state to 
make a “trade-off between the fundamental (but conflicting) interests of autonomy and 
alignment.” See Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of 
Alignment in East Asia,” Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015): 698, 703 (696-272). 
17 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Southeast Asian States Deploy Conventional Submarines,” The 
Diplomat, January 3, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/southeast-asian-states-deploy-
conventional-submarines/.  
18 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1990 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1990), 
116. 
19 Bateman, “Coast Guards.” 
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combatants, platforms able to launch anti-ship missiles, and longer range 
aircraft and aerial refueling tanker aircraft.20  
 
Fourth, a complex link exists between fiscal considerations and maintaining 
an armed force. Bernard Brodie stated that “in making choices among 
weapons systems and related systems, like radar-warning networks, the 
military budget is always the major and omnipresent constraint …we are 
inevitably concerned with (a) how the size of the national defense budget is 
determined, and (b) what sorts of considerations determine choices within the 
limits set by the budget.” 21  Hedley Bull explored the economic and 
institutional dimensions of the causes of military competition. He referred to 
Immanuel Kant’s proposition that the abolition of “standing armies links the 
contention that they are an economic burden with the contention that they are 
a cause of war, his argument being that the burden becomes so heavy in the 
long run that aggressive war is undertaken to remove it.”22 The notion that 
states undertake wars of aggression to eliminate the primary external threat 
and provide relief from the financial burden of maintaining a large and 
permanent military force, highlights the important link between a state’s 
fiscal situation and its level of armaments.23  On the one hand, “military 
Keynesianism” can be a means of economic stimulation, particularly in states 
with a large military-industrial infrastructure like the US.24 For instance, 
rearmament aided the Third Reich in the 1930s, and the US prior to and 
especially after entering WWII, to overcome economic depression.25  
 
On the other hand, economic growth often reduces the difficulty of increasing 
resources for defense simply because it can be done without challenging the 
                                                
20 Bateman, “Coast Guards”; and David Rosenberg and Christopher Chung, “Maritime 
Security in the South China Sea: Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities,” Ocean 
Development and International Law 39, no. 1 (2008): 51-69. 
21 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1959), 361 
22 Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, 12, fn. 3. 
23 See theories on “preventive war,” for instance David C. Kang, “International Relations 
Theory and the Second World War,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 3 (September 
2003): 301-324; and Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are 
Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics 44 (January 1992): 235-269. 
24 Buzan and Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, 107. 
25 David Gold, “Does Military Spending Stimulate or Retard Economic Performance? 
Revisiting an Old Debate” (International Affairs at The New School Working Paper, 2005-
01), 2. 
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expectations of any other claimant to the governments resources.26 This was 
the dominant explanation for rising defense spending in the Asia-Pacific in 
the mid-1980s to early 1990s, which many analysts chose to label a “regional 
arms race.” 27  The majority of regional countries experienced economic 
growth in the past couple of decades—interrupted by the 1997-1998 Asian 
Financial Crisis—which provided the financial stimulus for modernization 
programs. In the first round of modernization, those countries with the highest 
rates of growth of GDP had the highest increase in defense expenditure, while 
those countries with the slowest rates of economic growth experienced the 
slowest increase in defense expenditure. However, since 2001, while there 
remains a positive correlation between economic growth and defense 
expenditure, the relationship between the two is not as close and has been 
complicated by other variables. 
 
Fifth, state structures and institutions related to armaments can pursue 
interests of their own.28 Indeed, the Cold War US-USSR rivalry highlighted 
the anxiety that industrial and military elites pursued their own interests by 
stoking competition. In 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned 
against the “unwarranted influence” accrued by the “military industrial 
complex.”29 Moreover, the nature of modern military technology encourages 
some states to support an extensive R&D establishment which favors faster 
technological change in military equipment and becomes an additional force 
driving military competition.30 Technological change and development have 
become a decisive influence in the arms dynamic as military capability and 
technology are strongly correlated. As Buzan and Herring argue, technology 
is not just a problem in the hands of others, but a creator of security problems 
                                                
26 Ball, “Arms and Affluence,” 81. 
27 See Klare, “The Next Great Arms Race,” and Bates Gill, “Arms Acquisitions in East 
Asia” in SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press and SIPRI, 1994), 551-
562. 
28 Glaser, “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races,” 257. 
29 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “421-Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American 
People,” January 17, 1961, The American Presidency Project, University of California 
Santa Barbara, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12086&st=military-
industrial+complex&st1=.  
30 Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, 15; Harvey Brooks, “The Military Innovation 
System and the Qualitative Arms Race,” Daedalus 104, no. 3 (1975): 81-82; and Matthew 
Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and Soviet Union 
Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 269. 
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in itself, with technological change contributing to the greater destructiveness 
of war.31 China, Japan and South Korea have been particularly ambitious in 
driving independence in key areas of defense technology. This has largely 
been shaped by the collective role of American defense companies, through 
their provision of military equipment via export sales, which has channeled 
the development of indigenous defense-industrial capability.32 
 
Sixth, in many instances the desire for national prestige has had as much 
impact as geostrategic considerations. 33  The possession of sophisticated 
weapons and platforms, such as submarines, and the ability to operate and 
maintain them, has been regarded as an indicator of national wealth, 
technological prowess, and political modernity and sophistication. Modern 
military equipment thus becomes a symbol for national status and prestige. If 
one considers the spiral model, it incorporates the internal workings of the 
state. Philip Noel-Baker, for example, has argued that the increased influence 
of military officials in government decision-making, particularly in times of 
crisis, is a by-product of military competition. As Fallodon noted, whilst 
modernization may be a necessary process for a military institution, such 
measures cannot be viewed in isolation and inevitably neighbors and/or 
competitors will react to their own perception of threat. The increase in 
armaments erodes confidence, trust and restraint, leaving states primed for 
war. The underlying assumption behind the spiral model is that each actor has 
a self-centered perspective in which its own intentions are judged to be 
benevolent. While one’s own military modernization is justified on self-
protection grounds, those of the opponent are believed to have an aggressive 
intent. The “spiral model” stimulates the growth of nationalism and 
strengthens the appeal of armament policies. War then becomes a more likely 
policy choice because each society is psychologically predisposed to war and 
the national government becomes dominated by pro-military elements 
advocating the use of force in pursuit of national goals.34  War therefore 
                                                
31 Buzan and Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, 6. 
32 IISS, “Asia’s Growing Defence-Industrial Capabilities,” in IISS Strategic Dossier: Asia-
Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2016 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2016), 163.  
33 Ball, “Arms and Affluence,” 91-92. 
34 Noel-Baker, The Arms Race, 31-51. 
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becomes the likely and rather ironical outcome of states’ misguided efforts to 
preserve their security.35 This is particularly true in the case for China and its 
“naval nationalism,” and its desire for a carrier strike group capability and 
advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.36  
 
Interactive Arming: A New Framework 
It is thus important to develop a new framework based on strategic 
understandings of the use of force, and drawn from the regional-specific 
understanding of armaments dynamics, such as those in the Asia-Pacific. As 
Barry Posen has argued, any explanation for arming needs to combine 
systemic, national and subnational levels of analysis, consider quantitative 
and qualitative measurements of armaments, as well as identify structural and 
domestic causes of arming behavior.37  
 
The starting point for understanding the phenomenon of building armed 
forces is the contention or proposition that the term “arms race” is a 
“misnomer”38  and that this process is better characterized as a spectrum 
between two types of interactive arming (See Figure 3.11). This reflects 
Buzan and Herring’s notion of an arms dynamic that makes conflict more or 
less likely. However, unlike Buzan and Herring, this study contends that arms 
do not affect the likelihood of strategic competition or conflict, rather it is the 
perception of the strategic environment and the degree of political rivalry 
between actors. In addition, and reflecting Huntington’s ideas, interactive 
arming aims to affect the distribution of power, whether the intent is defensive 
or offensive. It does not assume that a codified pattern of behavior exists, 
rather, it is a framework for understanding arming as a strategic behavior. 
                                                
35 Paul F. Diehl, “Arms Races to War: Testing Some Empirical Linkages,” The 
Sociological Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1985): 332. 
36 Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism,” 65.  
37 See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany 
Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Hammond, 
Plowshares into Swords. 
38 That is, previously in the literature, the term “arms race” has been indistinguishable from 
the terms and definitions of “action-reaction,” “military competition,” and “military 
modernization.” 
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Interaction does not occur because of the “spiral model,” but because arming 
is a “natural function,” and essentially a means to fulfill political objectives.  
 
Interactive Arming 
Status Quo Belligerent 
Military modernization as reaction to 
strategic environment 
Political objective to use military force to 
affect the strategic environment  
Figure 3.11: Spectrum of Interactive Arming 
 
1. Status quo: A country responds to its strategic environment 
through the process of military modernization—a status quo 
situation. Countries aspire to develop military capabilities to 
provide for their defense, but seek to do so at the least financial 
cost. Among the potential risks associated with this approach is a 
defense capability less suited for rapid expansion in the event of a 
crisis. 
2. Belligerent: A country sets capability objectives with the intent to 
use force for a political objective. That is, at its most extreme the 
arming dynamic is expressed as a form of strategic competition: a 
state (1) perceives another state as a real and present danger; (2) 
is conscious that defense of its interests involves a significant risk 
of war; (3) is resolved to not be deterred from defending its 
interests, including through acquiring military capabilities 
deemed to be commensurate with this political posture; and (4) 
has the political objective of using force to affect the strategic 
environment. Competing has two core dimensions: defeating or 
deflecting the opponent’s strengths, and driving the competition 
into areas that play instead to one’s owns strengths. 
 
Interactive arming occurs between actors at the beginning or end of military 
modernization—when a political decision is made to develop a capability, or 
when that capability is fielded. This interaction is a “careful, continuous 
correlation of means and ends,” 39  responding to perceived shifts in the 
strategic environment. Any armament behavior inherently implies an 
                                                
39 Handel, Masters of War, 59. 
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interactive process, previously explained by international relations theorists 
as a “security dilemma.” However, as the strategic studies approach argues 
that material and ideational explanations are interdependent, this framework 
is informed by understandings of both the “security dilemma” and domestic 
determinants. Therefore, the following analysis utilizes its own lexicon that 
is based on the framework proposed above. An extension of the framework 
will be provided in the concluding chapter, based on the empirical results of 
the case study analysis.  
 
Five Sets of Cases 
The following five chapters examine a set of cases that, collectively, are 
expected to expose the full range of possible motivations behind armament 
decisions. The first case study examined is China, as its comprehensive 
military modernization, willingness to threaten and use force, and perceptions 
of its political intentions has spurred an interactive dynamic with the US, 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam. Consequently, China has been the 
centerpiece of this narrative and essential to understanding the changing 
capabilities and force structures of the key Asia-Pacific countries. 
 
The evidence from these cases support the “interactive arming” framework, 
and the proposition that the applicability of the “arms race” concept to 
understanding armament decisions in the Asia-Pacific is by comparison 
narrow and limited. As opposed to a universal theory or one dominant driver 
that explains military modernization for every case, or to prove the existence 
of an “arms race,” the evidence also demonstrates that each country has a 
specific and somewhat singular set of “key impulses.” Therefore, in order to 
examine which explanations had an impact on the military modernization of 
the five cases, it isolates the influence of a number of explanatory variables. 
Here, the dependent variable is the modernization of naval and associated air 
capabilities. The independent variables are: economic growth and increased 
financial investment for defense capabilities; changing balance of power; 
issues of sovereignty arising from maritime territorial disputes; requirements 
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for surveillance and protection of EEZs; national prestige; technology 
acquisition and reverse engineering; and alliance commitments.40  
 
The case studies are structured in three parts. Each has an introductory section 
called “Key Impulses,” which highlight the impulses expected to be most 
influential explanations of arming behavior in each case. Each case study then 
probes the arming behavior of the state concerned, seeking to confirm that 
arming is a “natural” function influenced by a variety of both domestic and 
geostrategic influences, and that, because states exist in a regional security 
environment, all arming is inescapably “interactive.” The concluding section 
of each case study assesses the findings against those anticipated.   
 
                                                
40 See Ball, “Arms and Affluence,” 79; Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, “The Military 
Build-up in the Asia-Pacific Region: Scope, Causes and Implications for Security” (SDSC 
Working Paper 264, Canberra: Australian National University, 1992), 10-17; Desmond 
Ball, “Trends in Military Acquisitions: Implications for Security and Prospects for 
Constraints/Control,” in The Making of a Security Community in the Asia Pacific, ed. Bunn 
Nagara and K.S. Balakrishnan (Kuala Lumpur: Proceedings of the 7th Asia-Pacific 
Roundtable, June 6-9, 1993), 132-141. 
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Chapter 4: 
China 
 
Key Impulses 
China’s long-term military modernization emphasizes the upgrading of its 
naval and air power, an aspiration that involves a drastic realignment of its 
traditional force structure. Such changes demonstrate that the People’s 
Liberation Army’s (PLA) responsibilities have expanded from its previous 
strong focus on homeland defense and internal stability to include both 
territorial defense and expeditionary duties.1 Whilst this modernization is 
often termed “rapid,” it has been an ongoing political and strategic process 
driven by competing and overlapping impulses.  
 
Four key impulses are driving Chinese military modernization. First, Beijing 
is motivated by the desire for strategic autonomy. Its investments and 
prioritizing of a self-reliant defense industry has driven foreign acquisitions 
for reverse engineering and technology transfer purposes to leapfrog 
generations in modern weapons systems. The drive to reduce its dependence 
on particularly Russian systems has led to a pattern of acquisitions of dual-
use military technologies as well as the theft of advanced weapons 
components, mainly sensors, radars and command and control parts. Despite 
the challenges in innovative capacity, China’s “trial and error” and reverse-
engineering methods, means it will inevitably have the technology and skill 
to have capabilities commensurate with its national prestige and economic 
weight. China lacks neither the will, nor resources or political backing to close 
the remaining gaps in its scientific, technological and industrial 
competencies.2 Second, China aims to erode the US alliance system and 
forward presence in the Asia-Pacific. China has shown a willingness to 
contest the US for power and influence, and not only to deter intervention in 
                                                
1 Timothy R. Heath, “Developments in China’s Military Force Projection and 
Expeditionary Capabilities,” (Testimony presented before the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, January 21, 2016), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT450.html. 
2 Ron Huisken, “The Emergence of China as a Military Power,” (Paper presented to the 5th 
East Asia Security Outlook Seminar, Brunei Darussalam, 29 January 2013), 12. 
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its sovereign affairs, but also to demonstrate its capability for blue-water 
power projection. It is unlikely that the PLA will match the “command of the 
commons,” that the US achieved in the decades following WWII, but this is 
not their objective. China aims to be a major power with global influence. 
However, Beijing is not attempting to replicate American primacy, rather it 
aims to erode Washington’s influence in Asia to create a favorable balance of 
power for China. 
 
Third, there is a perceived need to enforce sovereignty claims and secure 
easier access to the open ocean. China’s claims in the East and South China 
Seas have played a key role for both its geostrategic objectives as well as for 
its nationalist sentiments. On the one hand, the control of the “near and far 
seas” is essential for defending China’s expanding economic and strategic 
objectives, and consequently naval and associated air capabilities have been 
sought for both sea control and sea denial. On the other hand, the unqualified 
recognition of these territories as belonging to the mainland has been an 
important part of the CCP narrative to “righting the wrongs” of the Century 
of National Humiliation. Lastly, this desire to restore Chinese hegemony in 
the Asia-Pacific provides an overarching narrative for its comprehensive 
military transformation. Although there has been a debate about how long 
China can sustain its economic growth—which necessarily forms the basis of 
its national power—since the mid-1990s, Beijing has achieved an annual 
average GDP growth above six percent, has maintained its overarching 
strategic objective of counter-intervention for its military, and its nationalist 
rhetoric on the unification of its territories has proven resilient and popular 
among Chinese citizens.  
 
The “Chinese Dream” 
The CCP’s principle goal is to assure its political control over China as a one-
party system. To ensure survival of the CCP regime, the two pillars of the 
party’s domestic legitimacy are nationalism and economic benefits.3  The 
                                                
3 Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of 
Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter 
1998/99): 116. 
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CCP also places great emphasis on its goal to build armed forces 
commensurate with China’s ranking in the top tier of states in the 
international system.4 It must be noted that the CCP is the executive authority 
that defines China’s strategy and that the PLA is first and foremost the 
military arm of the CCP rather than the defense force of the PRC. The CCP 
has utilized nationalist ideology to build a broad base of national support for 
both its domestic and foreign policy.5 This stems from a significant historical 
narrative of the late 19th century: a weak and corrupt Qing dynasty being 
humiliated by the West, increasingly forced into unequal treaties and 
arrangements.6 The perception of China’s humiliation by the West, or the 
“Century of National Humiliation,” remains a significant influence on the 
modern Chinese worldview. China’s defeat by Britain and France in the 
Opium Wars (1839-1860), and its bitter historical experience with the West, 
has fueled Chinese thinking regarding Western “interference” in China’s 
internal affairs. The severity of its perceived wounds—especially with 
regards to its ancient symbolic supremacy, and civilizational and 
technological superiority—has driven a political discourse to rebuild China 
as the legitimate political “ruler” of Asia. This desire to correct the historical 
anomaly of China’s subordination to the West during the Century of National 
Humiliation influences China’s strategic thinking, particularly with regards 
to its territorial ambitions in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea and the 
South China Sea. For instance, in an analysis of the PRC’s need for a blue 
water navy, strategist Guo Yadong has described the Chinese nation as having 
“suffered disgrace for almost one hundred years” because of the invasions by 
the naval forces of the major powers.7  
 
This Chinese nationalism is a volatile mix of rising pride and lingering 
anxiety in the post-Cold War world. A shared objective of holding the nation 
                                                
4 Ian Easton, “China’s Maritime Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional 
Stability,” Project 2049 Report (September 26, 2013), 4. 
5 Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Approaches toward East Asian Regional 
Cooperation” (Paper for International Institutions and Global Governance Program and 
Japan Program, Council on Foreign Relations, December 2009), 1. 
6 Christopher A. Ford, “The Past as Prism: China and the Shock of Plural Sovereignty,” 
Joint Forces Quarterly 47 (4th Quarter, 2007): 19. 
7 Guo Yadong, “China Should Resist Noises of Threat Theories and Stick to Building Deep 
Blue Navy,” Huanqiu Shihao Online, May 5, 2010, Open Source Center: 
CPP2010050671007. 
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together during the turbulent rise to great power status has reinvigorated the 
loyalty of the Chinese people to the CCP-led state, and it is likely that the 
CCP will continue to enjoy the political support of its citizens even if the 
resources devoted to the internal security mission match those directed at 
modernizing the PLA and protecting national sovereignty. In 2013, when Xi 
Jinping became Chairman of the CCP, head of state and Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission (CMC), he called for the continued realization 
of the great renaissance of the Chinese nation and the “Chinese Dream.” 
According to many,8  Xi’s “Chinese Dream” slogan was inspired from a 
popular book by Colonel Liu Mingfu, The China Dream: The Great Power 
Thinking and Strategic Position of China in the Post-American Era.9 The 
book argues that China should aim to surpass the US as the world’s top 
military power, and that to be a strong nation a wealthy country needs to 
convert its economic successes into military power. Before ascending to the 
presidency, Xi visited the Haikou, a guided-missile destroyer that had been 
used to patrol the South China Sea, and remarked: “This dream can be said to 
be the dream of a strong nation. And for the military it is a dream of a strong 
military … To achieve the great revival of the Chinese nation, we must ensure 
there is unison between a prosperous country and strong military.”10  
 
Alongside the significant narrative of status and prestige, China began in the 
1970s to recognize the potential economic value of controlling its maritime 
approaches, which had been largely ignored under Mao Zedong. 11  The 
importance of control of the seas to China’s economic development was 
                                                
8 See Jeremy Page, “For Xi, a ‘China Dream’ of Military Power,” The Wall Street Journal, 
March 13, 2013, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324128504578348774040546346; and 
Edward Wong, “Chinese Colonel’s Hard-Line Views Seeps Into the Mainstream,” The New 
York Times, October 2, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/03/world/asia/chinese-
colonels-hard-line-views-seep-into-the-mainstream.html. 
9 Liu Mingfu, Zhongguo meng: hou Meiguo shidai de daguo siwei zhanlue dingwei [The 
China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Position of China in the Post-
American Era] (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi, 2010). 
10 Quoted in Edward Wong, “China’s Communist Party Chief Acts to Bolster Military,” 
The New York Times, December, 14 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/world/asia/chinas-xi-jinping-acts-to-bolster-
military.html.  
11 Daniel M. Hartnett, “China’s Evolving Interests and Activities in the East China Sea,” in 
The Long Littoral Project: East China and Yellow Seas—A Maritime Perspective on Indo-
Pacific Security, ed. Michael A. Devitt and Catherine K. Lea (Alexandria: Center for Naval 
Analyses, September 2012), 83-86. 
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influenced by economic considerations for the potential for hydrocarbons and 
minerals in the seabed, the significance of fisheries, and the increasing 
dependence on sea-lanes for China’s fledgling export economy. In 1985, 
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
reassessed its strategic outlook and concluded that the country was no longer 
facing an imminent threat of war, and therefore projected that China could 
enjoy a relatively stable environment for the foreseeable future. This afforded 
Beijing a strategic window of opportunity to focus on modernizing and 
downsizing the military in light of new requirements to fight a smaller and 
more technical war, referred to as “local war” (jubu zhanzheng) in PLA 
terminology.12  
 
A key figure in China’s naval modernization was General Liu Huaqing (1916-
2011), who for much of the 1980s as commander of the PLA Navy (PLAN) 
spearheaded ambitious efforts to transform the Chinese navy from a coastal 
defense force into a blue water navy.13  In 1986, Liu’s position as naval 
commander helped push the PLAN to formally shift its strategy from “Coastal 
Defense” (jin’an fangyu) to “Offshore Defense” (jinhai fangyu or “near seas 
active defense”). This required the navy to conduct independent operations 
actions further out from China’s coasts to defend its territorial maritime 
claims.14 Liu recognized that the PLAN was unable to meet the requirements 
of this strategy and that it needed to develop four capabilities: (1) the ability 
to achieve limited sea control in certain areas for a certain period of time; (2) 
the ability to effectively defend China’s sea lanes; (3), the ability to fight 
outside of China’s claimed maritime areas; and (4) the ability to implement a 
credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.15 
 
                                                
12 Yao Yunzhu, “The Evolution of Military Doctrine of the Chinese PLA from 1985 to 
1995,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 7, no. 2 (1995): 57-62. 
13 Edward Wong, “Liu Huaqing Dies at 94; Oversaw Modernization of China’s Navy,” The 
New York Times, January 16, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/world/asia/18liu.html.  
14 Daniel M. Hartnett, “The Father of the Modern Chinese Navy – Liu Huaqing,” Center for 
International Maritime Security Blog, October 8, 2014, http://cimsec.org/father-modern-
chinese-navy-liu-huaqing/13291.  
15 Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu [Memoirs of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: PLA Publishing 
House, 2004), 1-6. 
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Beijing has also expressed, more or less obliquely, the objective to change the 
post-Cold War distribution of power that upholds American leadership and 
primacy. Part of this strategic objective is to undermine American-led 
institutions that are believed by the CCP to counter China’s accession as a 
global power and the natural leader of Asia.16 Two examples of this strategy 
are Beijing’s establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB)17 and its 1992 declaration of its Law on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone (“1992 Territorial Sea Law”).18 The establishment of the 
AIIB aims to provide an alternative to Bretton Woods institutions, namely the 
World Bank and the IMF, which are viewed by many Chinese as a mere 
extension of US foreign policy.19 Despite the intent to fund much-needed 
infrastructure projects in the developing countries of Asia, when considering 
the governance structure it is clear the overall purpose is to increase China’s 
global influence. Only the PRC has a veto, the personnel rules are structured 
such that Beijing will provide all staff, and the emphasis on not having 
political tests for aid ensures China will not be encumbered in using AIIB 
funds for supporting friendly despots.20 Its 1992 Territorial Sea Law is a 
direct challenge to UNCLOS.21 China only joined the international maritime 
                                                
16 See G. John Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal 
Order,” Foreign Affairs 93, no 3 (May/June 2014): 80-90; and Randall L. Schweller and 
Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of US 
Decline,” International Security 36, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 41-72. 
17 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, “Articles of Agreement,” Asian Infrastructure 
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18 People’s Republic of China, “Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 
February 1992,” 24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, February 25, 1992, 
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19 Ming Wan, “The AIIB versus the World Bank and the ADB,” in The Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank: The Construction of Power and the Struggle for the East Asian 
International Order, ed. Ming Wan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 58-91. See 
also, Cary Huang, “China-led Asian bank challenges US dominance of global economy,” 
South China Morning Post, April 11, 2015, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1763525/china-led-asian-bank-
challenges-us-dominance-global-economy; and Chua Chin Leng, “AIIB Starts New Era for 
Asia,” China Daily, January 1, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-
01/16/content_23114658.htm.  
20 Paula Subacchi, “The AIIB is a Threat to Global Economic Governance,” Foreign 
Policy, March 31, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/31/the-aiib-is-a-threat-to-global-
economic-governance-china/.  
21 UN Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, “United National Convention on the 
Law of the Sea,” United Nations, December 10, 1982, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm.  
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community, UNCLOS III, to rally developing countries to fight against the 
so-called maritime hegemony of the United States and former Soviet Union. 
However, as the significance of its naval force and merchant shipping grew 
so did the desire to reshape the legal regime for China’s territory and 
territorial claims at sea; with significant implications for the East and South 
China Seas.22 
 
This narrative motivates military modernization to make the PLA’s 
capabilities commensurate with its international standing as a major power. 
That is, to indigenously create a modern military without reliance on Western 
scientific and technological innovation. This was reflected in a memo 
circulated by senior leaders to Party members in a document issued by the 
General Office of the Communist Party of China in April 2013, known as 
“Document 9” or the Briefing on the Current Situation in the Ideological 
Realm.23 The memo issued a warning that power could escape the grip of the 
CCP unless the party eradicated seven subversive currents coursing through 
Chinese society, with the number one problem being “Western constitutional 
democracy,” whose promotion would “undermine the current leadership and 
the socialism with Chinese characteristics system of governance.”24 It went 
on to denounce the promotion of universal values, civil society, neo-
liberalism, the “West’s idea of journalism,” the “undermining of the history 
of the CCP and of new China.”25  Consequently, a special place in PLA 
strategy is maintaining the perception that the CCP is best suited to protect 
China and to uphold its territorial claims, core national interests, as well as to 
maintain state sovereignty and prevent the imposition of Western values. 
 
The “Chinese Dream” relies on maintaining China’s economic strength. 
                                                
22 Hyun-Soo Kim, “The 1992 Chinese Territorial Sea Law in the Light of the UN 
Convention,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43, no. 4 (October 1994): 
894-904; and Liyu Wang and Peter H. Pearse, “The New Legal Regime for China’s 
Territorial Sea,” Ocean Development & International Law 24, no. 4 (1994): 431-442. 
23 Stanley Lubman, “Document No. 9: The Party Attacks Western Democratic Ideals,” The 
Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2013, 
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24 “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation,” ChinaFile, November 8, 2013, 
https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.  
25 “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation.” 
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Conversely, China’s economic strength has been a rallying point for its 
national prestige and upholding the CCP’s political legitimacy. As China 
specialist David Shambaugh has argued: “as China has grown economically 
more powerful in recent years, nationalism has increased exponentially,” and 
increased Chinese strength “is likely to result in increased defensiveness and 
assertiveness.”26 Other observers have also noted that as China’s economic 
growth continues, so too has its ability to develop military capabilities that 
support more aggressive national security policies. 27  China’s economic 
conditions are thus intimately connected to its national prestige and national 
security, and consequently influences its ability to sustain military 
modernization as well as the development of new military capabilities. Due 
to the close connection between nationalism, economy and national security, 
it is very likely that China will continue to have the fiscal strength and 
political will to support such defense-spending growth and military 
modernization at comparable levels. Hardly faltering during the Asian 
Financial Crisis, its defense budget has increased by double digit figures 
nearly every year since 1988—an increase of eight-fold over the last twenty 
years.28 In March 2014, Beijing announced a 12.2 percent increase of its 
military budget to USD132 billion, continuing more than two decades of 
double-digit increases in annual defense spending. Its fiscal strength supports 
the implementation of strategic and military objectives that stretch into the 
Far East along the old Silk Road (“One Belt, One Road”), into the Indian and 
South Pacific Oceans, as well as in South America, Africa and in the Arctic 
Circle.29 
 
At this juncture, it is important to briefly discuss the lack of transparency of 
China’s military expenditure. As China’s GDP has grown, so has its spending 
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on weapons and military. However, establishing the actual defense outlay for 
China is difficult as the PLA has long been able to generate impressive side 
revenues by establishing corporations and by commercializing amounts of 
land entrusted to it. 30  According to Transparency International, China is 
responsible for 12 percent of the world’s declared defense spending, but 30 
percent of the world’s secretive defense spending. It is estimated that off-the-
books spending ranges from 35 to 50 percent of total military expenditure. 31 
Based on China’s declared 2013 defense expenditure, this could be up to 
USD81 billion, which makes it very difficult to form an accurate assessment 
of what capabilities the CCP and PLA is spending their money on.32 Further, 
“no information is available on acquisition planning and only broad details 
are disclosed on actual and planned purchases.” The expenses for China’s 
paramilitary forces and the PLA’s own revenue stream, and the allocation of 
these funds, also remains uncertain. 33 The lack of transparency on defense 
outlay and capability does little to assuage neighbors as opponents’ 
acquisitions and enhancements are interpreted as attempts to coerce. Secretive 
decision-making in defense creates perceptions of unpredictability which 
causes observers to draw a host of various conclusions over underlying 
motives. Yet despite the opacity, the declared military budget of the CCP still 
serves as a useful guideline to national strategic intentions, priorities and 
policies—in particular, the modernization priorities, as a long-term indicator 
of the sustainability of spending, and a reflection of the state of civil military 
affairs.34 
 
Overall, the “Chinese Dream” reflects the desire to have the military and 
industrial power with cutting-edge science and technology that is 
commensurate with its national prestige and economic weight. Increasing 
investment into its defense industry and space program, the planned 
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acquisition of up to six aircraft carriers, and the indigenous production of 
stealth jets aim to demonstrate that China is technologically advanced and 
capable of innovation. China’s leadership has used its authority and centrally-
controlled economy to align its national culture with the needs for economic 
growth in science and technology, to promote military innovation.35 China’s 
aircraft carrier, space program and submarines are much circulated images, 
for instance, Chinese soldiers are regularly photographed spelling out the 
characters for “Chinese dream, strong military dream”; and its key weapons 
investments featured on a set of commemorative postage stamps for the 
“Chinese Dream.”36 
 
However, although China has long-term objectives and capabilities for 
advanced technological capabilities, in the short-term its fiscal situation is 
challenging. This was hinted at in November 2013, when the newly installed 
President Xi laid out a sweeping economic and structural reform agenda in 
the November 2013 Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Central 
Committee. 37  This agenda largely addressed local-government fiscal 
imbalances, including the central government taking on some spending on 
social services overseen by local governments, as opposed to big-ticket 
reforms. The situation continued to manifest in 2014 through to 2015 with 
growing indications of slowing growth, increasing debt, hints of deflation, 
troubles in both the stock market and the real estate sector, decreasing 
currency reserves, and very limited policy options.38 Xi was quoted in Xinhua: 
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“We must boost our confidence, adapt to the new normal condition based on 
the characteristics of China’s economic growth in the current phase and stay 
cool-minded.”39  
 
This “new normal” of China’s economic conditions was seen again in 2015 
with record-setting downturns and mismanaged government interventions, 
culminating in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Indices falling 32 and 
40 percent respectively in July, wiping out almost USD5 trillion in value. The 
beginning of 2016 also saw a steep sell-off in the stock market, which saw 
the CCP intervene with circuit-breakers to halt trading, yet within thirty 
minutes of reopening, the stock market had lost the 20 percent of value it had 
regained since December. 40 Alongside this, China reported that its foreign 
currency reserved plunged by USD99.5 billion in its attempts to boost the 
value of its own currency and stem the flow of capital flight overseas.41 On 
January 26, 2016, it was announced that the head of China’s National Bureau 
of Statistics, Wang Baoan, had been sacked and was being probed for 
corruption—a process that almost always guarantees a criminal conviction.42 
The conviction followed the release of data by the bureau that showed China’s 
economy grew at the slowest pace in 25 years at 6.9 percent.43 
 
At least three other officials at the securities regulator were also detained in 
2015, all of whom played a role in approving initial public offerings on the 
stock market. The presidents of the Agricultural Bank of China and Minsheng 
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Bank were arrested in 2015, and at least seven officials at Citic Securities, 
China’s largest brokerage, were convicted for insider trading in allegations to 
Citic’s role in the CCP’s intervention to rescue the falling stock market in 
mid-2015.44 The CCP responded to signs of economic weakness—including 
falling global exports—with stimulus measures to chase growth targets, 
rolling back some central and local fiscal reforms, intervened to control the 
faltering stock market, and devalued its currency (renminbi). This 
demonstrated an acknowledgement that the Chinese economy—which over 
the past three decades has been driven by high levels of investment in export-
oriented manufacturing capacity and infrastructure—needs to shift to a 
consumption-driven growth model.45 According to Suisheng Zhao, “from a 
historical perspective, the current China model is only a transitional model of 
development. It may have to go from a value-free to a value-added transition 
involving the sequencing of economic growth, legal reforms, democratization 
and constitutionalism, with different aspects of the development being 
emphasized at different times in the process to continue its political stability 
and economic growth.”46 
 
The slowdown of China’s economy will have an impact on not only 
sustaining the increases to its military outlay and expenditure, but also its 
overall military strategy. First, the growth in Chinese military power and 
strategic weight has largely occurred on the back of its expanding economy 
and a slowdown would have a negative effect on its capacity to project power 
and extend its influence. The CCP is no more immune than any other regime 
to economic and fiscal realities.47 Second, with changes to the economy, it 
remains to be seen whether the CCP can sustain focus on both internal 
contingencies and external challenges. Due to the connection between the 
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CCP political legitimacy, economic growth and national security, Beijing has 
a vested interest in maintaining its economic and resource base. 
 
Reducing Dependence on Foreign Military Technology 
A significant part of realizing the “Chinese Dream” is the objective of self-
reliance and indigenization in military innovation and defense production. 
China has thus engaged in the acquisition of certain weapon systems from 
foreign suppliers for reverse engineering. In 1999 then-President Jiang Zemin 
called for further impetus to modernization after research revealed that if 
China tried to match American military technology in the short-term, rather 
than leapfrogging, the result after twenty years would be China falling even 
further behind. 48 For instance, combat information systems aboard modern 
American frigates provide access to integrated data management systems, and 
advanced electronic warfare systems deliver a leading edge in communication 
and signal processing technologies.49 PLAN frigates have yet to acquire or 
indigenously developed versions of these capabilities. Another example was 
China’s 1995 procurement of Russia Su-27SK Flanker jets. It secured a 
USD2.5 billion production license deal from Russia to build 200 Su-27SKs. 
However, in 2006 Russia terminated the contract after 95 aircraft had been 
built when Moscow discovered that Beijing had reverse-engineered the 
aircraft and was covertly manufacturing an indigenous variant, the Shenyang 
J-11B, with Chinese-built avionics and weapons. 50  The successive 
indigenous variants, the J-15 and J-16 have been at the forefront of Chinese 
attempts to produce long-range fourth-generation fighters. 51  Reverse-
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engineering is believed to be the impetus for China’s 2015 acquisition of 24 
Russian Su-35s.52 
 
Despite the hype surrounding its military modernization program, China’s 
military research and development is a “black box.” 53 There is no doubt that 
China has acquired small numbers of certain modern weapons systems for 
reverse engineering and technology transfer.54 Particularly for China’s naval 
and aviation industry, the continued reliance on foreign parts is one of its 
biggest liabilities. To this end, President Xi re-emphasized the importance of 
R&D for the PLA. In March 2014, a new committee formed at the top echelon 
of the CCP. “The Small Leading Group for Deepening Reform of National 
Defense and Military” signaled Xi’s determination for reform of the PLA’s 
industrial and technological support base.55 In August 2014, Xi also chaired 
a study session of the Politburo devoted to examining trends in military 
innovation, and called for the country’s military to make technical and 
strategic innovations and to close the gap with other powers in emerging 
trends in warfare.56 Xi stated that a global revolution in military science and 
technology was taking place “at a speed so fast, in a scope so wide, at a level 
so deep, and with an impact so great that it has been rarely seen since the end 
of World War Two.” He added that this required China’s defense 
establishment to “vigorously promote military innovation.”57 
 
China’s promotion of military innovation—via development of its own 
indigenous defense industry—has driven the acquisition of advanced military 
technology for transfer into indigenous production. The key aim of having an 
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independent indigenous world-class defense technology base is twofold. First, 
to decrease dependence on foreign, particularly Russian, systems, and second, 
to further China’s role in its domestic arms market to supply low-cost, low-
capability arms.58 To this end, China’s acquisition of technology has included 
external and internal sources of technology, purchases, theft of foreign 
technologies, foreign-assisted developments as well as fully indigenous 
capability projects, and strictly military-oriented technologies as well as those 
featuring dual uses. 59  For instance, the new PLAN surface combatants 
revealed a pattern of propulsion, command and control, sensors and weapons 
components either purchased or reverse-engineered from foreign sources. 
 
According to a 2012 US Defense Threat Reduction Agency report, there are 
five key Chinese acquisition strategies. First, “selective modernization,” 
which includes acquiring foreign technology to meet certain short- to mid-
term needs, while continuing to develop its indigenous R&D and production 
infrastructure over the long-term. This is the most cost-effective method of 
achieving rapid modernization. Second, the use of non-professional 
intelligence gatherers—such as research institutes and corporations—to 
illegally acquire certain technologies or information. Two prevalent tactics 
have been the “ethnic targeting” of Chinese Americans, and “actuarial 
intelligence” (the aggregation of small amounts of information from a wide 
variety of sources). Third, the practice of “reverse engineering.” If successful 
this could allow temporary parity with sophisticated adversaries, whose 
continuing development of new capabilities presents a constantly moving 
target. However, the efficacy of this practice can be overstated, and reverse 
engineering comes at the expense of building up China’s long-term capacity 
for indigenous innovation. Fourth, the reliance on domestic science and 
technology achievements, the cultivation of scientific talent at home, and 
enticing foreign-educated Chinese to return to China. However, successes 
have not extended beyond the realm of strategic weapons. Chinese R&D 
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continues to rely on Western innovations and its defense industry suffers from 
several deficiencies including a lack of competition among major weapons 
producers. Lastly, China has acquired foreign dual-use technologies for use 
in PLA weapons platforms, which is often developed or acquired through the 
commercial sector. The principle method of acquiring such technology has 
been to enter commercial arrangements with foreign corporations that 
explicitly require technology-sharing. 60  Whilst the objective of the five 
strategies is to reduce Chinese foreign dependence on military technology, 
the outcomes are ironically dependent on foreign technologies. 
 
A leading influence in China’s military modernization program is Yang Wei, 
the chief Director of Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute (a civil sector state-
owned enterprise [SOE]), who has become one of the most influential 
individuals in Chinese military aircraft development. He was a leading 
designer of two of China’s most prominent aircraft—the stealth J-20 Chengdu 
and the Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder, which has been marketed as a low-
cost export alternative to other fourth generation fighters. It has been argued 
that Yang was a key thinker behind China’s approach to designing and 
building combat aircraft: instead of designing and building brand-new aircraft 
from scratch, Beijing has “borrowed” from other countries’ design, has 
integrated some imported and/or indigenous technology, and has produced 
systems at a fraction of the cost.61 The US’ National Security Agency (NSA) 
has identified numerous theft of design and technology from American 
aircraft since the early 2000s, including the B-2 bomber, the F-22 Raptor and 
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Details of pervasive Chinese military 
cyber theft were revealed in classified documents made public by former 
contractor Edward Snowden.62  
 
In 2013, US officials revealed a broad Chinese campaign of espionage that 
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had gained access to designs for two dozen major weapons systems critical to 
missile defenses, combat aircraft and naval ships.63 A key example is the J-
20 and the J-31 Shenyang, which feature a design based on American 
technology by way of stolen blueprints for the F-35 JSF and F-22. In 2007, 
the US intelligence operation “Operation Byzantine Hades” uncovered a 
large-scale multi-year Chinese cyber espionage program that targeted 
governments and industry to steal sensitive technology and weapons 
enhancements for the J-20. Then in 2015, in the first publicly-stated link to 
the Chinese army, two Chinese soldiers faced extradition to the US on charges 
of raiding secure databases of American military contractors. Working with 
a Chinese immigrant and aviation entrepreneur in Vancouver, who directed 
the pair toward email accounts of American aviation engineers, the hackers 
mined corporate networks for engineering manuals related to the F-35, C-17 
and F-22 military aircraft.64 US defense officials stated that the stolen data 
was passed on to a Chinese military unit called Technical Reconnaissance 
Bureau in Chengdu province, and that the data was then passed to the state-
run Aviation Industry Corporation of China. The F-35 data theft was 
confirmed after photographs were published on Chinese websites showing a 
newer version of the J-20, which incorporated several design upgrades to its 
weapons systems, shortened exhaust nozzles, and tail and vertical fin 
modifications to reduce radar detection.65 
 
Such theft has had the dual benefit of increasing the efficiency and lowering 
the cost of China’s own military development, while also whittling away at 
the US’ technological edge. It is important to note that China’s defense 
companies are labeled a “strategic” industry by the CCP, and are thus SOEs 
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where the state maintains absolute control. 66  While the pattern of 
development in China’s civil SOE sector has involved the deepening 
integration of firms in globalized, transnational processes of R&D and 
production, this has not been mirrored in the defense sector SOEs. As the 
CCP retains absolute control, security-driven concerns, party-army business 
relations, potential conflicts of interest, and the level of resistance by Chinese 
defense industry with ongoing CCP reforms has limited the scope of 
development and innovation. To circumvent this problem the defense sector 
SOEs would have to rely on civil sector SOEs in order to access globalized 
industrial processes, without incurring political costs.67 
 
The Chinese defense industry, through its civil sector SOEs, has 
predominantly stolen science and technology (S&T) and as much R&D as 
possible, in order to expedite the building of complete military platforms. 
This was evident in the development of the J-10 aircraft in which China 
bought Russian Su-27 flankers, kept the airframe, and invested significantly 
in software and hardware such as the avionics, radar, missile system and 
infrared target system.68 However, it remains to be seen how much China can 
capitalize on stolen technology and information and leverage the technologies 
it acquires. “Beyond the mere acquisition of potentially useful 
technologies … China must also be able to effectively leverage—that is, to 
absorb, assimilate, and exploit—these technologies for military purposes.”69 
Compared to the American defense industry, China also lacks significantly in 
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innovative ability, and thus competitiveness. As such, the larger question 
remains as to how much progress has China made in the building and 
production of world-class indigenous defense capabilities. The development 
of indigenous capabilities traditionally involves a process typically depicted 
along the lines of (Figure 4.1): 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Process of Indigenous Development of Capabilities 
 
It is clear that China has invested in theft and reverse-engineering or RD/TE, 
however, this has come at the expense of producing its own S&T, which is 
the foundation of a self-reliant, indigenous and innovative defense industry. 
Consequently, Chinese defense industry has struggled with the production 
phase, as it has proven quite difficult to replicate and build the technology 
needed for advanced platforms. The Chinese defense industry still cannot 
emulate the significant role the US defense-industrial base provides the 
American armed forces in terms of innovation and building demonstrators. 
For instance, although there been progress in shipbuilding and China now 
possesses the capability to produce the hulls and propulsion of modern 
warships, the systems integration, propulsion design and manufacture 
capabilities have remained weak. Additionally, despite increased defense 
spending in R&D, rampant corruption and inefficient resource allocation has 
limited its ability to innovate and implement weapons contracts. 70 
Consequently, much effort and money has been put into “trial-and-error” for 
production, and although there has been greater awareness of how 
commercial competition supports innovation, the imperatives of state security 
has continued to exert a restraining influence on China’s success in defense-
industrial development. China’s objective of an independent, indigenous and 
innovative defense industry: 
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depends on the resolution of conflicts that are currently in play: desire to establish 
internationally competitive, national technology standards and various other efforts 
that involve wresting ever-more advanced technology transfers from foreign 
investors in order to aid creation of a more indigenous innovative society. The latter 
efforts will increasingly shape the type and amount of foreign investment in China. 
The conflict between open access to information and the national need to enforce 
political stability will also need to be addressed.71  
 
For the foreseeable future, it is thus likely that the theft of foreign intellectual 
property and purchase of foreign platforms will continue to play a part in 
China’s military modernization.72 
 
Strategic Competition with the United States 
The most significant influence on China’s military modernization is strategic 
competition with the United States. In the 1990s, four key events involving 
the US necessitated the CCP’s drive to increase the tempo of its military 
modernization. First, the announcement of sanctions by then-US President 
George W. Bush on China for violating human rights during the Tiananmen 
square (“June 4th”) incident marked the lowest point in Sino-US relations and 
the beginning of a prolonged period of strained relations. The imposed 
sanctions suspended high-level exchanges between the two countries and the 
halt of the sales of all military equipment and weapons to China. This led to 
the “dissolution of the US-China grand bargain”73 that had stabilized Sino-
American relations for nearly two decades since the 1972 rapprochement 
between Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong. 74  The signing of the Three 
Communiqués and tacit understanding of policies, particularly regarding 
Taiwan, US security alliances in the Asia-Pacific, trade and human rights, had 
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led to a far-reaching understanding between Washington and Beijing, and was 
all dissolved by the American reaction to the violence unleashed in the 
Tiananmen incident.75 China accused the US of interfering in its domestic 
affairs, supporting democracy activists, and using various sanctions to 
leverage improvements in China’s human rights situation.76 
 
Second, the First Gulf War (1990-1991) demonstrated to Chinese leaders the 
major advancements of the US military in regard to precision-strikes against 
Iraqi targets. Beijing’s observation of Operation Desert Storm meant it was 
forced to confront the “disconcerting reality that China’s armed forces were 
woefully inadequate for the demands of modern warfare.” 77  The 
advancements by the Americans in precision-guided munitions and in putting 
“sensors and shooters” together, and the speed with which they could deliver 
the strikes highlighted the obsolescence of China’s military equipment and 
doctrine.78 The third event was the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1995-1996) during 
which two US aircraft carrier battle groups, led by the USS Independence and 
USS Nimitz, were moved closer to Taiwan.79 In December 1995, in response 
to China firing missiles inside the ROC’s territorial waters off the ports of 
Keelung and Kaohsiung to intimidate Taiwan’s first democratic presidential 
election, the US sailed the USS Nimitz off the south coast of Taiwan.80 This 
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sent clear signals to China about the lack of its deterrent force to prevent 
foreign interference in what it considered its internal affairs.81  
 
Lastly, in 1999, US aircraft accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade because of wrong target coordinates provided by the CIA. Never 
accepting the US versions of events, the Chinese believed the bombing of its 
embassy, killing three Chinese nationals, was a deliberate strike. 82  The 
Belgrade bombing proved to be a major impetus for Chinese military 
modernization efforts, with then-President Jiang Zemin and Vice Chairman 
of the CMC, General Zhang Wannian calling for a major breakthrough in 
“assassin’s mace” weapons developments.83 As Andrew Erickson has noted, 
“particularly after the Belgrade bombing, Jiang and Zhang would cite 
repeatedly the ‘two bombs and one satellite’ megaprojects as a model.”84 
 
Compared to many other regional states, the PLA’s military modernization 
programs remain largely opaque, with much speculation regarding potential, 
capabilities and intent. On the one hand, scholars such as Timothy Heath and 
Andrew Erickson85 have argued that the primary objective of its military 
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modernization is to enhance its warfighting capability to deter the US from 
intervening in the region, in particular the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, 
maritime territorial and EEZ disputes in both the East and South China Seas 
have further fueled demands for modernization of its naval and air capabilities. 
They have also stressed that despite the opacity of China’s ruling elite, the 
evidence demonstrates that China’s pursuit of military superiority is targeted 
towards coercing neighboring countries to accept Beijing’s “rules.” The key 
to the PLA’s modernization and acquisition programs is the operational 
approach of “counter-intervention.”86 The 2016 Pentagon report on China’s 
military power stated that the development in capabilities “serve to dissuade, 
deter, or if ordered, defeat possible third-party intervention during a large-
scale theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency.”87  
 
Other scholars, however, have argued that Chinese counter-intervention 
strategy is a “myth.”88 In their view, identifying counter-intervention as the 
focus of China’s military modernization is a flawed assessment of Chinese 
military strategy and modernization, as it mistakes an “operational concept 
for a military strategy or even a grand strategy aimed at pushing the United 
States out of the Asian littoral.”89 It is also argued that while China is rising, 
the CCP is unsure of its trajectory and ultimate objective.90 This is because of 
two key reasons. First, “even though China would strive to limit the role of 
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the United States in a conflict over Taiwan, China’s strategy, at least for now, 
does not seek to prevent US intervention much more broadly in the Western 
Pacific.” Second, excessive focus on “counter-intervention” impeded 
consideration of other significant shifts in the PLAN’s force structure, such 
as humanitarian and disaster relief efforts and blue water-capable forces. 
Third, “casting counter-intervention as China’s strategy narrows the objective 
of China’s military modernization to one primary mission, thereby 
overlooking the much broader range of goals that actually motivate China’s 
defense policy.” Moreover, “viewing China’s military strategy as principally 
designed to counter the United States is particularly worrisome because it can 
intensify the effects of the security dilemma between the two countries.”91 
Overall there remains consensus that Beijing is attempting to 
comprehensively transform its naval and associated air capabilities, and that 
the PLA’s long-term objective is to challenge the qualitative and quantitative 
superiority of American forces in the Western Pacific. 
 
The development of certain naval capabilities has been defended by Beijing 
as reactions to the American strategic rebalance to the region (which will be 
further discussed in Chapter 5: The United States in the Western Pacific). In 
this regard, the PLA’s warfighting capabilities aim to deter the United States 
from interference in China’s national and regional affairs. There is strong 
evidence that the PLA has sought to significantly raise the costs of American 
power projection in the region through “counter-intervention” operations. 
This strategic competition with the United States combines both material and 
ideational explanations. On the one hand, naval modernization is influenced 
by the aim of deterring American interference in China’s national interests. 
On the other hand, what Beijing understands by being a “great power” (or a 
“super power”) with commensurate military power is deeply informed by its 
observation of the United States and its supporting military apparatus and 
conduct of modern warfare. The prerequisites of “great power” status—power 
projection capabilities and a high-tech military with a robust innovative 
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capacity—are rooted in understanding the pillars of American hegemony.92 
 
Indeed, the CCP—striving for the moral high ground—has largely denounced 
calls that its military modernization is for power projection and displacing 
American primacy. Beijing argues that the US force posture and offensive 
strategy in the region has necessitated advances in China’s capabilities.93 In 
China’s domestic discourse, it has been common to argue that Washington’s 
renewed commitment to the region is destabilizing. 94  The US has been 
viewed as inciting regional countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Australia and 
the Philippines to actively challenge China. Beijing has argued that the 
“dominant power should leave space for the rising rest.”95 The US’ higher 
profile in Asia, including its deeper engagement with regional institutions 
such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its 
strengthening of its commitments to its allies and friends (adding to its extant 
regional military preponderance) has provided a dominant strategic narrative 
for China’s reactive military modernization. 
 
At the 2013 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the Director of the 
Center for China-America Defense Relations at the PLA’s Academy of 
Military Sciences, Major General Yao Yunzhu, commented to Secretary of 
Defense Chuck Hagel that the American rebalance was viewed in China as 
an “attempt to contain China’s rising influence and to offset the increasing 
military capabilities of the Chinese PLA.” She further noted that despite 
American reassurances, China was “not convinced,” as the US in Beijing’s 
view had opposing objectives: on the one hand, positively engaging China, 
and on the other hand reassuring its allies. Consequently, Chinese officials 
held the view that “with all the enhanced deployment, 60 percent naval assets, 
60 percent air force assets and military capabilities,” the US and its allies and 
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partners were reacting to China’s rise and attempts at containment.96 In 2015, 
the state-controlled China Daily further claimed that “whether China and the 
US can avoid a confrontation largely depends on whether the US can rethink 
its ‘dominant power’ status.”97 Since the announcement of the US pivot to 
Asia in 2012, Chinese officials have repeatedly raised questions about 
whether this rebalance was an effort to contain China. 
 
Efforts to transform the PLA into a technologically advanced military capable 
of projecting power have been presented as a reaction to Washington’s efforts 
to strengthen its alliance system, advancing in ballistic missile defenses, and 
increasing the joint operating effectiveness of its naval and air units in the 
Western Pacific.  In 2016, the PLAN had more than 75 major surface 
combatants (destroyers and frigates), and its naval acquisitions included two 
8,000-ton Sovremenny-class destroyers purchased from Russia in 2000, with 
another two ordered in January 2002. Four Type 071 Yuzhao-class 
amphibious ships were added to the East Sea Fleet by 2016, and three Type 
052D destroyers were delivered to the South Sea Fleet by 2015. Numerous 
Type 054A (Jiangkai-II) frigates are under construction. China’s new 
destroyers and frigates “provide a significance upgrade to the PLAN’s area 
air defense capability, which will be critical as it expands operations into 
distant seas beyond the range of shore-based air defense.”98 China now has 
the largest fleet of diesel attack submarines in the world (62) and the PLAN 
has put into service four new classes of indigenously built submarines 
including: a nuclear-powered ballistic submarine (SSBN) called the Jin-class 
or Type 094; a nuclear-powered general purpose attack submarine (SSN) 
design called the Shang-class or Type 093A; a SS design called the Yuan-
class or Type 039A; and a SS design called the Song-class or Type 039/39G.  
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China has made most of its advancements in the development of its anti-
access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, especially its anti-ship cruise 
missiles (ASCM) and ASBMs. While its short-range ballistic missiles, the 
DF-12s, are optimized for a Taiwan contingency,99 the modernization of its 
ASCMs and ASBMs has targeted US and allied bases, as well as missile 
defense and forward operating ships and aircraft in the Western Pacific. Its 
most capable new ASCMs are indigenous variations of the Russian SS-N-22 
Sunburn and SS-N-27 Sizzler—the YJ-62 ASCM fitted on its guided missile 
destroyers (DDG), and its long-range YJ-18 fitted on its Song-, Yuan- and 
Shang-class submarines.100  One of its key ASBMs, the DF-21D “carrier 
killer,” is a hypersonic medium-range ballistic missile equipped with a 
maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) designed to hit moving ships at sea, 
and is particularly targeted at aircraft carriers. 101  The basic support 
infrastructure—broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems—is 
already in place, which permits the PLAN to attack aircraft carriers, and other 
US and allied ships in the Western Pacific.102 In September 2015, Beijing also 
unveiled its second type of ASBM, the DF-26, dubbed the “Guam Killer” as 
it is China’s first ballistic missile capable of targeting Guam with 
conventional warheads. In December 2015, China confirmed its military had 
concluded tests of a new road-mobile ICBM, the DF-41, that is capable of 
hitting any part of the US with nuclear warheads.103  
 
China’s modernization has also increasingly included investments into space 
and hypersonic glide platforms in order to defeat US missile defense systems, 
such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and SM-3 and SM-
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6 on Aegis destroyers and cruisers.104 China is not subject to any missile 
control regime, compared to the US which has limited its development of 
nuclear-armed ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles under the 1987 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 105  China can and has 
invested in intermediate-, medium- and short-range missiles—both the DF-
21D and DF-26 can be armed with nuclear warheads—which, when 
operational, can pose significant problems for American deterrence and 
missile defense.106 With regards to space, China has invested in anti-satellite 
(ASAT) systems that can blind the US’ heavy reliance on satellite 
communication in the maritime theatre which would significantly impact US 
warfighting capabilities, and modern C4ISR capabilities.107 The PLA has 
replicated the US’ unmanned C4ISR capabilities and Beijing has long 
identified space technology as a national priority. To assist in this capability, 
for instance, in February 2016 it launched its new generation satellite, the 
Beidou Navigation Satellite System on its indigenous and most 
technologically advanced rocket, the Long March 5.108 Such counter-space 
capabilities have included investments into direct-ascent anti-satellite 
missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, computer network operations, 
ground-based jammers and directed energy weapons.109  
 
However, there is much conjecture about whether the Chinese has been able 
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to translate technology into capability and whether these weapons platforms 
represent quality.110 It is clear that China’s modernization efforts has been 
broad-based but uneven.111 Despite the investments in surface combatants 
and submarines China has been far from developing the integrated combat 
capabilities of a carrier strike group. The purpose of its first aircraft carrier, 
the 60,000ton former Soviet Kuznetsov-class multi-role, the Liaoning has 
been a “starter carrier” for research, experiment and training purposes for the 
PLAN.112 It has been used for the training of personnel, experimenting with 
new models of planes, and testing the reliability and compatibility of various 
systems—in order to make the second and subsequent carriers more 
advanced. 113  In January 2014, China announced that it was building its 
second aircraft carrier with intentions to build a six-carrier fleet. This would 
enable the PLAN to keep two vessels ready for sea at all times while 
sustaining a viable cycle of maintenance, training and sea duty.114 The second 
carrier is being domestically developed based on lessons and experience from 
operating the Liaoning. The second carrier encompasses advancements on the 
propulsion system, the hull and communication systems, as well as being 
equipped with updated weapons systems such as short-range anti-aircraft 
missiles. It will also accommodate China’s domestically developed J-15 
fighter jets, like the Liaoning.115 It apparently will feature a “Short Takeoff 
But Arrested Recovery” (STOBAR) system, allowing aircraft to generate its 
own force to launch. The system would be a stepping stone towards the 
catapult assisted take-off system (CATOBAR).116 So far, the United States 
and France are the only two countries that operate CATOBAR-capable 
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carriers.  
 
Whilst the PLAN has maintained the desire to have a nuclear-powered aircraft 
carrier, such technology remains restricted to its submarine fleet.117 To assist 
in the development of this capability, China General Nuclear (CGN) has 
started to develop China’s first floating nuclear plant (ACPR50S), which 
would be able to travel to different sites and anchor offshore to generate 
power. The aim is to complete construction by 2020.118 The ACPR50S had 
been approved by China’s National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRS) as part of the 13th Five Year Plan to accelerate technological 
innovation. The NDRS also urged CGN to launch the construction of the 
demonstration project to “meet batch development demands for marine 
nuclear power platforms” so as to “play an important role in the 
implementation of the strategy of a strong marine power.” 119  If such 
technology is suitable for ship installation after testing and evaluation, it could 
be incorporated into the design of a ship by 2023-2024, which could lead to 
a nuclear carrier completed by 2027-2028 and fully operational by 2030. 
 
Another weapons platform that is yet to be transformed into an advanced 
capability is the PLAN’s submarine fleet. China has placed emphasis on 
modernizing its submarine force as a “critical element of regional deterrence, 
particularly when conducting “counter-intervention” against a modern 
adversary.”120 Since the mid-1990s, China has tried to modernize its poorly 
equipped submarines of the 1980s, acquiring 12 Russian Kilo-class 
conventional attack submarines, and put into service four to five new classes 
of indigenously built submarines—the Jin, Shang, Yuan and Song. These 
have benefited greatly from Russian submarine technology and design know-
how.121  The Jin-class are armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed submarine-
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launched ballistic missiles, which potentially could give the PLA its first 
credible second-strike nuclear capability.122 However, its SSBNs are far from 
constituting a sea-based nuclear deterrent, mainly due to its relative 
detectability which means they are vulnerable to well-developed ASW 
systems. Currently, its SSNs are well-known to have noisy reactors and poor 
radiation shielding, and its SSBNs struggle with launching missiles at speeds 
above 15 knots, leaving them vulnerable to attack (See Figure 4.2).123 For 
example, the acoustics render the Jin-class too noisy for regular patrol.124 The 
PLAN’s most quiet submarine, the Type 095 nuclear-powered cruise missile 
submarines (SSGN)—an advanced variant of the Shang-class and the 
PLAN’s third generation SSN—is only likely to be ready for delivery in 2020. 
Although it would be deployed with China’s most advanced supersonic anti-
ship missile, the class still would only be on par with 1980s NATO era SSNs 
with regards to acoustics and sonar—roughly three decades behind American 
technology, and well behind the US Navy’s Virginia-class submarines (See 
Table 4.1).125 Stealth technology is critical for submarine platforms, as it 
determines its survivability, and therefore is a prerequisite to the submarine’s 
capability for effective area denial, power projection, and intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). 
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Figure 4.2: Acoustic Quietness of American, Chinese and Russian Nuclear-Powered and Diesel-
Powered Submarines126 
 
Rank Submarine source Decibels 
1 Ocean background noise 90 
2 SSN-774 (NSSN) Virginia-class 95 
3 SSN-21 Seawolf-class 95 
4 SSN Akula II-class 105 
5 SSN-688i Los Angeles-class 105-110 
6 SSN Akula I-class 110 
7 SSGN Shang-class (Type 095) 110 
8 SSN Shang-class (Type 093) 110 
9 SSGB Jin-class (Type 094) 120 
Table 4.1: Decibel Volume of American, Chinese and Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarines 
Compared to Ocean Background Noise 
 
Additionally, the PLAN’s air capability has relied on the re-modeled Russian 
Su-33 Flankers, the Shenyang J-15 or “Flying Shark,” which operates off the 
Liaoning. The PLA has made significant investments into indigenously 
developing its fighter aircraft based on its understanding of its Sukhois, 
particularly the Su-35. 127  In 2010, it debuted the first prototype of a 
supersonic stealth jet, the Chengdu J-20. In January 2016, it was announced 
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that the fighter was close to batch production stage, however, the aircraft’s 
operational capability remains unclear.128 Only the US has war-ready stealth 
jets—its first stealth jet entered service in 1983 (the F-117) and the US 
military is now heavily investing in the fifth-generation F-35 JSF. Whilst it is 
certain the PLA and PLAN will soon deploy the J-20s, it is still not clear how 
effectively it will do so.129  
 
This uneven military modernization demonstrates that China has faced 
limitations on a number of technological fronts. These include ASW 
capabilities. Whilst China is planning a second aircraft carrier and continues 
to upgrade its anti-ship cruise missiles, it has less than a dozen maritime patrol 
craft, not enough ships and logistical support to equip a carrier strike group, 
and its fleet has remained vulnerable to submarine attack.130  Apart from 
technological concerns, there have also been questions surrounding the skills 
and experience of personnel. Reports have indicated that some commanders 
do not have sufficient experience in joint operation and joint training with 
multiple services; that the training of command and staff have lagged behind 
the training of combat units; and that personnel training has not kept pace 
with its military modernization.131  
 
Additionally, whilst the DF-21D has represented a significant improvement 
in China’s modernization of its hardware, the quality and sophistication of its 
software has remained unproven, particularly with regards to its C4ISR 
capability. Without a real-time C4ISR integrated network to support the DF-
21D and J-20, such platforms are of limited utility during combat. In order to 
match US capabilities the PLA would need to make significant improvements 
to its integrated sensors (radar, imagery and underwater acoustics) and 
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satellite communications, and all these surveillance systems would need to be 
in place and networked to provide a near-real time and real-time Common 
Operating Picture and Common Intelligence Picture (COP-CIP).132 
 
To address these concerns, President Xi announced a major reorganization of 
the PLA on December 31, 2015, involving the redefinition of the roles, 
missions, authorities, and relationships between the CMC, the Services and 
the new joint warfighting commands.133 At a political level, the military 
reform reasserted the primacy of the CCP over the military, specifically 
placing ultimate command authority in the person of the CCP Chairman.134 
At an institutional level, it replaced its seven military regions with five new 
theater commands—northern, southern, eastern, western and central 
replacing the Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and 
Lanzhou.135 Many of the commanders were given theatres far from their 
original base of power, ensuring no one commander can maintain a network 
of personal loyalty that supersedes CCP authority. 136  Additionally, the 
reshuffling was justified as a shift from “regional defense” to “head-on 
proactive defense,” and to “shake off the former ‘big army’ style and build 
the joint operational commanding institutions that are more suitable for 
modern warfare.”137 At an operational level, its strategic nuclear force, the 
Second Artillery Force, has been rebranded as the PLA Rocket Force 
(PLARF), with not much change to its objective of maintaining conventional 
and nuclear abilities to deter and strike.138 The reform also inaugurated the 
                                                
132 Carlo Kopp, “Advances in PLA C4ISR Capabilities,” Jamestown: China Brief 10, no. 4 
(February 2010), 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36052
&cHash=1e3d991d9b#.VrE6l7J97RY.  
133 David M. Finkelstein, “Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and Reform of the PLA,” 
Center for Naval Analysis China Studies (January 2016), 2, 
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2016-U-012560-Final.pdf.  
134 “China Releases Guideline on Military Reform,” Global Times, January 1, 2016, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/961442.shtml.  
135 “Military Reshuffle Carries Deeper Significance,” Global Times, February 2, 2016, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/966856.shtml. 
136 Shannon Tiezzi, “It’s Official: China’s Military Now Has 5 New Theatre Commands,” 
The Diplomat, February 2, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/its-official-chinas-
military-has-5-new-theater-commands/.  
137 Zhang Tao, “Considerations for Replacing Military Area Commands with Theater 
Commands,” China Military Online, February 3, 2016, 
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/2016-02/03/content_6888462.htm. 
138 “Expert: Rocket Force a Core in Strategic Deterrence,” China Daily, January 3, 2016, 
http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0103/c90000-8998454.html; and Zhang Tao, “Expert: PLA 
117 
 
Strategic Support Force, whose aim and role is in counter-space capabilities 
in order to make the PLA more adept and combative through support in cyber, 
space and other sophisticated high-tech capabilities and development. 139 That 
is, a focus on using cyber and information dominance for attack, exploitation 
and defense via the 2PLA, 3PLA and 4PLA departments.140 
 
Disputing Sovereignty in the East and South China Seas 
The CCP has placed significant priority on its sovereign and territorial 
integrity—a rationale that has driven not only modernizing naval and air 
capabilities but also enhancements to China’s maritime constabulary force. 
China is party to multiple maritime territorial disputes in the Western Pacific: 
1. Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, including the islands of Kinmen, 
Matsu and Penghu. 
2. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea—claimed by 
China, Taiwan and Japan; but administered by Japan. 
3. The Ieodo/Suyan Islands in the East China Sea—claimed by 
China and South Korea; but administered by South Korea. 
4. The Paracel Islands in the South China Sea—claimed by China 
and Vietnam; but occupied by China. 
5. The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea—claimed entirely by 
China, Taiwan and Vietnam, and partly by the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Brunei; occupied in part by all these countries 
except Brunei. 
6. Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea—claimed by China, 
Taiwan and the Philippines; but controlled by China since 2012. 
 
The CCP’s sovereign maritime claims have been a consistent influence on 
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China’s naval modernization. On the one hand, maintaining China’s 
territorial integrity has been intimately linked to the CCP’s regime survival, 
as reflected in its decades-long effort to bring Taiwan under its control. 
Underlying its claims in the East and South China Sea is a historic narrative, 
tied closely with the CCP’s nationalist rhetoric. China cites records dating 
back to the Xia (c. 2070 – c. 1600 BC) dynasty, in which China was the first 
state to discover, name, explore and exploit the Spratly (Nansha) and Paracel 
(Xisha) Islands. China claims “tropical sea produce such as pearl-carrying 
shellfish, turtles and hawksbill turtles had been submitted to the imperial court” 
at this time demonstrates their sovereignty. 141  The seafaring heritage 
embodied by Zheng He, a Chinese admiral who sailed an armada of treasure 
ships as far as Africa about 600 years ago, is also celebrated as the face of an 
era when China projected its power far beyond its own shores.142 A further 
significant addition to this historic narrative is the triumph of the Qin state in 
221BC to end the Warring States period (475–221BC), and the feting of its 
ruler as the First Emperor of China, whose totalitarian regime created a 
centralized state that stretched over much of what China is today. The desire 
for linkages to unifying moments stretching as far back as the Warring States 
has enriched the CCP’s nationalist aspirations of unity by reclaiming “lost” 
territories in the East and South China Seas through enhanced military power 
and prestige.143  Moreover, American security guarantees to Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines have cemented the idea that the West’s 
wrongs against China have never been redressed.144 For instance, a 1993 
Chinese government white paper, The Taiwan Question and the Reunification 
of China, asserted: 
 
it is clear… that the US Government is responsible for holding up the settlement of 
the Taiwan Question … One cannot fail to note that there are people in the US who 
still do not want to see a reunified China. They have cooked up various pretexts and 
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exerted influence to obstruct the settlement of the Taiwan question.145  
 
On the other hand, control of its “near seas” and “far seas” (See Figure 4.3) 
has been regarded essential for defending and advancing China’s expanding 
economic and strategic objectives. The strategy of “near seas active defense” 
was first pronounced by Deng Xiaoping in July 1979 at a conference of the 
PLAN’s Committee Standing Committee.146 The plan was operationalized in 
December 1985 by Admiral Liu Huaqing concept of “defend actively, operate 
in the near seas” with the “first and second island chains” (See Figure 4.3) 
being important milestones for specific types of current and future naval 
deployments:147 
1. By 2000, the PLAN would be capable to exert sea control and 
dominance out to the first island chain, defined by the Kuril 
Islands, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, the Philippines and the 
Indonesian archipelago. 
2. By 2020, sea control would be enforced in the first island chain 
and sea denial out to the second island chain, as defined by the 
Kuril Islands, Japan and the Bonin Islands, Palau and the 
Indonesian archipelagos. 
3. By 2050, the PLAN would extend and influence out to the third 
island chain, and operate globally with aircraft carrier battle 
groups.148 
 
In the late 1990s, the concept of “far seas” operations begun to be advanced 
with Jiang Zemin stating that while continuing to implement the “near seas 
active defense” strategy, the PLAN should also “in the long run pay attention 
to enhancing the far-seas defense and operations capabilities.”149 Hu Jintao 
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then stressed the need for the PLAN to “make the gradual transition to far-
seas defense, enhancing the far-seas maneuvering operations capabilities.”150 
Operationally, this meant developing naval capabilities to project power from 
the Eastern Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean—with ports being developed 
in Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Pakistan (Gwadar) and Djibouti.151 Such ports are 
critical for building a line of infrastructure for logistics facilities to resupply 
PLAN ships, however, the “far seas” concept goes beyond the defense of 
China and is more connected with demonstrating China’s national pride 
through its naval projection powers. Consequently, Chinese naval 
modernization has been driven by the dual requirement to shore up the near 
seas and then move into the far seas—exerting sea control into the first and 
second island chains, and projecting power into the third island chain. 
 
The 1992 Territorial Sea Law was Beijing’s first official pronouncement of 
its “indisputable sovereignty” over islands in both the East and South China 
Seas (except for Taiwan, which is covered by China’s 1992 “One China” 
Consensus and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law). Then-President of the PRC, 
Yang Shangkun, at a meeting of the PLA general staff stated that China 
needed an aircraft carrier to control the South China Sea, that Beijing would 
step up espionage to guard against further weapons sales to Taiwan, and it 
would concentrate further on testing and developing medium-range 
missiles.152 As well, the maritime territorial claims are tied to the control of 
trade routes, fishing grounds, significant oil and gas exploration areas, and 
many of the disputed territories are and can be used as bases and support 
locations for military and maritime constabulary forces to support China’s 
naval strategy.153  
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Figure 4.3: “Near Seas” and “Far Seas,” and the “First and Second Island Chains”154 
 
Critical to the success of such an ambitious naval strategy have been the naval 
and air capabilities to exert sea control and area denial, which would then 
uphold the CCP’s maritime territorial claims in the East and South China Sea 
and protect its EEZs from perceived unlawful foreign intervention. For 
operational bounds this meant the “near seas” strategy would cover the first 
island chain; the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea—that is, 
the three near seas within the inner rim of the second island chain; and the 
seas adjacent to the outer rim of the second island chain, as well as those of 
the north Pacific. 155  Moreover, many of the countries party to China’s 
maritime disputes have formal and informal security guarantees with the 
United States: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. As well, 
relations with Vietnam and Malaysia have fluctuated mainly due to China’s 
incursions into those countries’ claimed EEZs.156 Therefore, as mentioned in 
the previous section, many requirements of China’s military modernization 
have been influenced by Beijing’s desire to deter American intervention in 
what it considers its “internal affairs.” 157  This has led to Chinese naval 
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modernization being driven by multiple actors (Figure 4.4): 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Interactive Arming Dynamics vis-à-vis Chinese Military Modernization 
 
Contingency planning for its maritime territorial disputes in both the East and 
South China Sea has driven investments in cruise and ballistic missiles, 
airfields, and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. The PLA ground forces 
are being streamlined in favor of investments in the PLAN—euphemistically 
called “a strategic requirement of being lean and effective.”158 Leaving aside 
the CCP’s concern for  regime survival and associated increased expenditure 
on its internal security structure, after the neglect of the navy under Mao 
Zedong, the refocused attention instigated by Deng Xiaoping led to 
invigorated efforts (particularly by Xi Jinping) to build a leaner and meaner 
navy and air force. Since this reorientation, China’s naval modernization 
program has encompassed a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, 
including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), submarines and surface 
combatants.159 The PLAN has aimed to accelerate the modernization of its 
forces for comprehensive offshore operations, and to improve integrated 
electronic and information systems to enhance command and control. It also 
aided the development of blue-water capabilities for conducting mobile 
operations and enhanced its capabilities for strategic deterrence and 
counterattack. 160 
 
A particular focus has been the quantitative and qualitative improvements of 
surface combatants which would also improve air defense capability. This 
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would enable the PLAN to deploy independent task groups farther from 
China’s shore in expeditionary operations, as well as build a carrier strike 
group capability.161 For example, in 2012 the PLAN launched the Jiangdao-
class corvette and a new Houbei-class patrol boat, both intended for littoral 
operations. This would allow the more advanced surface combatants to focus 
on operations farther from China. 162 To assist in supporting logistics, it also 
fielded the Qiandaohu-class replenishment ship which will improve the 
PLAN’s endurance for long-range deployments.163 The artificial islands in 
the South China Sea could also potentially be used for C4ISR, particularly if 
coupled with infrastructure for air and surface search, such as 3D Phased 
Array Radars, satellite communication dishes for connectivity, ASW aircraft 
and underwater acoustic sensors. In December 2016, the Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative revealed that China’s militarization of the Spratly 
Islands consisted of anti-aircraft guns, anti-ship point-defense weapon 
systems (CIWS, close-in weapon systems) and radars. 164  Such systems 
“would be the last line of defense against cruise missiles launched by the 
United States or others against these soon-to-be operational air bases. They 
would back up the defensive umbrella provided by a future deployment to the 
Spratlys of mobile surface-to-air missile (platforms), such as the HQ-9 
deployed to Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, …[and] components for 
SAM systems have been spotted at the southeastern Chinese port of Jieyang, 
possibly destined for the South China Sea.”165 
 
The PLA naval modernization has also been accompanied by the 
development of China’s maritime constabulary force, the Chinese Coast 
Guard (CCG). CCG vessels send a softer political signal and have lighter 
armaments than the PLAN, but have been a significant force in reinforcing 
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China’s sovereignty claims particularly around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 
and in the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Such ships have 
been effective in asserting and defending maritime territorial claims, 
particularly, in terms of confronting or harassing foreign vessels that are 
unarmed, such as fishing ships.166 In 2016, more than 100 ships served the 
CCG, making it the largest coast guard in the world. China also added a 
second mega-cutter—a 12,000ton vessel with 76mm rapid fire guns and two 
anti-aircraft machine guns to complement a 2015 version operating in the East 
China Sea.167 The development and use of this force has increased China’s 
capacity to assert and defend its maritime territorial claims. This has led to 
regional states, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, to create unified Coast 
Guards and to invest in offshore and littoral patrol and coastal combatants, 
most which are armed. 
 
Additionally, Beijing has been involved in a dispute, primarily with 
Washington, over whether China has a right under international law to 
regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China’s 
EEZ.168 China has asserted its right to regulate foreign military activities 
within its EEZ, based on the view that it has a right to prevent any activity 
that directly or indirectly threatens its security or economic interests. 169 
Beijing has interpreted this zone as its sovereign territory, even though the 
PLAN has frequently conducted such operations in other countries’ EEZs.170 
This has been contrary to the US’ and majority viewpoint that while 
UNCLOS171  gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities 
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within their EEZ, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign 
military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12nm territorial 
waters.172 If China would be able to claim EEZs over inhabitable islands in 
the East and South China Seas, it could permit China to expand its territorial 
waters and increasingly regulate foreign military activities. Adding to this, in 
November 2013, China’s defense ministry also unilaterally declared an Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over two-thirds of the East China Sea, 
encompassing the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu and Ieodo/Suyan Islands (See 
Figure 4.5).173 It claimed the ADIZ covered its EEZ, and asserted that all 
foreign aircraft abide by identifying their flight plans within the area, and 
follow instructions from the Chinese military.174 China’s declaration of the 
zone, without consultation with Japan and South Korea, demonstrated 
confidence in its capability for air defense over a large maritime area.175 
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Figure 4.5: Northeast Asian Air Defense Identification Zones176 
 
The US Department of Defense referred to an incident where “in August 2014, 
a Chinese J-11 fighter crossed directly under a US P-8A Poseidon operating 
in the South China Sea approximately 117nm east of Hainan Island. The 
fighter also performed a barrel roll over the aircraft and passed the nose of the 
P-8A to show its weapons load-out, further increasing the potential for 
collision.”177 Yet even if the maritime territorial disputes were resolved and 
none of China’s claims were accepted, the problem would remain as China 
would continue to apply its concept of EEZ rights to its mainland coastal EEZ. 
And it is within this EEZ that past US-Chinese incidents at sea have occurred. 
For instance, in 2001 the US Navy’s unarmed hydrographic survey vessel, 
                                                
176 CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University. 
177 US Department of Defense, The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving US 
National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment (Washington DC: Department of 
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USNS Bowditch, was collecting data in the Yellow Sea when it encountered 
the PLAN Jianghu-III vessel. The Jianghu-III forced the Bowditch to stop 
operating in China’s EEZ and depart.178 A week later, a US Navy EP-3 
reconnaissance aircraft collided with a PLAN J-8II interceptor aircraft 110km 
away from Hainan Island, forcing the EP-3 to make an emergency landing 
and killing the Chinese pilot.179 Moreover, contrary to its position that no 
foreign militaries should operate within its EEZ without permission, the 
PLAN has routinely conducted submarine operation, military survey 
operations, and surveillance-intelligence collection operations in foreign 
EEZs throughout the region. Indeed, in 2013 it was revealed that the PLAN 
had started “reciprocating” the US Navy’s habit of sending ships and aircraft 
into the 200nm zone off China’s coast by conducting patrols in the US’ 
EEZ.180 
 
Findings 
Explanations that utilize traditional “arms race” theories emphasize the 
bilateral Sino-US relationship. However, China’s military modernization also 
interacts and responds to not only developments in American military 
modernization, but also its assessments of Taiwan, Japan, and to a lesser 
extent its Southeast Asian neighbors. As Thomas Mahnken has argued, 
Chinese reactions to external developments are not simply a “tightly coupled 
action-reaction arms race” (H2).181 Potential contingencies, particularly in the 
Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea, have necessitated not just a response to 
the US, but also an assessment of capabilities of American partners and allies 
that encircle China’s access to the open seas (H3 and H4). The seriousness of 
its militarization of its artificial islands in the South China Sea have 
demonstrated China’s willingness to deter major powers (that is, the United 
States) from interference in what it considers its domestic affairs, and to 
                                                
178 Raul Pedrozo, “Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,” Naval War 
College Review 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 1. 
179 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters at Sea,” 1. 
180 Kathrin Hille, “Chinese Navy Begins US Economic Zone Patrols,” Financial Times, 
June 2, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/02ce257e-cb4a-11e2-8ff3-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3zvRwY99X.  
181 Thomas G. Mahnken, “Conclusion,” in Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: 
Theory, History, and Practice, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2012), 303. 
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coerce smaller powers into accepting the change in the South China Sea status 
quo. The PLA’s development of naval and associated air capabilities has been 
backed by political support and a realignment of its force structure—
subtleties not captured by pure “action-reaction” dynamics (H1). This 
transformation of its capabilities and force structure has been both reactive to 
its strategic environment, as well as the concerns for national prestige and 
status. However, such “interactive arming” dynamics, despite the rapid 
development in the past 15 years, and the opacity of the CCP regime which 
could cause misperception, has not led to Sino-US competition becoming so 
intense as to threaten conflict (H6). The following chapter examines China’s 
“peer competitor,” the United States in the Western Pacific, explanations for 
its military modernization, and the influence its capability development has 
had on the region. 
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Chapter 5: 
The United States in the Western Pacific 
 
Key Impulses 
Perceptions of American commitment or introversion and detachment have a 
clear influence on regional countries shoring up their defense capacities, 
including purchasing sophisticated weapons platforms. However, America’s 
direct influence on regional military modernization—and possible 
involvement in any interactive arming dynamics—is not self-evident. The 
United States retains a global force posture to meet global requirements which 
requires a continuous process of military modernization. The US has 
sustained this posture–which entails an aspiration to match or lead all other 
states across the full spectrum of military capabilities–since the end of World 
War II. Due to its overwhelming superiority in military capabilities, and for 
the standards it sets in the technological sophistication of its weapons 
platforms, the case of the United States demonstrates that the sustainment of 
military capabilities is a long-term and continual process. Acquisitions of 
aircraft carriers and fighter aircraft cannot be viewed for example as “sudden 
increases in defense expenditure that target China,” but rather should be 
viewed as part of a modernization cycle that supports long-term capabilities. 
For instance, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier—combined with its 
supporting escort ships and air wing—is a 50-year capability. An advanced 
fighter aircraft is an approximately 20-year capability. Upgrades to weapons 
platforms and the funding of weapons programs certainly intersect with 
spikes and dips in military expenditure, but these cannot be viewed sensibly 
in isolation from the overall strategic environment. 
 
Overall, American military modernization has been driven by three key 
impulses. First, due to its global responsibilities, the US pursues qualitative 
modernization and military innovation to maintain technological superiority.  
The US has aspired to be alert to all the possibilities that evolving technology 
opens up and to make sensible choices about the possibilities that are most 
consequential for the business of war. The upgrading of platforms and the 
development of AI and autonomous weapons systems has utility across a full 
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spectrum of conflict beyond the Western Pacific theatre. However, the 
Pentagon is aware that its qualitative superiority is being gradually eroded by 
the PLA’s qualitative and quantitative improvements, and that this will have 
a lasting effect not just on American security commitments to the region, but 
also its global command of the commons. As opposed to “pork barrel politics,” 
its modernization resembles that of a “bow wave”—post-GFC fiscal prudence 
is restraining the objectives to continue building ships and adding to 
American technological superiority. 
 
Third, it aims to preserve the regional status quo that has been conducive to 
American economic and strategic interests. The recovery of the American 
economy is dependent on its access to Asian markets and capital. 
Consequently, it has been vested in maintaining a favorable regional balance 
of power that allows freedom of navigation, and unrestricted access to Asian 
markets. Much of this is focused on bolstering the capabilities of partners and 
allies, for both self-defense and joint operational contingencies. Lastly, the 
strategic competition between the US and China is driving an intensifying 
interactive dynamic directed in particular at naval and associated air 
capabilities. It remains unclear whether the US and China have the long-term 
wherewithal to sustain such an expensive technological competition. On the 
one hand, despite China’s economic growth remaining stable and its ability 
to sustain higher defense spending seemingly assured, its capacity to innovate, 
deploy and operate advanced weapons systems remains an open question. On 
the other hand, while the US has set the bar for sustained military-
technological innovation in the post-WWII era, it remains an open question 
as to whether bipartisan politics and fiscal dilemmas can sustain the necessary 
levels of expenditure, particularly given America’s global responsibilities. 
 
“Bow Wave” Modernization, not “Pork Barrel” Politics 
A key criticism of the US’ commitments to the Asia-Pacific has been that its 
fiscal situation and turbulent acquisition process severely constrains its 
capacities, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, to sustain forward 
deployment and an innovative edge in future warfare, and its ability to support 
partners and allies. However, despite USD487 billion budget cuts mandated 
over the next ten years by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), 
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Washington has assured its allies and partners in the region that its rebalance 
is real.1 It reviewed the Defense Guidelines underpinning the alliance with 
Japan, strengthened its alliances with the ROK and Australia (ANZUS), and 
signed a 10-year Enhanced Defense Co-operation Agreement (EDCA) in 
2014 with the Philippines. 2  However, the political debate over national 
security and the pressures placed on military expenditure have left persistent 
doubts in the minds of allies and partners over whether Washington’s 
commitment is credible.3 These domestic constraints have had the dual effect 
of, first, increasing the perception of a US decline and thus increasing the 
chances of misadventure and miscalculation on behalf of Chinese decision-
makers. Second, they have increased uncertainty amongst its regional allies 
and partners of American wherewithal to maintain its focus and commitment. 
This has led to some regional partners accelerating their modernization 
programs and aspiring to enhanced self-reliance, as well as acquisitions of 
American weapons platforms with a view towards interoperability and 
keeping the US enmeshed in the region. The rising budget deficit, and 
increasingly volatile relationship between Republicans and Democrats has 
further damaged the credibility backing the rebalance to Asia. Such factors 
impact on Washington’s ability to remain engaged in the Asia-Pacific and 
respond to shifts in the balance of power. However, as will be argued, the 
effects on current American capabilities and effectiveness should not be 
overstated. 
 
                                                
1 Data is presented here to demonstrate the global nature of the US military, that is, 
USPACOM capabilities are often deployed outside its AOR and therefore US capabilities 
and expenditures cannot be separated regionally. See Amy Belasco, “Defense Spending and 
the Budget Control Act Limits,” Congressional Research Service Report R44039 
(Washington DC: Library of Congress, July 22, 2015), 1.  
2 See Andrew Davies et al, “Expanding Alliance: ANZUS Cooperation and Asia-Pacific 
Security,” ASPI: Strategy (Barton: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2014); 
Japan Ministry Of Defense, The Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines of Japan-
US Defense Cooperation (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, October 8, 2014), 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/20141008.html; “Document: Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement between the Philippines and the United States,” Official Gazette of 
the Republic of the Philippines, April 29, 2014, http://www.gov.ph/2014/04/29/document-
enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/; and James P. Zumwait, “US-Republic of Korea 
Alliance,” Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
Asia and the Pacific, Washington DC, June 6, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2012/06/191869.htm.  
3 G. John Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State 
Strategies in East Asia,” Political Science Quarterly 131, no. 1 (2016): 9-44; and Van 
Jackson, “Red Teaming the Rebalance: The Theory and Risks of US Asia Strategy,” Journal 
of Strategic Studies 39, no. 3 (2016): 365-388. 
 132 
The US modernization process is unique in that the American defense 
industries combine to make the US by far the world’s largest arms 
manufacturer (31 percent share of the global total)4 and the dominant source 
of innovation in military technology. For these reasons, the US has been a 
major influence on the military modernization process in most other countries. 
The defense industry that emerged from World War II created new political 
interests particularly in rural and semi-rural areas which became 
economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, giving legislators 
representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending 
regardless of national security circumstances or goals.5 Political factors have 
had varying degrees of influence on different aspects of US force structure. 
Under the US Constitution, the armed forces are precluded from playing a 
role in domestic politics, and national command and control are firmly in the 
hands of the civilian leadership. Civilian control is most prevalent with 
regards to US Congress and its decision-making power over defense spending. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) must justify its funding requests to 
Congress, and debates over the defense budget and weapons programs are an 
annual exercise in American politics.6  
 
Yet logistics, weapons production and R&D facilities affect large segments 
of the population, with military contracts clustered in contracting sites on the 
East and West coasts, the Great Lakes region, and several locations in the 
South.7 Legacies of the Cold War, contractual arrangements and employment 
implications have historically been a significant political barrier to the 
cancellation of outdated or problem-ridden military modernization 
programs.8 Almost every administration in the post-WWII era has attempted 
to reform the acquisition process to become more effective, efficient, and 
aligned to meet US’ fiscal dilemmas. Therefore, apart from strategic demands, 
US force structure and its military modernization are also subject to 
                                                
4 “The United States Leads Upward Trend in Arms Exports, Asian and Gulf States Arms 
Imports Up, Says SIPRI,” SIPRI Blog, March 16, 2015, 
http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015.  
5 Rebecca U. Thorpe, The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military 
Spending (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 11. 
6 Weeks and Meconis, The Armed Forces of the USA in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2-3. 
7 Thorpe, The American Warfare State, 15.  
8 See Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Restructuring the US Defense Industry,” 
International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999/2000): 5-51. 
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Washington’s competing fiscal priorities, the domestic politics of electoral 
votes, jobs and bases, and the defense industry lobby.  
 
However, claims that “pork-barrel” politics are a major determinant—as 
opposed to operational requirements and force structure—in the US weapons 
acquisition and modernization cycle are exaggerated, as there are legal and 
bureaucratic restraints on the defense industry. As well, US economic 
interests are tied to its security interests, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. 
Instead of “pork-barreling,” US modernization has faced the problem of a 
“bow wave.” Bow wave modernization forms when: 
 
the overall defense budget declines and modernization programs are delayed or 
stretched into the future. As this happens the underlying assumption is that funding 
will become available to cover these deferred costs, often peaking just beyond the 
five-year planning horizon. The “bow wave” metaphor is appropriate because, much 
like the bow wave pushed in front of a ship, the modernization bow wave is routinely 
pushed further into the future with each successive budget cycle as projected 
funding increases do not materialize as expected.9 
 
The emergence of this phenomenon has been a result of several contributing 
factors: the slow pace of US economy recovery, rising public debt, the extent 
of the country’s war-weariness after operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
defense sequestration which is constraining the modernization cycle.  
 
Since 2001, the US economy as the market-leader has faced the prospect of 
an unsustainable debt burden, unprecedented federal budget deficits, huge 
imbalances in international trade and capital flows and high rates of 
unemployment. 10  The Global Financial Crisis and consequent recession 
highlighted the trade-off between “spending to protect against external threats 
and spending to provide jobs and incomes for citizens at home,” and the 
related question of how much defense spending is appropriate and 
                                                
9 Todd Harrison, Defense Modernization Plans through the 2020s: Addressing the Bow 
Wave (Washington DC: CSIS International Security Program, January 16, 2016), 1.  
10 For a non-partisan analysis of the American budget outlook see, US Congressional 
Budget Office. “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027.” CBO Report, January 
24, 2016, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370#section1.  
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necessary.11 Despite the easing of America’s market recession, recent trends 
are still worrisome. In 2016, the federal budget deficit was predicted to reach 
USD552 trillion, raising the debt held by the public to 76 percent of GDP. 
This would be the first increase in budget deficit in relation to the size of the 
economy since 2009—and this is on the back of federal outlays projected to 
rise by six percent in the 2016 fiscal year to USD4.2 trillion, or 22.4 percent 
of GDP.12 The Congressional Budgetary Office (CBO) predicted that 2016 
mandatory outlays would be USD168 billion higher than in 2015, due to the 
significant investment in Social Services particularly, federal spending on 
major health care programs and subsidies for health insurance. Expected 
revenue was only expected to rise by four percent to USD3.4 trillion, and 
growing trends were expected to push the public debt to 86 percent of GDP 
by 2026.13 
 
Economic constraints are therefore central to discussions of national security. 
This is due to its impact on the long-term sustainability of America’s global 
force posture and warfighting strategies, which depend greatly on a growing 
and innovative economy.14 The 2010 National Security Strategy stated that in 
order to achieve its security objective the United States had to achieve 
economic growth, reduce the federal budget deficit, pursue science and 
innovation, and build capabilities and alliances to pursue interests shared with 
other countries.15 American fiscal pressures have influenced debates on the 
funding of defense, the efficacy of the military-industrial base, and the use of 
its economy as a coercive instrument and as a tool for soft power. Moreover, 
the reputation of its economy depends on the long-term potential of human 
capital, science and technology, and innovative capacity—all of which 
contributes to economic growth and increasing the resource base for 
                                                
11 Dick K. Nanto, “Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for US 
Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report R41589 (Washington DC: Library of 
Congress, January 4, 2011), Summary.   
12 “2016 United States Budget Estimate” (White House Office of Management and Budget 
and Council of Economic Advisers), Graphiq, 2016, http://federal-
budget.insidegov.com/l/119/2016-Estimate; and 
US Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2016 to 2026,” 
CBO Report, January 25, 2016, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51129. 
13 US Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2016 to 2026.” 
14 Nanto, “Economics and National Security,” Summary.  
15 President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy, (Washington DC: 
The White House, May 2010), 1.  
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defense. 16  This relationship of interdependence between economy and 
security—that the American economy serves as both an enabler of and 
restraint on its global strategic and political objectives—is true in some form 
of all countries but its current prominence has been a new phenomenon for 
the United States. 
 
With the effects of the Global Financial Crisis, the costly wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and the add-on cost of domestic social welfare programs 
(“Obamacare”), the US budget has been pushed deeper into deficit. In August 
2010, Admiral Mike Mullen, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
stated that the national debt was the single biggest threat to national security.17 
Under current policies, federal debt—as a consequence of long-term and 
persistent budget deficits—has been projected to grow to levels that may 
threaten the government’s ability to meet its security obligations. Added to 
this, the BCA has set limits on the base budget for national defense spending 
each year from FY2012-FY2021. Each year, if Congress enacts a spending 
level that exceeds BCA caps for the defense base budget, the President is 
required to sequester or levy across-the-board cuts to each type of defense 
spending to meet the BCA caps.18 In 2013, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Ashton Carter testified that the Defense department’s planned budget had met 
its target of three-quarters of the savings needed to comply with the BCA.19 
However, the remaining reductions would have serious consequences on the 
US Navy’s rather optimistic goal of a 306-ship fleet by 2020.20 
 
Historical experience suggests that the actual costs of current shipbuilding 
plans will be higher than what DOD’s budget forecasts, and here the military 
modernization cycle again has significance. In the US Navy, a ship may be 
                                                
16 Nanto, “Economics and National Security,” Summary. 
17 Geoff Cullen, “Adm. Mike Mullen: Debt is still the Biggest Threat to US Security,” 
Fortune, May 10, 2012, http://fortune.com/2012/05/10/adm-mike-mullen-debt-is-still-
biggest-threat-to-u-s-security/. 
18 Belasco, “Defense Spending and the Budget Control Act Limits,” Summary. 
19 Ashton B. Carter, “President Obama’s Fiscal 2016 Budget Request for Defense,” 
Testimony by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter before Senate Appropriations 
Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, transcript, Washington DC, May 6, 2013. 
20 US Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range 
Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015 (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, June 2004), http://navylive.dodlive.mil/files/2014/07/30-year-
shipbuilding-plan1.pdf.  
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retired before the end of its service life to save money or may be kept beyond 
that span to maintain a desired force level. The Navy currently assumes a 35- 
or 40-year service life for its large surface combatants; yet in the past, ships 
of similar capability were hardly in the fleet for longer than 30 years.21 The 
CBO has been quite pessimistic as to how the DOD could achieve its 
modernization plans within a constrained budget. It argued: 
 
several areas of DOD’s budget have frequently turned out to cost more than 
originally planned or to increase more rapidly than expected from extrapolation of 
recent trends. Those areas include the following: costs to develop and purchase 
weapons systems; compensation costs for military and civilian personnel (including 
military health care); and operation and maintenance costs.”22  
 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) also highlighted the concern with 
an overall declining budget, in which the BCA caps would reduce defense 
spending for the base budget by USD1 trillion or about 16 percent over 10 
years (until 2021). Historically, procurement accounts have been tapped in 
order to adjust to overall reductions to protect O&M, which partly funds the 
readiness of current forces. Procurement is often called the “bill payer” and 
varies in consonance with overall increases and decreases in total defense 
expenditure (See Figure 5.1). Faced with reductions, the Pentagon has often 
delayed weapon system purchases by stretching out programs, purchasing 
fewer units than planned in the near-term but generally retaining the original 
acquisition objective or total buy.23  
                                                
21 US Congressional Budgetary Office, “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 
Shipbuilding Plan,” CBO Report, October 29, 2015, 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50926.  
22 US Congressional Budgetary Office, “Long-Term Implications of the 2016 Future Years 
Defense Program,” CBO Report, January 14, 2016, 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51050.  
23 Belasco, “Defense Spending and the Budget Control Act Limits,” 26.  
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Figure 5.1: Trends in Types of DOD Spending in the Base Budget24 
 
The effects have been mainly negative: “stretching out” delays improvements 
in capabilities and requires services to rely on older systems for longer periods. 
Small decreases in quantity may yield significant savings in the short-term 
but have limited effects on overall unit costs if the acquisition objective 
remains the same. This “stretching out” has also created a bow wave25—
delays in the original acquisition objective place pressure on overall 
procurement budgets, with the long-term result of peak production rates for 
multiple major weapon platforms converging. Defense modernization thus 
becomes increasingly dependent on significant surges in future funding. The 
naval and air services have adjusted long-term acquisition objectives in 
response to budgetary pressures, meaning the modernization of key platforms 
will coincide.26 For example, the DOD developed plans to modernize all legs 
of the nuclear triad (nuclear-capable bombers, intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and ballistic missile submarines) at the same time, in addition to 
many other modernization programs for conventional forces.27 
                                                
24 Belasco, “Defense Spending and the Budget Control Act Limits,” 20. 
25 See Stephen Dagget, “Defense Budget: Long-Term Challenges for FY2005 and Beyond,” 
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5243 Redacted (February 2015).  
27 See Harrison, “Defense Modernization Plans Through the 2020s.”  
 138 
 
Although there is more discretion to adjust the pace of modernization than to 
make changes to ongoing training and support costs, there has been a 
widening gap between what the US would like to deploy to the Western 
Pacific and its ability to do so. While there is no current crisis in US military 
effectiveness and capabilities, 28 the 2020 objective of deploying 60 percent 
of the Navy’s assets into the region could actually represent a decrease in hull 
numbers. This is significant, as compared to China’s substantial qualitative 
and quantitative investments, the numbers and level of sophistication of 
American platforms matter. Particularly in the maritime theatre, the bow 
wave modernization cannot be pushed into the future indefinitely, as some 
systems will soon reach their life expectancy. Left unaddressed, force levels 
might have to be reduced, impacting negatively on overall force structure and 
capability. For example, the current fleet of Ohio-class ballistic missile 
submarines has already had their service lives extended from 30 to 42 years 
through Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP), and the Navy has pointed 
out that it is not practical to extend their lives further due to structural 
limitations. 29  Indeed, to maintain forward deployed forces for Unified 
Combatant Commands (COCOM), Navy ship deployment times in recent 
years have been extended from a limit of seven months, to eight months or 
more.30 
 
Therefore, although it may seem that the US is making large investments in 
naval platforms, the trends are instead reflective of bow wave modernization. 
The upfront pressures to find savings has resulted in cuts in procurement 
                                                
28 David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon, “The Myth of a US Military ‘Readiness’ Crisis,” 
The Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/article_email/the-myth-of-a-
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29 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine 
Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report 
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budgets as opposed to personnel and O&M budgets. This has converged 
modernization and acquisition cycles. The funding instability due to BCA 
budget caps and the potential for cost overruns in some programs has made it 
more difficult to execute long-term plans and maintain support for 
capabilities. 31  In November 2013, the then-Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral Jonathan Greenert warned in a statement to the Senate Armed 
Service Committee that if fiscally constrained the Navy would not be able to 
increase its presence in the Asia-Pacific. He added that this would largely 
negate the ship force structure portion of the Pentagon’s plan to rebalance to 
the region.32 In an October 2015 study, the CBO also warned that the Navy’s 
2016 shipbuilding plan was 32 percent above the historical average annual 
funding of USD13.9 billion. Therefore, if funding were to only be at the 
average level, the Navy’s target of 306 ships would be cut short by 
approximately 70 ships.33 
 
This target changed in November 2016, when the US elected Donald J. Trump 
as President. During his election campaign Trump announced a nationwide 
ship-building plan harnessing “American workers, American know how, and 
American materials” to create a 350-ship navy to showcase the “Navy’s role 
as the most effective instrument of American power projection.”34 This would 
reverse decades of fleet contraction and restore the Navy to a size it last 
enjoyed in 1998, in a move the Trump administration described as reflective 
of Reagan’s doctrine of “peace through strength.”35 Despite criticizing budget 
defense sequestration, Trump did not provide details on what kinds of 
platforms would be acquired, or how to pay for them. To achieve a 350-ship 
navy would mean increasing acquisitions of USD10 billion Ford-class 
carriers, USD3 billion Virginia-class submarines, and USD500 million 
                                                
31 Harrison, “Defense Modernization Plans Through the 2020s,” 17. 
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Jonathon Greenert, Washington DC, November 7, 2013, http://www.armed-
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littoral combat ships, as well as increasing personnel from 330,000 to 
350,000. 36  Increasing defense costs would have to be balanced against 
Trump’s wish list of big tax cuts for corporations, increasing infrastructure 
spending, no cuts to entitlements—all of which would have to pass through 
Congress. 37  Such plans therefore may or may not eventuate, and it is 
impossible to gage the regional effects of Trump’s proposed policies until 
they are approved, and well into his administration.  
 
The realistic scenario in the short to medium term remains the development 
of a 255-260-ship navy, which would still not meet the requirements for the 
US Navy mission to “Provide a Stabilizing Presence” in the region.38 Air and 
missile defense improvements and some undersea capabilities will remain 
slow, and despite the ability to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent the 
extent of fiscal changes will mandate force structure capacity limits. 
Consequently, the underlying question behind such fiscal and political 
constraints is how many forces the US will be able to forward deploy. At 
some point, the US Navy will be unable to place more assets in the Asia-
Pacific. Conversely, unless there is an unforeseen socio-economic crisis 
within China, the PLA and PLAN can continue to increase relative to the US 
Navy, both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
 
The Defense-industrial Base: Innovating to Compete 
The defense acquisition process has been transformed not only due to fear of 
losing American technological superiority to regional adversaries, but also to 
find more cost-effective weapons platforms to meet both Washington’s fiscal 
dilemmas and strategic requirements. 39  Washington has faced the dual 
challenge of how to balance defense sequestration with not only maintaining 
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39 In the 1990s, the RMA literature posited radical changes to maintain the US’ technological 
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its competitive defense industry, but also sustaining capability through 
training and equipping personnel. Washington has recognized that 
maintaining its technological sophistication in modern warfare is the most 
cost-effective way to maintain its competitive edge. This is particularly the 
case at a time when the distribution of material capabilities in the Western 
Pacific threatens to gradually change towards a more favorable balance of 
power for Beijing.40 Much of the reform of the defense acquisition process 
has centered on maintaining its military technological superiority and 
qualitative advantages, which is a key pillar of American primacy in the Asia-
Pacific.  
 
Traditionally, the competitiveness of the US military-industrial complex has 
guaranteed the innovative and technological edge in American capabilities. 
The desire to innovate and the dual-use (military-civilian) character of such 
technologies have certainly played a part in American military modernization. 
Some observers have expressed the view that the supply-side of the 
acquisition process has a greater influence in driving modernization and 
acquisition cycles, due to the nature of US electoral politics, lobbying and 
Congressional funding. 41 Defense industry benefits from the DOD “tick of 
approval” that guarantees a certain level of capability and often results in the 
increased capacity to export weapons platforms overseas. Moreover, there 
have been instances of senators blocking termination of certain weapons 
programs in their electorates due to a negative effect for defense-industrial 
jobs, and thus losing electoral votes. 42  The more than USD100 billion 
industry in exporting aerospace and defense sales is an important source of 
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employment in several Congressional districts. The three largest military 
companies in the world, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Boeing, 
are American-owned. In 2015, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
(DSCA) handled USD46.6 billion alone in foreign military sales. However, 
the great bulk of the value of US military sales, production and contracts lie 
in domestic procurement rather than export.43  
 
Therefore, the supply-side influence of determining acquisitions based on 
jobs and Congressional lobbyists—as opposed to strategic and operational 
requirements—has generally been exaggerated. A comprehensive reform 
process of how Washington acquires arms has been ongoing since the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, which sought to address overruns, schedule delays 
and inability to provide troops in the field with necessary logistics, equipment 
and weapons.44  From concept to deployment, a weapon system must go 
through a three-step process: first, the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System to identify requirements; second, the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution System to allocate resources and 
budgeting; and third, the Defense Acquisition System to develop and/or 
acquire the item.45 The DOD acquires goods and services from contractors, 
federal arsenals and shipyards to support military operations. The defense 
acquisition process has been a persistent Congressional concern. As the 2007 
House Armed Service Committee report of the FY Defense Authorization Bill 
stated:  
 
Simply put, the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process is broken. The 
ability of the Department to conduct the large scale acquisitions required to ensure 
                                                
43 For a detailed breakdown of US arms sales to its domestic market see: “The US defense 
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our future national security is a concern of the committee. The rising costs and the 
lengthening schedules of major defense acquisition programs lead to more 
expensive platforms fielded in fewer numbers. The committee’s concern extends to 
all three key components of the Acquisition process including requirements 
generation, acquisition and contracting, and financial management.46 
 
The acquisition process is highly complex. Although it does not always 
produce systems that meet estimated cost or performance expectations, on 
balance it has been markedly successful.47  The naval acquisition process 
involves numerous agencies in a complicated network (See Figure 5.2), where 
requirements are determined by threat assessments (STARs) in the Navy and 
capabilities assessments (JWCAs) in PACOM, and are budgeted for by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and not by defense contractors. In the weapons 
acquisition process, “effective competition” to generate innovation is 
encouraged through the following process. S&T is conducted by government 
agencies (NRC and DARPA), and this is then taken to the research and 
development, and testing and evaluating (RD&TE) phase. Defense 
contractors use RD&TE information to compete for building demonstrators. 
Once a company has won a contract and built the test demonstrators, it is not 
guaranteed it will be awarded contracts for full-scale development and 
production. Rather, the company that builds the demonstrators must share 
information with other bidders (such as operational test conditions, 
performance criteria, life cycle cost factors), and all defense contractors can 
again bid for development and production contracts. Different parts of a 
weapons platform—such as, sensors, shooters and the frame—are all put up 
for tender, and inevitably one platform is a combination of systems by 
different companies.48 
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Figure 5.2: The Complex Process of Writing Requirements for US Defense Acquisitions49 
 
On top of a comprehensive reform effort, the DOD has sought to end the 
consolidation of the defense industry (in 1980 there were 51 separate US 
defense companies which was reduced to four by 2001).50 In 1998, Lockheed 
Martin abandoned its attempted acquisition of Northrop Grumman after it 
became clear that the Department of Justice and the Pentagon would not 
support such a move based on anti-trust grounds. It further signaled that any 
further attempts to merge Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman 
would be actively discouraged. 51  In 2001, the DOD rejected a proposed 
acquisition of Newport News by General Dynamics in the interest of 
competition in the US shipbuilding and nuclear technology arenas.52 
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Since Goldwater-Nichols, reforms of the defense acquisition process have 
been ongoing, and have overshadowed the organic process of innovating and 
acquiring defense technologies that has resulted in platforms, such as MIRV, 
stealth and energy-directed weapons. Indeed, the DOD has repeatedly 
attempted to focus attention on arresting the decline of American qualitative 
superiority vis-à-vis the increasing qualitative and quantitative capabilities of 
the PLA. As the 2015 DOD report on Defense Acquisitions Systems stated: 
 
Beyond these operational acquisition questions, there is evidence that we have been 
pursuing less complex systems with about the same or less risk since 2009. This 
aligns with my concern that in some areas we may not be pushing the state-of-the-
art enough in terms of technical performance. This endangers our military technical 
superiority. In my view our product pipeline is not as robust as it should be in a time 
when our technological superiority is being seriously challenged by potential 
adversaries. … The broader challenge of adapting to threats while fielding 
warfighting capabilities is intertwined and concurrent with defense acquisition. 
Simply delivering what was initially required on cost and schedule can lead to 
failure in achieving our evolving national security mission—the reason defense 
acquisition exists in the first place.53  
 
Aware of the increasing diffusion of sophisticated technologies and 
capabilities particularly in the Asia-Pacific, in 2010, the then-Under Secretary 
of Defense Ashton Carter initiated the first iteration of Better Buying Power 
to increase the productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of the DOD’s 
acquisition, technology and logistics efforts. In its third iteration, Better 
Buying Power 3.0 recognized: 
 
the technological superiority of the United States is now being challenged by 
potential adversaries in ways not seen since the Cold War. Efficiency and 
productivity are always important, but the military capability that [the DOD] 
provides to [its] Warfighters is paramount. [The US’] operational effectiveness 
is based on the quality of [its] people and the quality of [its] products. The former 
is not in doubt; the latter depends on [DOD] efforts and those of the industrial 
base.54  
                                                
53 US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance 
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54 US Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall, “Implementation Directive for Better 
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There have been three key efforts to preserve US military superiority. First, 
the 2012 establishment of the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) to “re-
imagine existing DOD and intelligence community and commercial systems 
by giving them new roles and game-changing capabilities to confound 
potential enemies.”55 Second, in 2014 the Defense Innovation Initiative was 
created to help arrest and reverse an assessed decline in the US military’s 
technological and qualitative edge.56 Lastly, also announced in 2014, the 
Third Offset Strategy was launched. Its primary objective is maintaining US 
superiority over opposing armed forces that are both numerically large and 
armed with precision-guided weapons.57 As part of the Third Offset Strategy 
and on top of the Defense Innovation Initiative, the Pentagon created the 
Defense Information Unit Experimental in 2015 to help leverage lessons from 
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Silicon Valley on issues like big data, analytics, autonomy and robotics.58 
Compared to the 1970s, when Pentagon programs drove innovative 
technological developments, much innovation has been driven in recent times 
by business and many dual-use capabilities that have had their origins in the 
commercial sectors.59 To meet operational requirements as well as fiscal 
demands, the Pentagon has focused on artificial intelligence and autonomous 
systems—less a weapons platform and more a “general purpose 
technology” 60  which has a broad applicability across the full range of 
platforms and systems used by the US military and intelligence agencies.61 
The five key technologies identified by the Pentagon in the Third Offset 
Strategy are:  
1. Learning machines; 
2. Human-machine collaboration (using advanced computers and 
visualization to help people make faster, better and more relevant 
decisions); 
3. Assisted human operations (which means plugging every pilot, 
soldier, sailor and Marine into the battle network); 
4. Human-machine combat teaming (creating new ways for manned 
and unmanned platforms to operate); and 
5. Network-enabled autonomous weapons (all connected on a 
learning command, control, communications and intelligence 
[C3I] network).62 
 
These systems are designed to counter China’s investments in systems, 
doctrine and asymmetric capabilities that match or counter US capabilities.63 
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The technologies identified for development reflect that the “most dangerous, 
if not most likely, potential adversaries for high-end combat with the United 
States will exploit American reliance on integrated military systems,”64 in 
particular disrupting American C4ISR networks.65  
 
The Asia-Pacific Rebalance 
Washington’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated that the 
“United States has been a Pacific power for more than a century, with deep 
and enduring economic and security ties to the region … [and] the Asia-
Pacific region is increasingly central to global commerce, politics, and 
security.”66 The Asia-Pacific is the US’s largest regional trading area, both as 
a supplier of American imports and export market.67 In 2015, US exports to 
Asia totaled USD458 billion, while imports were worth USD1 trillion.68 The 
region’s SLOCs are vital to American commercial interests: about a third of 
the world’s shipping passes through Southeast Asian SLOCs in the 
Indonesian archipelago and the South China Sea, and the Malacca Strait 
serves as the primary link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.69  
 
Washington’s presence in Asia has been underpinned by the “San Francisco 
System,” a comprehensive structure of interrelated political-military and 
economic commitments between the US and its Pacific allies that was 
catalyzed by the San Francisco Peace Treaty process of 1950-51 with Japan.70 
Some elements such as the US alliance with Australia (ANZUS) of July 
195171 and the US-Philippine Mutual Security Treaty of August 1951 were 
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originally conceived as reassurance for their allies’ uneasiness with the 
potential for a re-emergence of a militarized Japan. The mutual security 
treaties with South Korea (1953) and Taiwan (1955), South Vietnam (1956) 
and Thailand (1966) came in the wake of San Francisco, expanding the 
system’s logic more broadly throughout the Western Pacific.72 Since then, 
despite the termination of Washington’s treaty with Taiwan in 1980, the US 
has maintained an informal security guarantee with Taiwan through the 1979 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). 73  At present, the US possesses the most 
powerful naval and air forces in the Western Pacific through USPACOM. It 
has also maintained the highest defense outlay worldwide, spending 
USD597.5 billion in FY2015—almost four times higher than that of China in 
second-place at USD145.8 billion.74  The significance of American naval 
power to its economic and strategic interests is enshrined in the first article of 
the US Constitution which commands the government to “provide and 
maintain a Navy.”75 Moreover, Washington has been not only a critical actor 
in the region but also a key influence on the region’s military modernization 
and acquisition programs. 
 
Washington has faced an enduring Cold War legacy challenge of a major 
drawdown in forces to reduce its military footprint, as well as how to 
streamline its defense strategy and force structure to address the harsh fiscal 
realities imposed by the Global Financial Crisis.76 However, despite these 
challenges, the demands arising from China’s military modernization has 
resulted in the US focusing on the “strategic rebalance”77 to Asia as a way to 
reassure regional allies and partners about America’s ongoing defense 
commitment. 78  In 2011, Washington announced that it would move 60 
percent of the US Navy to the Pacific by 2020. This goal meant that some of 
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its most advanced naval and air platforms have already been forward-
deployed or assigned to the region. This has included six aircraft carriers, the 
majority of its surface combatants, including Aegis-equipped destroyers 
(including the new Zumwalt-destroyer), F-22 Raptors combat aircraft and 
Virginia-class submarines.79  
 
America’s Asia-Pacific defense policy and strategy have been the subject of 
extensive debate since the end of the Cold War. 80 This debate has rested on 
how to prioritize Washington’s global commitments, and the resulting US’ 
waxing and waning relationship with regional states. Amongst regional states 
this has created mixed feelings and experiences of intense involvement, 
unwelcomed intrusion into Asian security matters, and sometimes even 
pronounced disengagement.81 Such fluctuations have impacted the credibility 
of Washington’s commitments and resolve, and thus regional states have 
become particularly sensitive to any incremental change to Washington’s 
force structure, declaratory policy and military strategy. 
 
American military preponderance has been based on global “command of the 
commons,” which includes the Asia-Pacific. The US has had a unique set of 
assets to sustain this commanding position: a large scientific and industrial 
base; the specific mix of military systems accumulated over the past decades 
of procurement; the ability to coordinate the production of new weapons 
systems; and the skills and associated technological infrastructure to 
effectively employ these weapons in a coordinated manner.82 US Cold War 
military expenditure consistently exceeded the expenditure of the world’s 
other major military powers combined—most of which were US allies. 
During the Cold War, its main forward presence was concentrated on the 
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European theatre in the context of NATO. However, the US also maintained 
a large presence in the Asia-Pacific. In the post-Cold War era, the largest 
concentrations of its forward deployed forces remain in this region, primarily 
in Japan and South Korea. 
 
Currently, the US operates the largest navy, air force and second largest air 
force (the naval air-wing) in the Asia-Pacific, and its military strength is the 
overriding contributor to American regional preponderance.83 These forces 
are mainly operated through USPACOM, which has five carrier strike groups 
at its disposal, with one forward deployed in Japan. It commands 
approximately 200 ships, 2,000 aircraft and 330,000 military and civilian 
personnel. It has an area of responsibility that covers 36 countries—five of 
which are treaty allies—reaching from Alaska to Madagascar, and from India 
to the South Pacific. 84 To support the 100,000 forward deployed forces, it has 
bases in Japan, South Korea, Guam and Hawaii with additional support 
provided from the continental United States (California, Alaska, Washington 
and Arizona). In addition, it has several access agreements, a policy known 
as “places not bases.”85 For instance, Changi Naval Base in Singapore is the 
only location in the Western Pacific which can service the largest versions of 
US aircraft carriers (or “super carriers”).86 From 2013, Singapore also agreed 
to host up to four US Navy Littoral Combat Ships (LCS).87 A rotational 
deployment of US Marines has started in Darwin, Australia, with a full 
contingent of up to 2,500 planned by 2020, pending upgrades to installations. 
Further access agreements for naval and air forces are in place with Thailand, 
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Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.88 As well, in 2015 the US had forward 
deployed 14 SSBNs, four SSGNs and 59 SSNs.89 Efforts have also been 
underway to enhance the flexibility of American forces in Asia. The 
combination of weaponry, training, operational experience and the ability to 
rapidly deploy additional forces from the continental United States makes US 
forces the most powerful force in the region and beyond.90 No other county 
in the world can operate, sustain and secure a global command and control 
structure, specifically with regards to C4ISR.  
 
However, Washington’s focus has increasingly shifted towards the emerging 
peer competition with China91 and rebalancing to the Western-Pacific.92 The 
2006 QDR stated the need to address “near peer competitors” and went on to 
predict that “of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest 
potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive 
military technologies that could over time offset traditional US military 
advantages absent US counter strategies.” 93 On the one hand, it can be argued 
that upgrading platforms has utility across a full spectrum of conflict beyond 
the Western Pacific theatre. On the other hand, current modernization has 
focused on the requirements for its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, 
interoperability of its forces with allies, and maintaining high levels of its 
capability through the “manning, training and equipping” of its personnel.94 
The overarching economic and geostrategic importance of the Asia-Pacific 
has meant that Washington has aimed to maintain a balance of power that 
prevents the rise of any regional hegemonic state that could threaten US 
interests by seeking to obstruct American access or dominate the maritime 
theatre. Its leading edge in naval and associated air capability has been a key 
determinant in maintaining regional stability through its provision of 
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extended deterrence to and reassurance of its allies and partners. 
 
Earlier traces of Washington’s re-alignment to the Western Pacific began in 
the mid-1990s. In 1995, Bill Clinton’s administration published the third 
iteration of the East Asian Strategy Report, dubbed the Nye Report after its 
author, Joseph S. Nye, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs.95 The Nye Report outlined a four-part strategy: “(i) maintain 
the forward presence of American troops; (ii) try to develop multilateral 
institutions as reinforcing mechanisms; (iii) put [US] alliances, particularly 
with Japan, on a firm basis after the Cold War; and (iv) from that position of 
strength, encourage China to define its interests in ways that could be 
compatible with ours.”96 This report was distinct in that it was the first report 
to highlight “continuing areas of uncertainty and tension” and the requirement 
to reaffirm American security commitments to the region.97 For instance, the 
Third Taiwan Straits Crisis (1995-1996) was a practical demonstration of 
friction between Washington and Beijing—it signaled US resolve to use force, 
and the limited Chinese capacity to prevent interference in what it considers 
“domestic affairs.” The 1998 East Asian Strategy Report reaffirmed its 
commitment to maintain a military presence of “approximately 100,000 in 
the region, while harnessing new technology to retain our lead in 
capabilities.”98 The Clinton administration also decided to forward deploy 
two SSNs and homeport them in Guam by 2002, essentially re-establishing 
Guam as a strategic location.99 This silent “pivot before the pivot” reflected 
Washington’s caution over Chinese intentions and the George W. Bush’s 
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administration’s deliberate decision to avoid antagonizing Beijing.100  
 
By the late 2000s, growing concerns over China’s military and economic 
advancements, and its increasing assertiveness in its maritime territorial 
disputes resulted in American allies and partners seeking greater US presence 
and leadership.101 This situation provided the backdrop for the Barack Obama 
administration to officially declare a rebalancing of strategic priorities to the 
Asia-Pacific. In October 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced 
a “pivot” (later renamed the “strategic rebalance”) to the Asia-Pacific. Prior 
to this, the public narrative in the region was one of US lack of strategic focus 
and decline due to the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as 
competing domestic and fiscal priorities particularly after the Global 
Financial Crisis. Secretary Clinton reiterated that the US was a “Pacific power” 
and outlined a regional strategy involving: 
 
six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our 
working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with 
regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-
based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.102 
 
A month later, President Obama also stressed that the United States was 
“turning [its] attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.”103 The 
announcement of a “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific reflected the intention to 
underscore the importance of the region to US interests and to reinvigorate 
American engagement and leadership in order to address regional uncertainty 
about Washington’s commitment. 104  In this context, the US Defense 
Department’s January 2012 strategic guidance reaffirmed that “while the US 
military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity 
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rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”105 
 
To support Washington’s rebalance policy, the 2010 QDR had already 
directed the development of “a joint Air-Sea Battle concept” between the Air 
Force and Navy to defeat adversaries across the range of military operations, 
“including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area 
denial capabilities.” This was to be achieved by integrating “capabilities 
across all operational domains—air, sea, land, space and cyberspace—to 
counter growing challenges to US freedom of action.” The Air-Sea Battle 
concept also aimed to “guide the development of future capabilities needed 
for effective power projection operations.” 106  Due to increasing Chinese 
capabilities, the Air-Sea Battle concept rose in prominence—particularly 
among US allies—as giving operational “teeth” to a possible and credible US 
warfighting strategy. 107  In 2015, the concept was renamed as the “Joint 
Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons” (JAM-GC) to 
expand it across all services and make it a fully integrated joint concept that 
also included land forces.108 
 
Interoperability with allied forces has also been a key force multiplier that 
underscores how critical the US’ regional bilateral partnerships are to its 
national interests and strategic objectives.109 The Western Pacific is a major 
operational hub for forward-deployed US Navy forces and taken together, the 
US and its regional allies spend far more on defense than any conceivable 
coalition of enemies. The San Francisco System of interrelated political-
military and economic commitments between the US and its Western Pacific 
partners has provided the basis for the maintenance of approximately 100,000 
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US military personnel deployed in the region. Allied bases and logistical 
support have also delivered US forces with essential strategic depth and 
mobility. Assuring allies and maintaining partner capacity, while dissuading 
and deterring those actors that might otherwise seek to disrupt the balance of 
power, has remained a long-standing goal of US defense policy.110  This 
integrated system of “hubs and spokes,” with the US at the center has both 
maximized America’s influence and prevented unilateral aggression by 
creating a favorable balance of power for Washington. Through this system 
the US has also  promoted democratic ideals, liberal commerce and freedom 
of maneuver to legitimize its Asia-Pacific presence.111 In this respect, the 
2015 US National Security Strategy stated: 
 
We are modernizing our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the 
Philippines and enhancing the interactions among them to ensure they are fully 
capable of responding to regional and global challenges. We are committed to 
strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to reinforce shared rules and norms, forge 
collective responses to shared challenges, and help ensure peaceful resolution of 
disputes.112 
 
In June 2012 then-US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that by 
2020, 60 percent of American naval assets would be deployed in the Asia-
Pacific, including six aircraft carriers, a majority of its cruisers, destroyers, 
LCS and submarines.113 In June 2013, his successor Chuck Hagel pledged 
that 60 percent of the US Air Force’s overseas-based forces and a similar 
percentage of its space and cyber capabilities would also be based in the 
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region.114 In 2015, he also announced that the Navy would introduce the Joint 
High Speed Vessel (JHV) in the Pacific and forward-station four additional 
Virginia-class nuclear submarines in Guam. The Pentagon also declared its 
intention to permanently rotate up to four LCS at Singapore by 2017 and to 
base an additional seven LCS in Japan by 2022.115 By 2018 the Navy’s 
advanced multi-mission Zumwalt-class destroyer would also begin operating 
out of the region. And by 2020, the US plans to operate the Hawkeye early 
warning and unmanned Triton ISR aircraft in the region.116  
 
In addition, the US has invested in regional security cooperation, particularly 
with Southeast Asian countries. The normalization of US-Vietnam relations 
along both military and diplomatic paths has proceeded apace, due to Chinese 
actions in the South China Sea. 117  The US-Indonesia Comprehensive 
Partnership was signed in 2010 which included joint exercises and an annual 
joint commission meeting.118 President Obama’s trip to Malaysia in 2014 
resulted in a similar US-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership and renewed 
emphasis on existing bilateral arrangements such as the Malaysia-US 
strategic talks and increasing military-to-military cooperation. 119  In 
Singapore, the US Navy has had extensive access to naval and air logistical 
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facilities since 1990.120 US military equipment has also become the weapons 
systems of choice for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). 121  Under the 
EDCA with the Philippines, the US committed USD66 million for the 
construction of in-country military facilities. 122  EDCA also enabled 
rotational access for the US military to Philippine bases and in March 2015 
both sides begun joint patrols in the South China Sea. 123  However, the 
Philippines’ President Rogrido Duterte stated in October 2016 that the US 
forces may be asked to leave the Philippines has raised uncertainty over the 
US-Philippine alliance.124 
 
Nonetheless, doubts remain over American capabilities and resolve. 
American foreign policy debates have reflected war weariness and reluctance 
to resort to military force to deal with international crises raging from the civil 
war in Syria to the Russian annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea. The protracted 
recovery from the Global Financial Crisis and partisan divisions leading to 
repeated policy gridlock in US Congress further contributes to a general 
unease about Washington’s resolve and ability to commit to the region. 
Washington expects its allies to contribute more to collective defense, 
alongside supporting US-led efforts to uphold a favorable balance of 
power.125  
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On the one hand, the US effort emphasizes mainly qualitative advances in 
naval and associated air capabilities to maintain its technological lead in the 
region. On the other hand, it pushes its allies and partners to pursue both 
qualitative and quantitative advantages in their capabilities to target both 
interoperable and self-reliant defense contingencies. As will be demonstrated 
in the Japan and South Korea chapters, the US alliance has allowed the 
transfer of sophisticated defense technologies to these countries, as well as 
placing greater demands on host nations to “share” more of the operational 
burdens. In 2011, Secretary of State Clinton placed US alliances at the 
“fulcrum of our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific.”126 Yet as Ashley J. Tellis 
has argued: 
 
because the cost of US contributions toward such collective goods may become 
burdensome over time, accepting increased contributions by friends and allies 
remains an attractive solution … So long as their political aims fundamentally 
cohere with Washington’s, anything they do to augment the supply of global public 
goods serves the US, their own, and other common interests.127  
 
Consequently, Washington has encouraged its allies to develop stronger 
military postures to balance against a rising China, should engagement fail. 
Yet, concerns also emerged that American allies and partners might be unable 
to keep pace with the advanced weapons technologies resulting from the 
Third Offset Strategy. As Peter Dombrowski notes, “if past is prologue, future 
American administrations will seek to limit access to advanced systems and 
thereby complicate future allied and coalition operations.”128 Countries like 
Japan, Singapore and South Korea may choose to match American 
investment in innovative technologies, however, technical and technological 
challenges will remain, for instance, sustaining the interoperability of 
communication systems, and maintaining doctrine and training.129 
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Such dynamics have had a dual effect on regional military modernization 
efforts. On the one hand, they have driven US allies to acquire platforms to 
fulfill capabilities (often from American suppliers) which demonstrate 
commitment to Washington and facilitate high levels of interoperability (as 
will be explained in the chapters on Japan and South Korea). A significant 
example has been the commitment by Japan, South Korea, Australia and 
possibly Singapore to purchase F-35 JSFs before the aircraft had achieved 
initial operating capability (IOC).130 Given the long-standing reliance on US 
security commitments, Washington’s allies will most likely cautiously 
cooperate with the next administration, whilst increasing their self-reliant 
defense position. On the other hand, China inevitably views these reactions 
to its re-emergence as a major regional player as evidence of a US-led posture 
of containment and coercion. 
 
Strategic Competition with China 
Ever since the 1990s, consecutive US administrations pursued a concerted 
engagement with Beijing in the expectation or hope that China would become 
a “responsible stakeholder” in the existing US-led strategic order. A hallmark 
of the US-China relationship under the Obama administration has been the 
proliferation of bilateral dialogue mechanisms, based on the expectation that 
US and Chinese officials need to understand each other’s positions on a wide 
range of issues. However, at the same time, the US strategic and political elite 
has become increasingly disillusioned with China’s strategic behavior, and as 
previously argued, actions were put in place to counter potential Chinese 
aggression even before the “pivot” announcement.131 More recent actions by 
Beijing since 2009-2010 displayed a growing maritime assertiveness and 
challenge to the rules-based order and freedom of navigation in the Asia-
Pacific.132 This has been further evidenced by China’s creation of artificial 
islands to support military aircraft and naval operations in the South China 
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Sea.133  
 
As Chinese capabilities grow, the concern in Washington has been that 
Beijing is changing the regional status quo, is defining its interests more 
expansively and intends to carve out maritime “spheres of influence.”134 The 
changing distribution of military capabilities, and uncertainty about China’s 
future trajectory has fueled greater Sino-US strategic competition. As Adam 
P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry have argued: “as in any strategic interaction, it 
takes two to tango. Indeed the United States and its Asia Pacific security allies 
and partners are engaging in extensive efforts to hedge against both 
uncertainty and Beijing’s specific policies by balancing against China.”135 
Both Beijing and Washington have bolstered relations with regional partners 
in tandem with concerted military modernization in the face of uncertain 
intentions, implicitly competitive strategies, and potentially coercive policies 
of the other.136 Therefore, despite declared policies stressing engagement and 
cooperation mechanisms, military modernization and force postures 
increasingly have displayed balancing in the form of both external security 
cooperation with Asian states and national military modernization 
programs.137  
 
This dynamic has created an atmosphere of uncertainty about the other side’s 
intentions, as both sides have concluded that there was no other alternative to 
competition for qualitative and quantitative advantages in its naval and 
associated air capabilities. 138  Washington has remained wary of China’s 
improving naval capabilities and its associated objectives, and the DOD has 
expressed concern that the technological and qualitative edge of American 
military forces has gradually eroded. In reaction to this changing balance of 
power, the US has developed new operational concepts, changed its force 
posture and basing arrangements, and focused investments on innovative 
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weapons technology. China’s rising power and military challenge to 
American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific has sharpened the focus in the 
Pentagon and in Congress on the need to develop capabilities to respond to a 
“peer competitor.” The PLA’s increasing qualitative and quantitative 
improvements in naval and associated air capabilities has led Washington to 
pursue (mainly) qualitative improvements in its own navy, and supporting 
both qualitative and quantitative improvements of its regional allies and 
partners’ capabilities. This has led to competitive arming dynamics, in which 
Washington has aimed to maintain its primacy in the Asia-Pacific. As the 
2014 QDR stated, 
 
Defense spending in [the Asia-Pacific] continues to rise. As nations in the region 
continue to develop their military and security capabilities, there is greater risk that 
tensions over long-standing sovereignty disputes or claims to natural resources will 
spur disruptive competition or erupt into conflict, reversing the trends of rising 
regional peace, stability, and prosperity. In particular, the rapid pace and 
comprehensive scope of China’s military modernization continues, combined with 
a relative lack of transparency and openness from China’s leaders regarding both 
military capabilities and intentions.139 
 
China’s rising power challenges America’s position in the Asia-Pacific.140 In 
response, some regional allies, particularly Japan, have sought to align 
themselves more closely with the US to balance China’s growing power. 
Aware that its technological edge has been gradually eroded by the increasing 
diffusion of advanced capabilities in the region, particularly to China, 
Washington has looked to innovate and generate a new military-technological 
edge.141 Underlying this development has been the objective to maintain a 
rules-based order conducive to America’s strategic and economic interests.142 
To meet these goals, the US has adopted a two-pronged approach when it 
comes to the military dimension of the rebalance to Asia: first, transforming 
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US forces in regards to technology and operational concepts. Second, 
strengthening the network of allies and partners to assist the US with forward 
missions, provide bases and protection of bases, and confer political 
legitimacy to US military operations.143 
 
Therefore, Washington’s changing Asia-Pacific force posture and structure 
has had a dual objective: it has been directed at maintaining American 
maritime freedom of maneuver in the region, while making it operationally 
more difficult for Chinese to deter American operations. In reaction, Beijing 
has argued that these extra assets devoted to the region, reinvigorated US 
partnerships, and increasing American investments into space, autonomous 
systems and artificial intelligence (AI), were aimed at containing China.144 
Accordingly, the PLA has sought  to address perceived and actual shortfalls 
culminating from current American primacy, the US strategic rebalance 
toward the Asia-Pacific, and the development of JAM-GC for increasing the 
joint operating effectiveness of US naval and air forces for countering PLA 
operations.145  China’s revisionist intentions and desire to prevent foreign 
“intervention” have consequently fueled strategic competition, augmented by 
the development and modernization of specific naval and associated air 
capabilities, such as ASW and C4ISR.  
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The most significant examples of this interactive arming dynamic in naval 
and associated air capabilities has been demonstrated by the development of 
China’s ballistic missile program, which falls under the PLARF (See Chapter 
4: China). However, it is not yet clear whether the PLA can already field the 
C4ISR capabilities necessary to strike a fast moving ship in open waters.146 
In August 2014, Admiral Harry B. Harris, Commander of USPACOM, stated 
in response to a question about the threat posed to US Navy aircraft carriers 
by China’s ASBMs that the US was “very well aware of the capabilities that 
China has and is trying to develop and I’m very confident we would be able 
to carry out any mission that we have to.” 147  Further,  Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Greenert observed that the US was developing 
countermeasures to protect US carriers. He added that the US had “lots of 
intelligence” on the DF-21D and that new electromagnetic weapons, 
unmanned aircraft and other standoff weapons would help mitigate the threat 
of anti-ship missiles.148 
 
The surprisingly rapid qualitative improvements in PLA capabilities have 
triggered improvements in US missile defense systems. The focus has been 
on surface combatants, particularly aircraft carriers, with regard to how to 
deconstruct the ballistic missile “kill-chain” (the sequence of events that 
needs to be completed to carry out a successful attack). Innovative US 
shipborne defenses with the capability to detect, track, destroy or deflect such 
advanced missiles have been deployed.149 This has involved employing a 
number of active and passive measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with 
interceptor missiles (“hard kill”), and masking the exact location of Navy 
                                                
146 Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific,” 136.  
147 Quoted in Greg Sheridan, “China’s Military Provocation in The Pacific An Accident 
Waiting to Happen,” The Australian, August 9, 2014, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/greg-sheridan/chinas-military-
provocation-in-the-pacific-an-accident-waiting-to-happen/news-
story/d56701879cfa01072eab97a2ac09283a.  
148 Jon Harper, “Navy’s Top Admiral: Reducing Carrier Fleet Would Burn Out Sailors, 
Ships,” Stars and Stripes, May 21, 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/navy-s-top-admiral-
reducing-carrier-fleet-would-burn-out-sailors-ships-1.284362; and Michael Fabey, “US 
Navy Looks to ‘Series of Systems’ To Counter Chinese Anti-Ship Missile,” Aerospace 
Daily & Defense Report, April 21, 2015, 5.  
149 Rear Admiral Edward Masso, “Our Aircraft Carriers are Not Sitting Ducks,” Forbes, 
August 4, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/08/04/our-aircraft-carriers-are-
not-sitting-ducks/#5c668309131c.  
 165 
ships or confusing ASBM re-entry vehicles (“soft kill”).150 Lockheed Martin 
and Raytheon, under study contracts from the US Missile Defense Agency, 
have begun developing concepts for a kill vehicle capable of taking out 
multiple objects simultaneously atop a single interceptor (“Multi-Object Kill 
Vehicle,” MOKV).151 The Aegis combat system has also been upgraded to 
have the capacity for conducting ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations 
by incorporating changes to Aegis system’s computers and software and 
arming ships with BMD interceptor missiles.152 
 
Another example of competition has been the US Navy’s efforts to counter 
the PLA’s progress in developing ASW capabilities and complicating US 
maneuvers in the region. On October 26, 2006, a Chinese Song-class diesel 
electric submarine reportedly surfaced approximately eight kilometers away 
from the US carrier, USS Kitty Hawk, which was operating with its strike 
group in international waters in the East China Sea near Okinawa.153 Defense 
officials believed the Chinese submarines were practicing how to track and 
target carriers.154 A former commander of US Pacific Fleet’s submarine force, 
Rear Admiral Hank McKinney stated: 
 
the Chinese very well could have staged this event to make a point about the 
vulnerability of the Battle Group to submarine attack. The US Navy is fully aware 
of [those] vulnerabilities … The Chinese are building a credible submarine force 
which will make it very difficult for the US navy to maintain sea control dominance 
in or near coastal waters off of China.155  
 
In November 2015, a Chinese attack submarine also closely trailed the aircraft 
carrier USS Ronald Reagan while it was operating off the south of Japan in 
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the Sea of Japan. The submarine conducted a simulated cruise missile 
attack. 156  In December 2016, the PLAN seized (and later returned) an 
American underwater survey drone in international waters off the 
Philippines.157  Such drones assist in ASW and are used to track foreign 
submarines and assist the navigation of US submarines.158 
 
Consequently, the US Navy has stepped up measures to counter China’s 
submarines, bolstering ASW capabilities by increasing ASW training 
exercises, procuring platforms with ASW capabilities, and developing 
technologies for conducting new operational approaches to ASW.159 Much of 
the difficulty faced by US ASW stems from the technical challenge posed by 
the stealth of advanced conventional submarines. Yet, as the PLAN expands 
its submarine force,160 US naval forces have declined in relative numbers and 
this development could become a significant shortcoming due to heavy 
demands placed on them to perform both precision-strike and ASW missions 
during conflict. Thus, the DOD has emphasized qualitative improvements 
including hardware and software upgrade to kinetic weapons, in particular 
countering wake-homing torpedoes through the development on new anti-
torpedo torpedoes (ATT).161  The Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) 
system, which consists of a sensor, processor and small interceptor missiles, 
is the first of its kind of “hard kill” countermeasures for ships and carriers 
designed to find, classify and track torpedoes through a Torpedo Warning 
System (TWS), and then destroy them with a Countermeasure Anti-Torpedo 
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(CAT). 162  The plan is to equip all aircraft carriers and other high-value 
surface combatants with the system by 2035.163 
 
Additionally, there has been evidence that China has started to invest in 
capabilities to erode America’s global command of the commons, which is to 
a significant degree based on American forward-deployed forces and 
infrastructure in the Western Pacific. The PLA has fielded a series of 
“interrelated missile, sensor, guidance, and other technologies designed to 
deny freedom of movement to hostile powers in the air and waters off its 
coast.”164 If these capabilities do fulfil their potential for counter-intervention, 
this would in the PLA being able to exclude US forces from parts of the 
Western Pacific, in particular the Taiwan Strait.165 
 
Findings 
The US case study demonstrates dynamics that are not captured by the 
traditional “arms race” theories and the “action-reaction” concept. Rather, the 
more plausible explanations for military modernization demonstrates 
“interactive arming.” The US’ domestic situation and fiscal priorities have 
proven to be a restraining factor on American military modernization 
programs (H1). Yet these constraints have caused reactions from its regional 
allies and partners to pursue and modernize capabilities for self-reliant 
defense (H5). Moreover, “arms race” theories do not capture activities which 
respond to changing levels of armaments, but do not directly involve defense 
acquisitions. For the US, the desire to bolster its allies and partners’ defense, 
as well as finding a cost-effective solution to the erosion of its military 
superiority, has led to defense technology transfers to partners and allies, 
increased security cooperation and reinvigorating alliances, and investments 
in civilian S&T industry. 
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A peer competition such as that between the US and China, typically also 
involves a “war of words” for the moral high ground. Thus, Beijing has 
endeavored to portray Washington’s rebalance pejoratively as renewed 
“containment” when the US insists it is protecting regional order and stability.  
(H4). It has focused on American presence in the region from the perspective 
of the rebalance and Washington’s increasing investment in qualitative 
weaponry as opposed to a reaction to the PLA’s military transformation (H3). 
This demonstrates that regional countries—whether allied or in opposition—
are responding to American military modernization given its significance in 
defining the Asia-Pacific balance of power (H2). As the US’ military 
modernization has a two-fold purpose in the Western Pacific—to counter 
China’s military modernization and erosion of American military superiority, 
as well as to reassure partners and allies of American security commitments—
the reactions in the region have been heightened. Decreases in American 
military capability are felt as acutely as increases, and both changes have 
resulted in regional pushes for both collective defense and self-reliant defense 
capabilities. This indicates that arming dynamics have also been influenced 
by the perceptions of the changing regional balance of power. However, such 
perceptions and misperceptions have not spiraled into conflict (H6). The next 
chapter examines Washington’s key ally in the region, Japan.  
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Chapter 6: 
Japan 
 
Key Impulses 
The change in Japan’s security and defense policies signifies a reaction to its 
changing security environment. Despite its pacifist identity, this process has 
been informed by nationalism and a sense of uniqueness. Moreover, 
overwhelmingly the Japanese population has developed unfavorable views of 
China, South Korea and North Korea. In response, both South Korea and 
China have harnessed incremental changes made to Japanese defense policy 
and military modernization as instruments for their own nationalist policies 
and rationales for military modernization.  Yet, Japan’s ability to maintain its 
capabilities is dependent on whether it can sustain its defense spending over 
the long-term. Despite lifting its informal “1 percent of GDP” cap on military 
spending in 1987, due to the difficulty of managing the JSDF on stagnant 
economic growth, 1  Japan’s socio-economic problems have still been a 
significant impediment to maintaining its levels of military modernization. If 
the Japanese economy does not recover there will be limited resources with 
which to fund its ambitious modernization and defense strategy. Japan has 
also faced the challenge that as per its constitution its military capabilities and 
any acquisitions must clearly be towards the “defensive end of the spectrum.” 
Therefore, Japan has been unable to acquire offensive weapons, such as 
aircraft carriers and long-range strike systems.  
 
Moreover, although Japan has moved towards a “collective self-defense” 
arrangement under its alliance with the US—limited resources have already 
strained alliance capabilities and produced contentious negotiations on cost-
sharing.2 Due to Japan’s distinct post-war ideology, and social contentions 
over the American military footprint in Japan, Tokyo’s enhanced posture and 
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desire to increase cooperation with Washington has also remained subject to 
the Japanese public’s appetite to qualify its post-war pacifism. 
 
Japan’s modernization of its naval and associated air capabilities is driven by 
three key impulses. First, it is motivated to manage domestic pacifism and 
constitutional barriers to, at a minimum, possess a naval and air self-defense 
capability not solely reliant on American security guarantees. A broad 
national anxiety exists of Japan as a resource-poor group of islands, whose 
livelihood is reliant “on other countries for the supply of natural resources, 
energy, food, and many other materials which are indispensable to national 
existence.” Tokyo is particularly concerned about maritime security and the 
protection of open and safe SLOCs. 3  However, overall, Japan’s self-
perception as a pacifist nation has proven to be a restraining influence on its 
military modernization. 
 
This relates to the second impulse which is the objective to normalize its 
armed forces and allow its defense-industrial base to become globally 
competitive. The normalization of the Japanese armed forces and changes in 
its strategic doctrine assist in managing US pressure for burden-sharing, as 
well as deepening political and military joint-ness and interoperability with 
the US. Increasing self-reliant defense also enhances Japan’s security and 
survival should the US decrease its commitments to its regional allies. 
Moreover, Tokyo is also responding to the existential threats sensed from a 
Korean peninsula contingency and an expanding China. For historical and 
geopolitical reasons, Japan is extremely sensitive to the changing balance of 
power in Northeast Asia. The moves to revitalize the alliance through 
enhancing the interoperable capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces 
(JSDF) with US forces, as well as increasing security cooperation with 
Southeast Asian nations, is increasing China and South Korea’s perception of 
a revival of Japanese militarism.  
 
Lastly, because of its sensitivity towards changes to the regional balance of 
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power, Japan aims to maintain a regional power status commensurate with its 
economic position and perception of national prestige. For instance, the 
qualitative and quantitative development of Japan’s submarine capability has 
been significant as it demonstrates that Japan has strengthened its ability to 
conduct denial operations against China. At present, China cannot dominate 
Japan as long as it remains allied to the US, even though the PLA already has 
a higher number of vessels and aircraft relative to the JSDF. Japanese 
decision-makers are aware that Japan can neither keep up with the 
quantitative numbers of the PLAN, nor defend itself without the assistance of 
the US. Additionally, Japan is becoming increasingly concerned about North 
Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile program, and experiences a tense 
relationship with South Korea due to historical grievances. 
 
Managing “Pacifist Nationalists” 
In response to a darker security outlook, particularly the Abe government has 
placed considerable effort into reinterpreting Japan’s constitution, updating 
defense guidelines and managing pacifist sentiment. Due to Japan’s war-time 
history such efforts have been perceived by the ROK and China as aggressive 
and destabilizing. Nevertheless, in September 2015, reflecting the belief that 
Japan’s current defense policy constrained its ability to protect fundamental 
interests, the cabinet of Prime Minster Abe passed a bill that allowed the 
“reinterpretation” of Article 9 of the Constitution. This enables Japan’s armed 
forces in the future to exercise the right of collective self-defense under 
certain conditions, including the ability for the JSDF to assist its American 
ally, should the US come under attack.4 The cabinet announcement stated that 
the “international environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly 
severe” and advocated more active measures to prevent conflict and deter 
possible threats to national security.5  
 
According to the previous interpretation of Japan’s constitution, Japan 
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possessed the right of collective self-defense, meaning the right to defend 
another country that has been attacked by an aggressor. However, exercising 
that right would have violated the constitution’s war-renouncing Article 9. 
Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution states: 
 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use 
of force as means of settling international disputes … In order to accomplish the 
aim of the preceding paragraph, land sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized.6 
 
Bureaucrats from Japan and United States have long worked closely together 
to make incremental yet steady changes to Japan’s security policies, often 
within the framework of the US-Japan alliance framework. The 2015 
“reinterpretation” was actually part of a series of interpretations of Japan’s 
post-war constitution since the Korean War. General Douglas MacArthur in 
the 1945 Potsdam Declaration prescribed three primary principles for Japan: 
popular sovereignty, pacifism and human rights;7 with the preservation of 
Japanese pacifism embodied in Article 9. MacArthur’s aims for the US 
occupation of Japan were two-fold: first, he wanted to eliminate any chance 
of future Japanese militarism through disarmament and demilitarization; 
second, he sought to establish a democratic system of government to 
extinguish the feudalistic aspects of Japanese society that Washington 
perceived as responsible for Japan’s militarism.8  
 
As the Cold War progressed, Japan’s strategic importance grew and the 
Korean War gave impetus for revising Article 9. When North Korea invaded 
South Korea in 1950, the US occupational force in Japan was deployed to the 
peninsula. To fill the military vacuum by providing for national defense 
capability, MacArthur ordered Japan  to create the National Police Reserve 
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(NPR).9 The NPR was originally meant to be constabulary, however, the 
entry of Chinese Communist Forces in the war on the Korean Peninsula 
increased the scope of threat Japan faced and by 1954 the forces were 
renamed into the Japan Self-Defense Forces, trained and outfitted with US 
military equipment.10 Thus while the original US initiative was focused on 
disarmament and restraining Japanese nationalism, the policy quickly shifted 
to enhancing Japan’s military capabilities and a flexible interpretation of 
Article 9 to allow Japan to take on a more active part in its alliance with the 
US and regional security.  
 
Since then, Washington has repeatedly pointed to the need for Japan to 
remove constitutional restrictions which have prevented Tokyo from 
participating in collective security arrangements.11  Richard Nixon’s 1969 
Guam Doctrine made clear Washington’s desire for America’s allies to do 
more for their own defense, and this applied especially to Japan. The aim was 
to enhance allies’ self-reliance, that is, give major responsibility for self-
defense to its Asian allies, with only financial and technical assistance from 
the United States.12 The post-Cold War international system then marked a 
departure from “exclusive defense” towards “collective defense.” With no 
strategic threat to contain, Washington could now credibly threaten to 
abandon Japan. Conversely, Japan was more dependent than ever on the US 
to guarantee access to oil and to manage its tense relations with Pyongyang 
and Beijing.13 In 1996, in the Tokyo Declaration, President Bill Clinton and 
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro shifted the US-Japan alliance emphasis 
from Article 5 (“the defense of Japan”) to Article 6 (“peace and security in 
the ‘Far East’”).14 The 1997 US-Japan Defense Guidelines laid out what 
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Japan’s new regional role meant: Article 9 was reinterpreted to allow the 
JSDF to respond to regional contingencies by supporting American forces 
exclusively in non-combat roles such as logistics and information-sharing.15  
 
Article 9 however has since become a core part of Japan’s civic identity, with 
strong majorities of the general population and policy-makers internalizing 
the ideals of Article 9 and taking great pride in its meaning. The trauma of the 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the catastrophic defeat in 
WWII that discredited militarism, created a profound commitment to 
pacifism. 16  Due to Japan’s collective identity and group-ist dynamic, 17 
popular opposition to Abe’s security and defense policies remains strong and 
significant despite Japan’s changing security environment. In a series of 
Asahi Shimbun polls in July 2015, 57 percent disagreed with the proposed bill 
to allow collective self-defense and expand SDF activities abroad. An 
overwhelming 72 percent disagreed that Prime Minister Abe had been 
“courteous” when addressing the public about the security bills and a majority 
55 percent disapproved of how the opposition parties reacted to the proposed 
bills. Moreover, 48 percent polled also believed that the security bills violated 
the Japanese Constitution, and a majority 45 percent could not foresee 
continuing support for Abe.18  
 
The September 2015 bill was met with protest, with an estimated 25,000 
people gathering at Shibuya in the previous month to “Save Article 9.”19 
Student activism movements grew in response to the “reinterpretation.” The 
most prominent has been the Students Emergency Action for Liberal 
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Democracy, which evolved out of opposition to Japan’s 2013 state secrets 
law under which whistleblowers and journalists face imprisonment for 
revealing and reporting sensitive information.20 Many opponents believed 
that Abe had used his parliamentary majority to railroad the democratic 
process and unilaterally pass the security bills despite widespread 
opposition. 21  Yet, the Prime Minister’s position represents a significant 
conservative element within Japanese society that desires to shed the 
perceived weakness and deference characterizing Japan’s post-WWII stature. 
Reviving nationalist sentiments and a common perception of security 
problems bind together much of Japan’s bureaucracy and political parties—
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its main opposition, the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) are often in agreement on foreign and 
defense policy.22 Moreover, this issue is considered a backburner compared 
to Abe’s ability to stimulate Japan’s economy.23 This was demonstrated in 
July 2016 when Abe’s LDP secured a clear majority in the upper house 
elections, meaning the conservative LDP has a clear path to revise the pacifist 
constitution.24 
 
China and South Korea, however, have vehemently opposed Japan’s efforts 
to revise Article 9. Indeed, the rewriting of the constitution has been used as 
reasons to lament Japan’s latent nationalism and re-militarization, and have 
consequently contributed to a reactive process in which China and South 
Korea have acted to counter an “unrestrained” and militarized Japan. For 
instance, the China Daily newspaper claimed that the reinterpretation of 
Article 9 promoted a “new Cold War” with the US, Japan and South Korea 
                                                
20 Linda Seig and Teppei Kasai, “Japan Student Group Injects New Exuberance into Anti-
war Protests,” Reuters, August 28, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-politics-
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in one camp, and China, North Korea and Russia in the other.25 China’s 
Ministry of Defense News Channel also stated that Japan had “manufactured 
incidents and stirred up tension to pave the way for easing constitutional curbs 
that have kept the military out of overseas conflicts for nearly 70 years.”26 On 
a different occasion it also claimed that “Japan’s lift of the ban of collective 
self-defense is not an isolate incident but a key move in “Abe’s militarism” 
(sic).”27 
 
South Korea’s Yonhap News made similar claims, stating that “The South, a 
onetime colony of Japan, has remained cautious over the laws as Japan under 
its conservative leader Shinzo Abe has appeared reluctant to fully atone for 
its wartime atrocities including the sexual enslavement of Korean women 
during World War II.”28 In another article it placed the Abe government’s 
“move to beef up the nation’s military power without a clear apology for its 
imperialist past” alongside “North Korea’s nuclear weapons drive” as the two 
major obstacles to East Asian peace and stability. 29  Working with 
Washington to enhance self-reliance and increase Japan’s capacity to 
contribute to the alliance has thus led to a fear of re-militarization and ultra-
nationalism from China and South Korea of an unrestrained Japan, which may 
one day be also no longer restricted by Washington’s security guarantee, yet 
still have advanced military capabilities derived from the alliance. 
 
Yet contemporary Japanese nationalism and its motivations for a more 
independent and self-reliant defense policy and force structure has often been 
misunderstood in academic and media discussion. The Chinese and South 
Korean reporting on Japanese opinion polls and protests have contributed to 
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the perception that a clear majority of Japanese society deem the new security 
bills as unconstitutional and an affront to its pacifist nature. This has further 
been compounded by international reporting of ministerial visits to the 
Yasukuni shrine (which honors the Japanese war dead, including convicted 
war criminals), and the perceived historical revisionism in a select number of 
Japanese textbooks.30 This has contributed to the shorthand explanation that 
Abe’s current national security policy is a revival of Japan’s WWII ultra-
nationalist and imperialist imperatives.  
 
However, Japan’s sense of national consciousness and identity takes root in 
Japan’s cultural and ethnic homogeneity, maritime boundaries, and “unique” 
fusion between Western and Asian civilizations. 31 It is based on the idea that 
the Japanese people have always existed as a separate people, that they 
possess unique attributes and pure blood, and that they have a unique mission 
in bridging the divide between East and West. 32  Japan’s rapidly aging 
population and low fertility rate are therefore often labeled as more pressing 
threats to the survivability of the Japanese state.33  
 
Thus, although popular connotations of Japanese nationalism trace it to 
imperialist ambitions, Japan’s national consciousness is rather a distinct 
expression rooted in pacifist ideals and feelings of “uniqueness.” Indeed its 
2013 NDPG termed its new approach to taking a greater role in international 
operations as “Proactive Contribution to Peace” and “Proactive Pacifism.34 
The Japanese public and bureaucracy has been largely in agreement about the 
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threats to its livelihood—North Korea’s nuclear program, China’s 
comprehensive military transformation, South Korea’s peer competitiveness 
and hostility, and the fluctuating credibility of America’s security guarantee. 
Indeed, recent incidents of North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile testing, 
Chinese incursions into Japanese territorial waters, and South Korean anti-
Japanese protests have led to an erosion of support for Article 9. 35 Compared 
to the 2015 polls, in 2006 opposition to constitutional revision was 10 points 
higher, at 67 percent.36 As well, in a 2016 poll, 86 percent of Japanese had an 
unfavorable view of China, with 81 percent associating it with arrogance, 76 
percent viewing it as nationalistic and 71 percent as violent.37  
 
Requirements for the US-Japan Alliance 
For Washington, Japan remains its most geostrategically significant ally in 
the region. Conversely, for Japan, the alliance with the US is the key pillar of 
its foreign and defense policy due to the American provision of extended 
deterrence. Japan’s naval force structure has remained largely structured as 
an adjunct to the US Navy to meet alliance commitments in East Asia.38 Japan 
has served as a critical hub for US forward deployed forces, with 
approximately 50,000 American soldiers stationed in Japan and the exclusive 
use of approximately 90 facilities. Through this arrangement, the US has 
guaranteed Japan’s security, including through extended deterrence under the 
US “nuclear umbrella.”39 At the end of the Cold War, there were concerns of 
the alliance being “adrift” without a purpose.40 Yet since the late 1990s, the 
rise of China and increasing North Korean belligerence gave US-Japan 
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relations a new guiding strategic rationale. However, the revitalization of the 
alliance to improve the operational capability as a combined force has 
contributed to the perception of a remilitarizing Japan fueled by right-wing 
nationalism and sustained by American political support and advanced 
military technology. 
 
The US-Japan alliance has been a legacy of the American occupation of Japan 
after World War II. Unlike other defense treaties, the US pledge to protect 
Japan’s security is not reciprocal.41 During the Cold War, the US increasingly 
viewed Japan as geostrategically significant not only to counter the Soviet 
threat in the Pacific, but also to hedge against the possibility of an aggressive 
China. 42  Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida’s (1946-1947 and 1948-1954) 
“Yoshida Doctrine” resisted Washington’s push for a full-scale Japanese 
rearmament or a collective security arrangement. Yoshida argued that Japan 
was democratic and peaceful, and that world opinion would protect Japan. 
More importantly, Article 9 forbade any remilitarization and public opinion 
was firmly against change. Yoshida also appealed to containment ideas by 
arguing that rearmament would impoverish Japan as it would alienate its 
neighbors and block off essential markets and resources to the small island 
nation. 43 This approach resulted in a highly asymmetric alliance. Although 
the US has pledged to protect Japan’s security, the treaty also grants the US 
the right to have military bases in Japan, the right to project military power 
from these bases against a third country without consulting Tokyo, the right 
to veto any third country’s military personnel in Japan, extraterritorial legal 
rights for US military personnel, the right to intervene to quell domestic 
disorder in Japan, and an indefinite time period for the treaty.44 
 
The alliance and the consequent institutionalization of the Yoshida Doctrine 
thus politicized the American guarantee of Japanese security. Japanese civic 
identity adopted the Yoshida Doctrine. Consequently, Japanese public 
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opinion often associates the alliance with the American military footprint 
(particularly in Futenma, Okinawa45), the domestic costs of being dependent 
solely on the US, and foregoing certain sovereign rights. Moreover, it set a 
pattern for the tumultuous discussion on the divisive issues of the 
interpretation of the constitution, the rearmament of Japan, and the 
relationship with the US. Due to the success of the doctrine in achieving 
economic growth and Japan’s desire for political stability and group 
consensus, these debates were often shelved,46 further reinforcing the ideal 
type of Japan as a pacifist trading nation. 
 
Thus the movement of the US-Japan alliance from an asymmetric 
arrangement towards a more balanced security partnership has been 
motivated not just by Washington’s expectations for Japan to take on more of 
the burden and reduce its “free riding,” but also by the Japanese bureaucracy 
who has aimed to reduce Japan’s passivity and dependence in foreign 
affairs.47 Part of the changing structure of the alliance has also related to the 
fiscal situation of Japan and the US as both economies are under strain and 
managing low growth. Whilst Tokyo recognized Washington’s rebalance 
objectives, it remained concerned about the ability of Washington to commit 
due to its fiscal constraints and defense sequestration. Japan’s Ministry of 
Defense, for instance, noted that the 2014 QDR highlighted that the risks to 
American forces would increase significantly if sequester-level cuts 
continued into FY2016.48 Yet hosting American troops has placed strains on 
Japanese communities, particularly in Okinawa. Compounding basing 
controversies, Japan has over the years provided up to USD4 billion annually 
in direct and indirect host-nation support (HNS), which constitutes 
approximately 75 percent of the total US cost of maintaining troops in 
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Japan.49 The 2012 estimate of costs related to the stationing of American 
forces in Japan was USD7.16 billion per annum,50 while the 2015 five-year 
deal was set to even increase the amount of support provided by Tokyo.51 The 
Ministry of Finance’s calls to cut Japan’s budget spending for US forces 
stationed in Japan were opposed by Washington, despite a public desire for 
Tokyo to restore public finances on top of Japan’s expanded role in the 
alliance through new security legislation.52   
 
In this context, requirements for the US alliance entails Tokyo to focus on 
bolstering self-reliance through developing capabilities to support US 
operations in the region. Yet because of its perception of American 
detachment to the region, it also seeks enhanced security cooperation with 
other US partners. Despite economic stagnation, Tokyo has kept a constant 
one percent share of its GDP for military expenditure. 53 It has proved to be 
the one of the most effective Asia-Pacific countries in managing this 
constraint on its defense resources.  The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 
(JMSDF) is still widely regarded as the most powerful navy in the Asia-
Pacific after USPACOM, and Japan’s alliance with the US based on the 
Japan-US Security Treaty54 has long been an anchor of the US security role 
in Asia.55 The Japanese navy has evolved to “combine enhanced capabilities 
to retain sea control in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea with extended 
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operational reach and flexibility, including an expeditionary component to 
meet alliance and diplomatic commitments in East Asia and beyond its 
confines.”56 Its 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) signaled 
a definitive shift away from its static Cold War framework, outlining a new 
“dynamic defense force” to strengthen its deterrence and response 
capabilities.57  
 
In 2012, Japan announced plans to increase its defense spending for the next 
five years, outlaying more than USD230 billion to acquire surveillance drones, 
fighter jets, naval destroyers and amphibious vehicles. This included the 
creation of a new amphibious unit, the Western Army Infantry Regiment, 
modeled on the US Marines, which would be called on to retake islands 
captured by an enemy58—a clear response to Chinese naval and aerial activity 
near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Japan has also invested more in 
its indigenous defense industry and has loosened the restriction on arms 
exports. In 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set out the Three Principles 
on Transfer of Defense Equipment, 59  which allows arms exports if they 
contribute to international cooperation and Japan’s national security.60 Tokyo 
has since signed a February 2016 agreement with the Philippines allowing the 
transfer of defense equipment,61 and announced the sale of  six used maritime 
surveillance vessels to Vietnam.62 In November 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe confirmed that Japan would also donate two decommissioned Japan 
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Coast Guard (JCG) patrol vessels to Malaysia.63 In the same month, India and 
Japan signed a civil nuclear pact, allowing Japan to export nuclear power 
equipment and technology to India.64 
 
The JSDF has become more active in overseas missions, including efforts in 
the 2000s to support US-led coalitions in Afghanistan and the reconstruction 
of Iraq.65 It has also contributed to global operations like anti-piracy patrols 
and UN peacekeeping operations.66 In April 2015, the US and Japan agreed 
on revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, the first update 
since 1997, which deepened alliance cooperation and could lead to an 
enhanced operational role for the JSDF.67 Its new arms exports principles 
were also written with an aim to deepen cooperation in its R&D chains for 
defense innovation purposes. As Taisuke Hirose has argued,  
 
boosting bilateral DE&T cooperation would allow the United States and Japan to 
enhance interoperability and economic efficiency between the two militaries, both 
of which serve to strengthen the alliance. Moreover, military cooperation would 
tighten industrial cooperation and lead to further economic collaboration and 
exchanges of people and information. The new arms export principles can serve as 
a favorable wind for strengthening US-Japan relations.68 
 
In 2014, Tokyo also revised its espionage laws, enacting the State Secrecy 
Law in 2014. The new law imposed tough penalties for civil servants, 
politicians and others who leak sensitive information related to diplomacy, 
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terrorism and espionage. Those who disclose information designated as 
“special secrets” could face up to 10 years in prison.69 Particularly after the 
WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden leaks, Japan had been under increasing 
pressure from Washington to better protect state secrets—including 
intelligence shared by the US—and to have the ability to prosecute cases of 
espionage.70 The passing of the new law—despite domestic protests arguing 
that it would conceal government misdeeds and limit press freedoms—was a 
critical step in advancing US-Japan intelligence sharing. 
 
The alliance has significantly influenced the modernization of Japan’s 
sophisticated capabilities to maximize interoperability with US forces, 
particularly in the naval and air space. These capability developments have 
not just targeted China’s military transformation, but have also aimed at 
increasing joint warfighting capacities for a broad range of East Asian 
contingencies. Although Japan indigenously develops its own ships, these 
platforms have benefited from advanced American software and weapons. 
Japan is one of five allied countries (alongside South Korea, Australia, Spain 
and Norway) to have Aegis-equipped surface combatants.71  The US and 
Japan have also cooperated in developing certain technologies—sensor, 
advanced kinetic warhead, second-stage propulsion and a lightweight nose 
cone—for the BMD interceptor missiles (SM-3 Block IIA version) used by 
only Japanese and American Aegis ships, with Japan funding a significant 
share of the effort.72 In 2015, the US also authorized the sale of two additional 
Aegis destroyers and Japan announced plans to modernize its existing six 
destroyers with the latest Aegis system to bring its capability up to eight 
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BMD-capable Aegis destroyers using the SM-3.73 The Aegis-equipped Atago-
class destroyers are modelled after the American Arleigh Burke destroyers, 
and the Osumi-class tank landing ships can accommodate two American-
designed Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft.74 In particular, the 
sensors, radars and electronic countermeasures are based on American 
designs and utilize American logistical support. 75  And despite being 
indigenously developed, the JMSDF’s submarine operations have been 
integrated with the US Navy so its crews benefit from joint training 
exercises.76 
 
Japan has also invested in 42 F-35A JSFs, as part of its modernization 
process.77 The key strategic explanation was that the aircraft could be used in 
concert with the JMSDF, the US Air Force and the US Navy’s air wing in 
order to enhance allied operational capability and flexibility.78 Upgrades to 
its aging F-2 fighters have included equipping them with American Joint 
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits that enable the jets to have a precision 
strike capability. 79  Enhancing Japan’s precision strike capability has 
strengthened interoperability and joint planning with the US, and increased 
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Japan’s defense capability and deterrent. 80  Such platforms, particularly 
JDAMs, serve as force multipliers within the alliance context. To assist 
further integration with US global command and control, Japan also acquired 
three RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned surveillance systems (to be based at the 
USAF Misawa Air Base) 81 and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne early 
warning and control aircraft (as part of its modernization of its 13 E-2C 
aircraft), which will enhance allied situational awareness of air and naval 
activity in the Pacific.82 In addition to naval and associated air capabilities, a 
significant feature of allied efforts has been the multi-level intelligence 
system for coalition operations, the OED (OSIS [Ocean Surveillance 
Information System] Baseline Upgrade Evolutionary Development), which is 
a significant element for submarine detection in the East China Sea. Japan has 
been one of seven US allies to receive OED hardware and software, and key 
aspects of the US OSIS are co-located within JMSDF OSIS facilities.83 
 
Transforming Japan’s Defense Industry 
Tied to Japan’s desire to normalize its self-defense forces to meet the 
requirements of the US alliance has been the goal to liberalize its defense 
industry. Japan, as the world’s third largest economy in terms of nominal 
GDP, has been a prolific supplier of sophisticated civilian technology to the 
global market place.84 Japan’s technological capabilities are at or above world 
levels in many areas that are critical for military systems. Its missiles, ships 
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and armored vehicles are technologically competitive with Western 
counterparts. 85  However, as a result of the post-war “peace-oriented” 
constitution, its participation in the global arms market has been severely 
limited. 86  Despite having strong competitive advantages in the civilian 
market, Japanese companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and 
Kawasaki Heavy Industry have not been able translate this strength into the 
defense market (See Table 6.1).87 Additionally, Japan has not participated in 
international development programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter, and 
despite technology transfers agreements with the US, Japan’s defense 
industry has remained relatively isolated from the international arms market. 
 
Rank Company Country Defense 
revenue 
(USD mn) 
Total 
revenue 
(USD mn) 
% of 
defense 
revenue 
1 Lockheed-
Martin 
US 43,468 7,248 92 
2 Boeing US 29,500 94,571 31 
3 BAE Systems UK 23,622 25,278 91 
4 Raytheon US 22,384 24,069 93 
5 General 
Dynamics 
US 19,696 31,353 63 
21 Mitsubishi 
Heavy 
Industries 
Japan 4,033 34,835 12 
68 Kawasaki 
Heavy 
Industries 
Japan 884.66 13,517 7 
69 Komatsu Ltd. Japan 884.66 16,046 6 
77 NEC Japan 805.45 23,719 3 
81 Fujitsu Ltd. Japan 696.87 40,135 2 
Table 6.1: Comparison of World and Japanese Defense Manufacturers (2016) 
 
However, in April 2014, Prime Minister Abe’s cabinet in accordance with its 
new National Security Strategy, set out its new arms export principles, The 
Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which 
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specified when overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology 
cooperation would be permitted. The new rules virtually lifted the ban on 
arms exports to the US.88 This was a result of three dynamics. First, the 
Japanese government in the 1990s actively promoted the indigenization of the 
defense industry to enhance the nation’s independence and to stimulate 
“technical competence, production efficiency, and economic growth.” 89 
Second, and in contrast to the first dynamic, Japan’s stagnant economic 
growth—but also restriction to the JSDF market (which is slashing 
procurement in line with the overall Japanese budget)—created pressure on 
defense production base. Recently, over 50 Japanese defense firms or 
subcontractors have withdrawn from doing armaments work, while another 
13 declared bankruptcy.90 Lastly, the one-way technology transfer to Japan 
from the US had become a serious alliance management issue. 91  Thus, 
changes to the legislation were spurred by the desire to export the SM-3 Block 
IIA by the US to a third-party, as well as the desire to bid for the Australian 
submarine contract.92 
 
As a result of the new principles, Japan has been in talks with several regional 
countries. Japan and India have discussed the sale of two ShinMaywa US-2 
seaplanes that can perform patrol, search and rescue, and replenishment duties 
in the Indian Ocean. In 2015, both India and Thailand   signaled interest in 
purchasing the Soryu-class to modernize their submarine fleets. 93  In 
December 2015, Japan and India agreed on a legal framework for the transfer 
of defense equipment and technology. 94  India also publicly welcomed 
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Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation on collective self-defense and invited 
Japan to permanently participate in the bilateral India-US Malabar naval 
exercises. 95  Also in December 2015, Japan and Indonesia agreed to 
strengthen security cooperation and begun talks on the transfer of defense 
equipment and technology as part of “Japan’s intention to seamlessly support 
maritime support capabilities of the ASEAN countries.” 96  Japan’s first 
official defense pact to allow the transfer of defense equipment and 
technology to an ASEAN nation was signed with the Philippines in February 
2016.97 The agreement provided for Japan and the Philippines to conduct joint 
research and development, and joint production of defense equipment and 
technology. 98  Japan had already agreed in June 2015 to provide the 
Philippines with ten patrol vessels for the Philippine Coast Guard.99 In May 
2016, Japan and Vietnam also agreed to establish an “extensive strategic 
partnership,” including ties between their defense industries.100 Vietnam’s 
Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phac expressed gratitude to Japan for 
furnishing its maritime law enforcement ships and requested ongoing support 
to deliver newly built patrol ships to Vietnam in addition to the six already 
received.101  
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Yet, the loosening of arms exports has led to reactions from China. Beijing 
argued that Japan’s actual intent was to contribute to a weapons build-up of 
in the region and use the US-Japan alliance as a form of containment. Chinese 
foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated: 
 
against the backdrop of an intensifying swing to the right for Japanese politics, the 
intention behind and effect of massively loosening restrictions on the export of 
weapons really worries people … We hope that Japan can really learn the lessons 
of history, respect and face up the legitimate and reasonable security concerns of its 
neighbors and take real steps to promote regional peace and stability.102  
 
And Xinhua claimed: 
 
by interfering in the South China Sea issue, Abe has revealed his ambition to wield 
greater military influence, fueled by the eased rules on arms exports … Heightened 
tensions will help Japanese arms manufacturers to sell more weapons to other 
countries, which will further complicate regional security.”103 
 
Reacting to China 
Despite normalizing bilateral relations in 1972 and the third-largest two-way 
trade relationship in the world, 104  due to historical tensions, conflicting 
strategic interests and a territorial dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 
China-Japan relations have remained tense. Since the early 1990s, Japanese 
officials have become increasingly concerned about Beijing’s lack of 
transparency over its political intentions, its growing economic clout and 
military modernization. Japan’s 2015 defense white paper, Defense of Japan, 
stated: 
 
while advocating “peaceful development,” China, particularly over maritime issues 
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where its interests conflict with others’, based on its own assertions incompatible 
with the existing international legal order, continues to act in an assertive manner, 
including coercive attempts at changing the status quo, and is poised to fulfil its 
unilateral demands without compromise. China’s actions include dangerous acts 
that may invite unintended consequences, raising concerns over China’s foreign 
direction.105 
 
The Defense of Japan 2015 also discussed in-detail China’s growing military 
capabilities and increasingly bold activities in Japanese territorial waters.106 
Consequently, China and Japan’s naval and associated air capabilities suggest 
attempts to offset each other’s level of armaments. This reactive process has 
been symptomatic of “the steps that one side takes to promote its own security 
[leaving] the other with a growing sense of vulnerability.”107 Richard Bush 
has argued that what makes this security dilemma unique—and indeed, quite 
problematic—is the historical antagonism: “Imperial Japan exposed and 
exploited China’s weakness … fostering a deep sense of victimization among 
the Chinese and leaving scars on the Chinese psyche.”108  
 
Modern historical grievances are rooted in Japan’s defeat of the failing Qing 
dynasty in 1895 and the 1931 invasion and brutal occupation of Manchuria.109 
Relations have been further aggrieved by repeated Japanese ministerial visits 
to the controversial Yasukuni shrine, certain textbooks promoting historical 
revisionism, and Tokyo’s stance on its military transgressions during World 
War II, particularly the “comfort women” issue.110 China, particularly its 
state-owned media, has reacted. For instance, the China Daily claimed in 
2015: 
 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took reluctant steps toward saying the right 
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things in his speech on Aug 14 commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of 
World War II. And despite not going far enough, he appears to believe that a few 
highly qualified and clearly limited expressions of polite regret can wipe clean 
Japan’s historical debt towards China … Read superficially, Abe seemed to say all 
the right things.111  
 
The CCP’s promotion of nationalism through patriotic history education has 
in recent times sparked large public outpourings of anger at Japan. While the 
state-sponsored patriotic education was intended to serve domestic political 
purposes, the government has since faced greater difficulties stopping large 
anti-Japanese demonstrations.112 
 
Mutual suspicion and mistrust escalated to open hostility in the 2000s over 
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Japan and China 
have engaged in struggles over the uninhabited islands since the 1970s,113and 
the contest escalated upon the identification of natural oil and gas reserves 
along the continental shelf around the islands.114 Japan has claimed to have 
discovered the islands (terra nullius) in 1884, officially annexed them in 1885, 
and in 1972 at the end of the American occupation the Japanese government 
resumed responsibility for them.115 China has based its claims on a Chinese 
“portolano”116 from 1403, and has referred to the Chinese tributary state 
system in which Japan was a vassal state to Imperial China.117 In line with 
this, some Chinese have also questioned Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu 
Islands (Okinawa), further antagonizing its territorial dispute with Japan, as 
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well as broader relations as a whole. 118  In 2010 a Chinese fishing boat 
collided with two Japanese patrol boats in the East China Sea in two separate 
incidents, 40 minutes apart.119 In response to Japan’s detention of one of the 
fishing boat captains, the Chinese government blocked exports of rare earth 
minerals, preventing them from being loaded aboard ships at Chinese ports.120 
 
In 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the five islands from a 
private landowner in order to preempt their sale to Tokyo’s ultranationalist 
governor, Shintaro Ishihara. 121  Beijing protested, condemned the act as 
“nationalism” and in violation with the status quo. Chinese citizens also 
staged a series of anti-Japan protests. By the end of 2012, China begun 
deploying CCG maritime law enforcement ships near the islands and stepped 
up “routine” patrols to assert jurisdiction in what it considered “Chinese 
territorial waters.”122 Often the ships waved signs saying, “Leave Chinese 
waters” and “Follow the Chinese law.” 123  On December 13, 2012, the 
anniversary of the 1937 Nanjing massacre, a small surveillance plane 
belonging to China’s State Oceanic Administration flew so low across the 
airspace over the disputed islands that it escaped Japan’s land-based radar on 
a nearby outpost.124 
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In 2013, China further escalated the situation by declaring it would establish 
an ADIZ in the East China Sea, covering the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands as well as airspace overlapping existing ADIZs of Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan.125 The ADIZ declaration increased indignation and anxiety as 
China did not consult with affected countries. Japanese and many 
international observers argued that the requirements for flight notification in 
the ADIZ went beyond international norms and impinged on freedom of 
navigation. China’s declaration of the ADIZ implied Chinese military 
enforcement within the zone and, therefore, the overlap of ADIZs could lead 
to serious accidents and unintended clashes elevating the risk of conflict.126 
That year, Chinese warships also locked their fire-control radar on a Japanese 
destroyer and a helicopter on two separate occasions within the space of three 
weeks.127 Beijing blamed the tensions on Japan’s attempt to buy the islands 
while Japan’s defense minister Itsunori Onodera responded that “we intend 
to push China very hard to restrain from engaging in such dangerous acts.”128  
 
By 2015, there were almost daily encounters as both countries scrambled 
fighter jets. Japan encountered Chinese aircraft 883 times in FY2016, up 73 
percent from the previous fiscal year, and the second-highest amount since 
the JSDF begun publicizing numbers in 2001.129 In 2016, tensions again 
escalated in June when Japanese P-3C patrol aircraft spotted a Chinese 
Dongdiao-class intelligence ship entering Japanese 12nm territorial waters, 
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off the south coast of Kyushu.130 The incursion came just less than a week 
after a Chinese frigate entered the contested contiguous zone around 
Senkakau/Diaoyu Islands; this was only the second such recorded incident 
since the end of WWII after a Chinese submarine was detected in 2004.131 
 
China’s military modernization and actions in the East China Sea has driven 
not only the transformation of Japanese naval and associated air capabilities, 
but also its maritime constabulary needs. To strengthen its versatility in 
amphibious operations, particularly in the East China Sea, Tokyo decided to 
acquire 17 V-22 Ospreys from the United States.132 Moreover, to counter 
China’s actions and qualitative improvements in naval capabilities, Japan 
started to enhance its C4ISR, ASW and island defenses. With regards to 
C4ISR, in 2014 it built a fixed-air defense radar on Okino Erabu Island (on 
the northern tip of Okinawa) with an FPS-7 long-range search radar 
strengthening air control. It is also upgraded existing defense radars on 
Miyako (off Okinawa Island) and Takahatayama Islands (off Honshu Island) 
to the same system.133 ASW capabilities were modernized with the 2015 
launch of two Izumo-class helicopter destroyers—capable of carrying up to 
400 troops, seven ASW SH-60K helicopters and seven MCH-101 mine 
countermeasure helicopters (which the JSDF has also decided to acquire).134 
At a full-load of 24,000tons, the Izumo-class has been the largest ship ever 
commissioned by the JSDF. It joined the two Hyuga-class helicopter carriers 
commissioned in 2009 and 2011, further enhancing Japan’s power 
projection.135 
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The JSDF also developed a next generation maritime patrol aircraft, the 
Kawasaki P-1, with an acquisition timetable of 65 aircraft at a rate of one to 
two per year.136 The 2015 defense budget allocated USD3.2 billion for a bulk 
order of twenty planes in order to reduce unit costs. It also allocated USD9.1 
million for capability improvements for its P-3Cs with regards to radars and 
infrared detection systems.137 Moreover, Japan has begun development of a 
Variable Depth Sonar system which will be mounted on destroyers, enabling 
coordinated searches among multiple destroyers to enhance the ability to 
detect and classify submarines at greater depths.138 As aforementioned, the 
JMSDF also made significant investments in its submarine fleet, with the aim 
to bring their fleet total from 16 to 22 by 2020.139 Currently, the Soryu-class 
has been produced at a rate of one per year, greatly outstripping the 
decommissioning rate of its predecessor, the Oyashio-class.140 The Soryu-
class (4,100 tons submerged) is one of the most advanced diesel-electric 
submarines in the world, with an air independent propulsion (AIP) system 
that allows it to remain submerged longer than any other submarine of similar 
displacement. 141  Critical areas of JMSDF submarine activities targeted 
towards China have involved the “Tsushima Strait, the Miyako Strait between 
Okinawa Island and Miyako Island, and the Osumi Strait off the southern tip 
of Kyushu, each of which constitutes a passageway through which Chinese 
naval vessels must pass to move from the East China Sea to the Pacific 
Ocean.”142  
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An additional measure for responding to China’s movements around the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been the modernization of Japan’s maritime 
constabulary forces, the JCG, in order to match China’s “white hull” force. 
Legislation relating to the JCG has enabled the coast guard to take actions 
still denied to the JMSDF. Japan’s Coast Guard Law states: 
 
In situations where the crew of the vessel refuses to comply with repeated calls to 
stop, when they resist the captain or vice captain’s enforcement of his duties, or 
when they try to flee, the director-general of the Japan Coast Guard, based on the 
vessel’s appearance, its navigational patterns, suspicious behavior by the crew, and 
information gathered concerning other surrounding situations, can authorize the use 
of weapons against the vessel for the purpose of stopping the vessel, within reason, 
and when all the following stipulations apply, the captain or vice captain can then 
use force, within reason, against the vessel if he determines that there is no other 
way to stop it.143 
 
Although the JMSDF has its own “Special Boarding Unit,” it does not have 
authority to fire on enemy ships unless fired upon first. In contrast, the JCG 
is legally allowed to initiate armed conflict under the conditions of “justifiable 
defense” and during an “emergency.” Warning shots, if ignored, can be 
followed by disabling fire targeted on the offending vessel’s crew. 144 
 
In 2014 Japan commissioned two high-endurance Shikishima-class patrol 
cutters with landing helicopter pads (PLH-class)—according to the 
Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, Admiral Yuji Sato “one of the 
largest-ever investments in the 66-year Japan Coast Guard history.”145 In 
2015, it also introduced a crew rotation system across its patrol vessels in 
order to increase its operational capacity and awareness. Japan’s FY2015 
budget request included funding for an additional six new PL-class patrol 
vessels for 2016, six new Patrol vessel Medium (PM)-class ships for 2016-
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2017, and life extension and upgrades for its two PLH-class cutters.146 It also 
allocated USD1.71 billion to reinforce JCG fleet strength and staffing, 
including building six new Patrol vessel Large (PL)-class cutters dedicated to 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 147  In March 2016, the JCG announced the 
purchase of an H225 medium-lift multi-purpose helicopter to bring its fleet 
total to 48.148 It also announced in April 2015 the order of an unspecified 
number of Falcon 2000 aircraft—long-range high-speed jet aircraft with 
sophisticated surveillance systems to enhance monitoring capability over 
maritime areas. 149  In November 2016, Japan’s Cabinet Intelligence and 
Research Office (CIRO) reported that China had greatly increased unilateral 
oil and gas development along Japanese waters near the Japanese-controlled 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.150 The CIRO stated that the CCG had engaged in an 
“intimidation campaign” around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in a five-phase 
campaign since 2012.151  
 
In response, the CCG moved in the same direction by developing capabilities 
designed to counter Japanese superiority in constabulary forces. It added 
larger and better armed ships, and started to build a new coast guard base near 
Wenzhou port on the Chinese coast. This would give Chinese vessels easier 
access to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.152 Due to the operational requirements 
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of the East China Sea, the Chinese construction of two 10,000ton high-
endurance cutters has been similar to the capabilities of Japan’s 9,000ton 
Shikishima-class cutters. Not only will they also be equipped with helicopter 
landing pads, but they also have similar hulls, anti-aircraft CIWS mounts and 
gun turrets.153 China’s Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Company is in the 
process of constructing four new 5,000ton cutters while China Ship-building 
Industry Corporation has been contracted to build two 4,000ton cutters and 
an additional two surveillance ships.154 Both class of ships are similar to JCG 
patrol vessels in terms of tonnage, speeds, lengths and helicopter flight 
decks.155 
 
The Korean Peninsula 
Japan has an uneasy relationship with both North and South Korea. North 
Korea’s increased asymmetric capabilities, nuclear weapons test and 
belligerence pose a direct threat to Japan. More complex is its relationship 
with South Korea. It is often assumed that Japan and South Korea, whose 
democracies and capitalist markets are compatible, and who share anxieties 
over the security of its sea-lanes for merchant shipping, should naturally 
cooperate rather than compete. Rather, in spite of North Korean belligerence 
and increased Chinese aggressiveness, Japan and South Korea have struggled 
to maintain amicable relations. South Korea shares many of China’s concerns 
regarding Japan’s adjustment of its force posture due to Japan’s WWII legacy 
on the peninsula and also has a territorial dispute with Tokyo over 
Takeshima/Dokdo Islands. South Korea’s objective of reunification of the 
Korean peninsula overrides effective trilateral coordination between Tokyo, 
Seoul and Washington. However, the reunification of South and North Korea 
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poses an existential threat to Japanese defense planners: 
 
A unified Korea that retains nuclear weapons is tilted towards China, refuses to 
countenance a continued security relationship with the United States that includes 
some continuing American military presence, and/or is resolutely hostile toward 
Japan in its vision of the future would represent a major foreign policy defeat for 
Japan and a problem of immense concern for the nation’s future. A reunified Korea 
with renewed animus toward Japan would have long-term, unfavorable implications 
for Japanese security.156 
 
North Korea has played a singular role in driving Japan’s requirements for 
ballistic missile defense. The 1998 test of a Taepodong missile over Japan 
consolidated support for a sustained military alliance and the development of 
ballistic missile defense with its US ally. In March 1999, the JMSDF and JCG 
spotted two North Korean spy ships in Japanese waters in the Sea of Japan. 
In 2001, the JCG even sunk a North Korean spy ship disguised as a Chinese 
squid fishing vessel that had entered Japan’s EEZ.157 In 2002, Japanese public 
support for a hardline stance against North Korea increased after North 
Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il admitted that his country had abducted at least 12 
Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, eight of whom Pyongyang claimed 
to be dead.158 This led to the 2003 launch of Japan’s first independent spy 
satellites equipped with radar equipment and camera in order to monitor 
North Korea without relying on allied and foreign intelligence networks.159  
 
In March 2010, North Korea sunk a South Korean warship (the Cheonan) and, 
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in November 2010, attacked South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island with artillery 
fire. These incidents, combined with repeated missile launches and tests of 
nuclear devices spurred Japanese leaders—with widespread public support—
to enhance BMD in cooperation with the US In 2002, Japan concluded that 
North Korea had about 100 Nodong mid-range missiles with adequate range 
(approximately 1,200km) to cover the whole Japanese archipelago. 160  In 
response, in 2004 Japan begun the development of its BMD system consisting 
of Aegis-destroyers to intercept ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase; 
Patriot PAC-3 missiles to intercept ballistic missiles in the terminal phase; 
sensor systems to detect and track ballistic missiles; and command and 
control, battle management; and communication systems to counter ballistic 
missiles through the coordination of weapon systems and sensor systems (See 
Figure 6.1).161  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Japan's BMD Architecture and Concept of Operations162 
 
As previously noted, Japan-US cooperation in this area has consisted of the 
development of the advanced ballistic missile interceptor, the SM-3 Block 
IIA, to be deployed on Aegis destroyers, as well as recertification of US PAC-
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3 missiles. 163  In November 2016, the defense ministry also considered 
acquiring the US land-based THAAD system. The system intercepts missiles 
when they re-enter the atmosphere, supplementing its PAC-3 missiles and, if 
deployed, would give Japan a three-tiered BMD capability.164 
 
Japan’s naval modernization vis-à-vis South Korea has been much more 
complex due to a “recursive” relationship. That is, the two states cooperate 
when their interests converge, but revert to discreet shadowboxing and the 
elicitation of nationalism for domestic political gain.165 Tokyo and Seoul 
normalized relations in 1965, however, despite mutual strategic interests such 
as North Korean belligerence and China’s military transformations, Japan-
South Korea relations have remained volatile due to the historical legacy of 
Japan’s 35-year annexation of the Korean Peninsula (1910-1945).166 The tone 
for mistrust and grievance against Japan—stemming from this time—has the 
economic and political oppression of the Korean, the indignity and 
humiliation felt by Koreans from the Japanese campaign to suppress Korean 
identity, and the forcing of Korean men into labor and Korean women into 
sex slavery continues to echo into the present day. 167  This has been 
compounded by the South Korean perception of Japan’s lack of sincerity in 
its apologies and a matching Japanese perception of South Korea’s 
insufficient appreciation for past apologies and reparations.168  
 
The territorial dispute over Takeshima/Dokdo Islands and the failure to 
jointly demarcate an EEZ that overlap these islands, has also been a source 
for antagonism. Both sides have presented elaborate legal-historical cases. 
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South Korea’s position has been that Dokdo Island was subjugated as Korean 
territory in 512BC when the Silla Kingdom conquered the Usan State 
(Ulleungdo and Dokdo Islands), which was noted in the geographical annals 
of King Sejong in 1454. 169  On its part, Japan has argued that Korea’s 
historical claims are illegitimate because they are based on a mistaken 
description of the islands, and that Japan established sovereignty over the 
islands in the early 17th century when its sailors used them as a “navigational 
port, docking point for ships and a rich fishing ground.”170 It is important to 
note that both sides would stand to gain economically from formal ownership 
of the islands.171 Japan and South Korea, as parties to the 1982 UNCLOS, 
would be entitled to a 200nm Exclusive Economic Zone and privileged access 
to the resources of the sea and seabed within the zone.172  
 
Japan and South Korea relations are also influenced by their economic rivalry 
in global markets, having long competed in similar industries, particularly in 
electronics and metal manufacturing.173 Inflation in Japan’s currency (yen), 
relative to South Korea’s won would erode South Korea’s price 
competitiveness. In fact, through Prime Minister Abe’s 2012 quantitative and 
qualitative easing program (“Abenomics”), 174  Japan took measures to 
depreciate certain electronics and metals prices through depreciating the yen, 
eroding South Korean export competitiveness (a key part of its economic 
growth) and weakening profit growth of many South Korean firms.175 South 
Korea has run a trade deficit with Japan for more than 30 years and nine out 
of South Korea’s top 10 exports goods are in direct competition with Japan’s 
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exports (See Table 6.2).176  Many policy-makers in Seoul have perceived 
Japan’s efforts to boost its export competitiveness as coming at the expense 
of South Korean industry. For instance, South Korea’s finance minister and 
deputy minister, Hyun Oh-seok warned the G8 in 2013 that “these monetary 
policies are having quite a negative impact,” and there needed to be 
“coordinated efforts to prevent … unintended side effects from [Japan’s new] 
monetary policy.”177 
 
Japan South Korea 
Export USD 
bn 
% of 
total 
exports 
Export USD 
bn 
% of 
total 
exports 
1 Vehicles 141.9 22.0 1 Electronic 
equipment 
134.3 27.1 
2 Machinery 124.0 19.2 2 Vehicles 62.7 12.6 
3 Electronic 
equipment 
98.3 15.2 3 Machinery 58.3 11.8 
4 Medical, optical, 
technical 
equipment 
35.9 5.6 4 Ships, boats 33.2 6.7 
5 Iron and steel 24.5 3.8 5 Plastics 27.7 5.6 
6 Plastics 23.4 3.6 6 Medical, optical, 
technical 
apparatus 
27.6 5.6 
7 Organic chemicals 15.9 2.5 7 Mineral fuels 27.4 5.5 
8 Precious metals 14.0 2.2 8 Iron and steel 18.7 3.8 
9 Ships, boats 12.8 2.0 9 Organic 
chemicals 
17.9 3.6 
10 Rubber 9.8 1.5 10 Iron or steel 
products 
11.1 2.2 
Table 6.2: Comparison of Japan and South Korea’s Top 10 Exports (2016) 
 
Consequently, Washington expressed for many years its frustration at Japan 
and South Korea’s failure to not only move past divisive historical issues and 
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build a cooperative security relationship, but also to forge a meaningful 
trilateral US-Japan-South Korea relationship.178 In 2012, Seoul and Tokyo 
almost signed two agreements that would have instigated meaningful defense 
cooperation: a General Security of Military Information Agreement 
(GSOMIA), and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). 
The idea of Japan and South Korea sharing military intelligence had been 
discussed since the late 1980s.179 The GSOMIA would have allowed the two 
countries to more easily share classified information regarding common 
security issues like North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. The ACSA 
would have provided a framework for logistical cooperation in situations such 
as disaster relief and peacekeeping operations. 180  Yet, the ACSA and 
GSOMIA agreements were suspended in July 2012 in response to domestic 
pressure with 61 percent of South Koreans opposed to the pacts, and 69 
percent believing, specifically, that the US had been pressuring then-
President Lee Myung-bak and his Cabinet to sign the GSOMIA.181 Tensions 
over the cancellation of the agreements were further inflamed when President 
Lee visited Takeshima/Dokdo a month later. Tokyo reacted by recalling the 
ambassador to Seoul for 12 days, and the Japanese Cabinet proposed to refer 
the issue to the International Court of Justice to resolve the territorial 
dispute.182  The GSOMIA agreement was eventually signed in November 
2016, citing sharing intelligence on North Korea nuclear development as the 
primary reason for its relatively short one-month negotiation period.183 
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Consequently, while Japan’s capabilities have largely been developed to 
fulfill interoperability requirements under the US alliance framework and in 
response China’s comprehensive military modernization, these capabilities 
also meet the operational requirements for Japanese contingencies involving 
the Korean peninsula. Japan’s need to secure and defend its extended interests, 
including its SLOCs and EEZs, encompasses both the contested territories of 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands in the East 
China Sea. For example, the development of doctrine, training and joint 
operations between the JMSDF and JCG has targeted both contingencies 
involving China and the Koreas. After two episodes in 1999 and 2001 when 
North Korean spy boats entered Japanese territorial waters, the JMSDF and 
JCG adopted a manual to set up procedures for joint responses to such 
scenarios and engaged in joint training.184 In 2015, the two forces held their 
first joint training on “gray-zone” scenarios in response to Chinese incursions 
into Japanese waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. They since adopted 
an information-sharing protocol and daily exchange of information.185 
 
These developments, however, implicitly offer a threat to South Korea’s 
economic and strategic interests, and South Korea has engaged in a similar 
naval build-up of blue-water capabilities (discussed in-detail in Chapter 7: 
South Korea). Indeed, South Korea’s amphibious assault ship class has been 
named “Dokdo” and the logo has been inscribed with the words (in English) 
“Project Power.”186 Consequently, interactive armament dynamics have also 
developed in response to Japan’s military modernization and changes in 
strategic doctrine (See Figure 6.2). These transformations were targeted at its 
larger opponent, China, and its attempts to change regional balance of power. 
Yet, such changes in armaments and organization have also been applicable 
to the Korean peninsula, and South Korea has reacted accordingly. 
                                                
pacific/south-korea-japan-ink-intelligence-sharing-pact-north-korea-
threat/#.WG21Qvl97RY.  
184 Céline Pajon, “Japan’s Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force: Cooperation 
among Siblings,” Maritime Awareness Project, December 1, 2016, 
http://maritimeawarenessproject.org/2016/12/01/japans-coast-guard-and-maritime-self-
defense-force-cooperation-among-siblings/.  
185 Pajon, “Japan’s Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force.” 
186 Ball, “Asia’s Naval Arms Race,” 8. 
 207 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Interactive Arming Dynamics vis-à-vis Japanese Military Modernization 
 
However, because of Japan’s more concerted and focused efforts on the 
development of its naval capabilities vis-à-vis China, its experience with 
training and technology from the US Navy, and South Korea’s focus on North 
Korea and reunification contingencies, South Korea’s development of blue-
water capabilities has merely been an asymmetric reaction to Japan. Despite 
South Korea’s recent investments in advanced naval and associated air 
platforms, Japan’s capability development has been well-ahead due to its 
technological sophistication of command and control, its frequency of 
maneuvers, its development of doctrine and training, and the level of 
integration between the services (ground, air, navy and coast guard). 
 
Findings 
The dynamics of Japan’s military modernization in response to changing 
currents in Northeast Asia’s strategic environment have demonstrated the 
multilateral character of interactive arming, as opposed to a simple bilateral 
relationship with China (H2). Most importantly, the re-interpretation of 
Article 9 of the constitution, new security legislation aimed at normalizing 
the JSDF and the revised Defense Guidelines has been a competitive response 
to a darker security outlook even though it is not reflected in any way in the 
country’s military force posture. Much domestic political effort has been 
focused on managing the Japanese public’s pacifist sentiments in order to 
meet the requirements of a changing regional balance of power (H1). Tokyo 
is particular sensitive to the potential threat emanating from China’s 
comprehensive military transformation, as well as its uneasy relationship with 
both North and South Korea (H4). Despite these tensions, and numerous 
incidents over contested maritime territories and ADIZs, conflict has not been 
a result (H6). 
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These concerted efforts have reflected a realization that the “social contract 
that eschews war for dependence on the US protective shield”187 cannot meet 
Japan’s changing security needs and long-term defense options. That is, the 
requirements set by the US-Japan alliance for collective self-defense, 
although an important loosening of past restrictions, still limits quite severely 
Japan’s authority to use its armed forces unilaterally (H5). Developments 
such as these, although they demonstrate a reactive behavior to changes in 
Japan’s strategic environment, would simply be missed if analysts viewed 
events through the lens of “arms racing.” In turn, this significant change in its 
strategic doctrine and the incremental testing of public pacifism has led to 
protestations of alarm from Japan’s neighbors. That is, Japan for the last three 
decades has fielded a technologically sophisticated and capable navy, and the 
military modernization of the JSDF continues to advance across a broad front 
(H3). But it has been the revision of Article 9, a political maneuver addressing 
defense and the use of force in the Japanese context that has clearly had the 
greater impact in China and South Korea in stimulating their own military 
transformations. To complete the analysis of the interactive arming dynamic 
between China, Japan and the ROK, the next chapter examines the rationales 
of South Korean arms acquisitions. 
                                                
187 Alexis Dudden, “Two Strategic Cultures, Two Japans: Executive Brief,” in Strategic 
Asia 2016-17: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, 
Alison Szalwinski and Michael Wills (Washington DC: The National Balance of Asian 
Research, 2016), 30.  
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Chapter 7: 
South Korea 
 
Key Impulses 
The Korean Peninsula is the most militarized area in the world and South 
Korea’s armed forces have long been focused on North Korean contingencies. 
Previous academic discussion on South Korea’s defense expenditure and 
military programs have centered on the tensions between the two Koreas and 
the possibility of another major conventional conflict on the Korean 
Peninsula.1 Indeed, the US-ROK alliance was the direct result of the 1950-53 
Korean War and has been geared towards a North Korean contingency ever 
since. Not least because of the intersecting interests of three major nuclear 
powers plus Japan renewed conflict on the peninsula would have serious 
ramifications for the entire Asia-Pacific. Consequently, the South Korean 
armed forces’ primary objective for nearly six decades has been to preserve 
the status quo and maintain a robust defense posture to deter Pyongyang. 
However, increasingly the programs of the ROK Navy have changed in pace 
and purpose—seeking blue-water power projection capabilities for  
contingencies beyond the peninsula. 2  The ROK Navy’s website logo 
emphatically states: “To the Sea! To the World!”3 
 
Three key and interrelated impulses appear to have have driven South Korean 
naval and associated air modernization. First, a need to meet alliance 
requirements. Pressure from Washington to assume a larger share of the 
burden contributed to South Korea’s increased capabilities in ballistic missile 
defense, ASW, anti-ship warfare, anti-air warfare, and an indigenous defense 
industry. Second, South Korea is looking beyond the immediate demands of 
deterrence and defense against North Korean to a future when a unified and 
                                                
1 See Anthony H. Cordesman and Ashley Hess, The Evolving Military Balance in the 
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia (Washington DC: CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy, 
June 2013); and David C. Gompert, “North Korea: Preparing for the End,” Survival 55, no. 
3 (2013): 21-46. 
2 Paul Pryce, “The Republic of Korea Navy: Blue-Water Bound?” CIMSEC Blog, January 
28, 2016, http://cimsec.org/the-republic-of-korea-navy-blue-water-bound/21490. 
3 ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Republic of Korea Navy,” 2016 
http://www.navy.mil.kr/NavyBoard/english/main/main.jsp.  
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self-sufficient Korea can take its place alongside Japan and the PRC. This 
goal has been expressed through its increasing focus on self-reliant defense 
and investments in indigenous defense industry. However, self-reliance has 
been a long-term objective as the ROK armed forces continue to face many 
operational and technical challenges. Like Japan, the requirements of the US-
ROK alliance have resulted in South Korean dependence on the US for its 
defense, even against North Korea. This is particularly evidenced in the 
indefinite delay of plans to transfer OPCON from the US to South Korea, due 
to the deficiencies in its C4ISR capabilities. The net result has been for South 
Korea to focus on the short to medium term modernization requirements 
driven by North Korean contingencies, reducing the scope to prepare for its 
longer-term aspiration for self-reliant defense vis-à-vis China and Japan. 
Seoul is responding to an increasingly negative security outlook, and its 
perceptions of how the increasing investments by China and Japan change the 
Northeast Asian balance of power. China’s military transformation and 
Japan’s response have triggered South Korea’s investment in in blue-water 
capabilities that signal its determination to withstand coercion from China 
and Japan over sovereignty and territorial maritime claims. 
 
The US-ROK Alliance and Desire for Self-reliance 
The US and ROK have been allies since 1953 when they signed the Mutual 
Defense Treaty. From the 1960s to the early 1980s, the ROK Navy built its 
fleet as a pillar of deterrence against invasion by North Korea and to address 
burden-sharing obligations under the alliance. Because of the nature of the 
conflict, South Korea emphasized its contribution to land-based operations 
and was content to operate elderly naval vessels donated or loaned  by the US 
Navy.4 Since then, the US maintained a continuous presence in South Korea 
to deter aggression from the North, with American conventional forces and 
its extended nuclear deterrence augmenting South Korean force structure. 
Despite the strengths in the alliance, there have been periodic strains. Seoul 
has often disagreed with its ally about which policies are most suitable for 
North Korea, how to respond to China’s rise, and how to manage South 
                                                
4 Yoji Koda, “The Emerging Republic of Korea Navy: A Japanese Perspective,” Naval War 
College Review 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 17. 
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Korea-Japan relations.5 There also have been tensions over burden-sharing 
and cost overruns of ongoing realignment initiatives such as the re-location 
of US Forces Korea (USFK) and the transfer of wartime operational control 
(OPCON) which would give South Korea control of its own military forces 
during war. Although Washington and Seoul share a common interest in 
deterring North Korea, they have disagreed on where the responsibility 
should lie. South Korea has three options: first, to take primary responsibility 
(Washington’s first preference); second, to share the burden with the US; and 
third, to support American actions as a junior partner (Seoul’s first 
preference). 
 
In 2006, Washington and Seoul set a timeframe for the OPCON transfer to 
occur between October 15, 2009 and March 15, 2012—the US sought to 
transfer by the end of 2009 while the ROK preferred 2012.6 Yet, by 2014 the 
transfer was indefinitely delayed as not only had Seoul and Washington 
deemed the situation on the peninsula too precarious, but an assessment was 
also reached that South Korean capabilities were too underdeveloped.7 The 
objective to reduce the 28,500 American forces stationed in South Korea was 
deferred in 2014, when an additional 800 troops were sent to South Korea 
citing the enhanced North Korean threat and the US rebalance.8 Additionally, 
the planned 2016 consolidation of USFK from Seoul to Camp Humphreys in 
the southern city of Pyeongtaek was delayed for a further year. The relocation 
plan would have reduced US military sites from 174 to 96 and would have 
allowed “the return of valuable land back to the Republic of Korea.”9 The ups 
and downs in the alliance have demonstrated Seoul’s delicate balancing act 
                                                
5 Mark E. Manyin et al, “US-South Korea Relations,” Congressional Research Service 
Report, R41481 (Washington DC: Library of Congress, April 26, 2016), 1-2. 
6 Kate Ousley, “Wartime Operational Control,” in 2006 SAIS US-Korea Yearbook, ed. 
David Straub (Washington DC: John Hopkins University, 2006), 31-32. 
7 Steven Denny, “South Korean Politics Drive OPCON Transfer,” The Diplomat, October 
28, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/south-korean-politics-drive-opcon-transfer/.  
8 Tony Capaccio and Nicole Gaouette, “US Adding 800 Troops for South Korea Citing 
Rebalance,” Bloomberg News, January 8, 2014, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-07/u-s-adding-800-troops-for-south-
korea-citing-rebalance.  
9 “USFK Relocation to Pyeongtaek Pushed Back to End of 2017,” Yonhap News Agency, 
December 13, 2015, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2015/12/13/0200000000AEN20151213002100315.ht
ml; and Jun Ji-hye, “US military’s largest overseas base taking shape in Pyeongtaek,” 
Korea Times, December 13. 2013, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/12/116_193061.html.  
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between its strategic needs in an increasingly complex environment, and its 
desire to have control over its own military forces without overdependence 
on American equipment and technology.  
 
Moreover, Seoul and Washington’s views have also differed on how to 
respond to the rise of China and the military modernization of Japan.10 The 
2009 Joint Vision for the ROK-US Alliance aimed to upgrade the alliance’s 
areas and level of cooperation, however, this was in areas of “space, cyber, 
disasters due to climate changes, counter-piracy and other maritime security 
matters, … prevent[ing] the spread of WMD, … and participate in UN-led 
peacekeeping operations.”11 Yet, for Seoul, the main objective of the US 
alliance and its contribution to “peace and stability in Northeast Asia” has 
been the deterrence of North Korea and not other contingencies. Peacetime 
operations and combined exercises, such as Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, 
have assisted in preparing against North Korean contingencies. 12 
Consequently, despite South Korea being a geostrategic location for US 
forces to face China and Russia, and to provide a front-line defense for Japan, 
South Korea resisted upgrading the alliance to address the changing Northeast 
Asian strategic environment.13 This changed in 2006, when the US requested 
to reduce and realign the number of troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula 
to free them for more pressing duties elsewhere, namely Iraq. American 
insistence that the remaining troops in Korea enjoy “strategic flexibility”—
that is, capable of conducting operations external to the peninsular—reflected 
a change in doctrine towards responding to more global contingencies.14 This 
created further impetus for South Korea to develop its self-defense 
capabilities,15 described in its 2004 Defense White Paper as “co-operative 
                                                
10 Mitchell B. Reiss, “Drifting Apart? The US-ROK Alliance at Risk,” Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis 21 no.1 (2009): 11. 
11 ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2014 Defense White Paper, 116. 
12 See “CFC Announces Start of Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 2016,” USFK Press Releases, 
March 6, 2016, http://www.usfk.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article/686836/cfc-announces-
start-of-key-resolve-and-foal-eagle-2016/.  
13 Kongdan Oh, “US-ROK: The Forgotten Alliance,” Brookings East Asia Commentary 22 
(October 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/10/south-korea-oh.  
14 Nina Sawyer, “USFK Realignment and Reduction,” in 2006 SAIS US-Korea Yearbook, 
ed. David Straub (Washington DC: US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2006), 21-22. 
15 Richard A. Bitzinger, “Transforming the US Military: Implications for the Asia-Pacific,” 
ASPI: Strategy, (December 2006), 28. 
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self-reliant defense” or the “balanced development of the ROK-US alliance 
and self-defense side by side.”16 
 
Policy diversions from its American ally has thus impacted modernization 
decisions. Up until the 1980s, the ROK Navy was focused on surface combat 
as opposed to power projection and ASW. In the latter half of the 1980s, naval 
modernization became conspicuous with the introduction of advanced 
weapons platforms, indigenously developed surface combatants, and the 
acquisitions to enhance ASW capabilities.17 This rapid advance in military 
modernization was mainly due to South Korea’s awareness that its economic 
and political clout was increasing, and consequently also its interests and need 
to protect related interests. Approximately 80 percent of South Korea’s 
borders are coastline and like Japan, it is reliant on securing its sea-lanes and 
EEZ, including over the contested Takeshima/Dokdo Islands and 
Ieodo/Suyan Islands, to facilitate its export-driven economy and dependence 
on international trade. 18 
 
Reflecting changes in its strategic environment, in 1995 then-President Kim 
Young-Sam approved the long-term development of a blue-water navy. His 
successors Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun provided further opportunity 
for the ROK Navy to extend its reach beyond the limitations of the Korean 
Peninsula.19 The 2010 sinking of its corvette, the Cheonan, by North Korea, 
and increasing concerns over Chinese and Japanese naval modernization   
provided Seoul with a set of objectives for qualitative and quantitative 
increases in naval and associated air capabilities. Moreover, demands for 
capability development from South Korea’s indigenous defense industrial 
base intensified. The dual aims for an independent force structure and a self-
reliant defense industry has attracted bipartisan and domestic political support 
                                                
16 ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2004 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of 
Natioanl Defense, Deember 2004), 94. 
17 Koda, “The Emerging Republic of Korea Navy,” 20.  
18 Terence Roehrig, “Republic of Korea Navy and China’s Rise: Balancing Competing 
Priorities” (CNA Maritime Asia Project, Workshop 2: Naval Developments in Asia, 
Arlington, August 2012), 62. 
19 Ian Bowers, “The Republic of Korea Navy – A ‘Big’ Small Navy,” in Small Navies: 
Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace, ed. Michael Mulqueen, Deborah 
Sanders and Ian Speller (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 99. 
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due to the perception of isolation in a “friendless neighborhood.”20 In this 
regard, South Korea’s 2012 Defense White Paper stated that “countries in 
Northeast Asia are undertaking efforts towards mutual cooperation while at 
the same time keeping each other in check, in order to secure a position of 
regional ascendancy as well as to fulfill national interest.”21 It further added 
that modernization was driven by the need to: 
 
resolutely safeguard ROK territory, territorial waters and airspace in the East, West 
and Southern Seas including the five Northwest Islands, as well as Marado, 
Ulleungdo, and Dokdo. In particular, the ROK military is maintaining a strong 
readiness posture based on the unwavering resolve to safeguard Dokdo, which is 
undoubtedly the territory of the ROK in terms of geographical and historical facts 
and international law.22  
 
In October 2013, the former chief of naval operations, Admiral Chie Yoonhee, 
was appointed as the first Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff not stemming 
from the land forces. The next iteration of its Defense White Paper in 2014 
warned that “historical and territorial conflicts and a growing arms race have 
intensified among the countries of Northeast Asia.”23 Seoul recognized that 
given South Korea’s strategic location in Asia, any changes in the region’s 
distribution of power created by competitive military modernization 
programs, would not only have ramifications throughout the region, but also 
for South Korean interests.24 Additionally, although being hardest hit by the 
Asian Financial Crisis and suffering setbacks during the Global Financial 
Crisis, South Korea recorded steady increases in its defense expenditure 
despite contractions to its GDP growth.25 An increasing share of its military 
                                                
20 Michael Wesley, Restless Continent: Wealth, Rivalry and Asia’s New Geopolitics 
(Collingwood: Black Inc, 2015), Google e-book, Chapter 4. 
21 ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of 
National Defense, December 11, 2012), 14. 
22 ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper, 60. 
23 ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2014 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of 
National Defense, December 31, 2014), 2.  
24 Victor D. Cha, “Strategic Culture and the Military Modernization of South Korea,” 
Armed Forces & Society 28 (2001): 100 
25 Based on figures from WMEAT, and IMF World Economic Outlook databases. For 
detailed data on South Korean annual defense budgets see also “Appendix 16: Annual 
Defense Budgets” in 2014 Defense White Paper, 298. 
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budget has been allocated to naval modernization, with the focus increasingly 
shifting away from land-based contingencies.26  
 
South Korea’s military modernization has therefore increasingly reacted to 
contingencies beyond the peninsula. Seoul has aimed for an independent as 
possible foreign policy, and expressed misgivings about cooperation with the 
US’ key ally, Japan, due to Japan’s efforts to expand its own capabilities. And 
even though Seoul  agreed to make its nascent BMD capabilities interoperable 
with American systems including through the planned acquisition of THAAD 
systems, it has resisted full integration into the US-led regional BMD network 
in which Japan plays a large role.27 Consequently, the US alliance has played 
a dual role in South Korean military modernization: bolstering South Korean 
deterrence and defense of North Korean aggression, but also fueling South 
Korea’s capacity and necessity for self-reliant defense. Many force upgrades 
resulted from the desire for interoperability and joint warfighting 
capabilities—similar to the US-Japan alliance—as well as South Korea’s 
growing nationalism and self-assertiveness in its foreign and defense policy. 
 
Seoul’s force modernization has been balanced between meeting alliance 
operational requirements and acquiring capabilities in areas previously 
directed by US forces, particularly in regards to surveillance, reconnaissance 
and early warning.28 The ROK government allocated USD12-14 billion for 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) acquisition programs from 2012 to 2015.29 
South Korea also benefited from American technical expertise for Aegis and 
Patriot PAC-3 upgrades, as well as upgrading airborne early warning and 
control (AEW&C) aircraft designed to detect incursions in South Korean 
airspace.30 It has also upgraded its ground-based tactical C4ISR system and 
                                                
26 Ball, “Asia’s Naval Arms Race,” 8-9. 
27 Manyin et al, “US-South Korea Relations,” 3-4. 
28 Cordesman and Hess, The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and 
Northeast Asia, 112.  
29 US Commercial Service, “Defense Industry Equipment,” export.gov, December 28, 
2015, 
http://www.export.gov/southkorea/doingbusinessinskorea/leadingsectorsforusexportsinvest
ment/defense/index.asp. 
30 “WON By Default: Korea’s E-737 AWACS,” Defense Industry Daily, October 16, 2014, 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/us-export-restrictions-hand-korean-ex-competition-
to-us-firm-02497/.  
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has sought to acquire a harbor surveillance system and mobile underwater 
surveillance sonar.31 Moreover, the ROK invested in power projection and 
long-range surveillance capabilities, in particular Global Hawk unmanned 
aerial vehicles, AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, F-35 JSFs and four A330 
Multi Role Tanker Transport (MTT) aerial refueling tankers which would 
extend the operational range of its fighter aircraft.32 Such US-origin arms 
acquisitions have extended beyond alliance requirements of deterrence and 
defense against North Korea. Similarly, South Korea’s ambitious domestic 
procurement program have gone beyond the need for self-reliance, for 
instance its KF-X 4.5 generation fighter will be equipped with advanced 
stealth technology, such as an indigenously developed active electronically 
scanned array (AESA).33 
 
Strengthening Indigenous Defense Industry 
Tied to its objective of self-reliance has been the desire to strengthen South 
Korea’s indigenous defense industry to produce sophisticated weapons 
platforms for both domestic purchase and international export, and to 
overcome its reliance on American technology. The South Korean defense 
industry developed mainly with the assistance of American experience and 
technology during the Cold War, and consistent efforts have been underway 
to turn the South Korean defense industry into a major arms exporter. The 
1969 Nixon Doctrine boosted the local defense industry due to the reduction 
of US defense commitments to Asia and the need for self-reliance. This 
development also liberalized the export of advanced US military technologies 
to allies such as the ROK.34 In 2005, the ROK Ministry of National Defense 
under President Roh Moo-hyun released the Defense Reform 2020 plan, 
which aimed to create a self-reliant and technological sophisticated defense 
force through the creation of an defense industrial base capable of producing 
                                                
31 Cordesman and Hess, The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and 
Northeast Asia, 111; and US Commercial Service, “Defense Industry Equipment.” 
32 “Korean Air Refueling: Airbus Wins,” Defense Industry Daily, July 2, 2015, 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/korean-air-refueling-competition-afoot-024281/; and 
US Commercial Service, “Defense Industry Equipment.” 
33 “KF-X Fighter: Korea’s Future Homegrown Jet,” Defense Industry Daily, December 6, 
2016, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/kf-x-paper-pushing-or-peer-fighter-program-
010647/.  
34 Richard A. Bitzinger, “South Korea’s Defense Industry at the Crossroads,” Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis 7, no. 1 (1995): 236.  
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advanced capabilities. 35  It announced a qualitative transformation of the 
South Korean military by calling for the replacement of nearly every outdated 
major weapon, which meant replacing one-third to one-half of platforms. 
 
The Defense Reform 2020 plan projected an 11.1 percent per annum defense 
budget increase until 2015 and then a seven percent per annum budget 
increase through to 2020. Half of this budget increase would be dedicated to 
the investment and modernization of forces. 36 It further aimed to reduce the 
number of armed personnel and prioritize new technology-intensive and 
efficient measures. This directive was aimed at offsetting the changing 
demographic trend of a rapidly aging population, and thus reducing reliance 
on conscription for recruitment.37 However, due to the change in governments 
and lower than expected economic growth, the targets set for expenditure 
were never met. In March 2011, the Defense Reform 2020 plan was adjusted 
and replaced with the Defense Reform Plan 307, which aimed to address 
many of the perceived weaknesses in South Korean deterrence and command 
and control. The documented highlighted the 2010 events of the sinking of 
the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island as evidence for a need for 
reform. 38  The importance of defense reform and self-reliance has been 
consistently highlighted by the political elite and South Korean defense 
ministers.39 In particular, the development of an advanced and self-sustaining 
defense industry capability has been a significant driver for naval and 
associated air modernization 
 
In 2016, South Korea ranked 9th in global arms export and second in the 
region behind China. Three of its companies were also in the top 100 for 
defense manufacturing which collectively rank higher than the top five 
                                                
35 Chung-in Moon and Jin-Young Lee, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Defence 
Industry in South Korea,” Security Challenges 4, no. 4 (Summer 2008): 122.  
36 See Bruce W. Bennett, “A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform 
Plan,” (Paper Prepared for the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, RAND 
National Defense Research Institute, 2006), 1-2. 
37 Moon and Lee, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Defence Industry in South 
Korea,” 122.  
38 Bruce W. Bennett, “The Korean Defense Reform 307 Plan,” Asan Institute Issue Brief 
(April 18, 2011), http://en.asaninst.org/contents/issue-brief-no-8-the-korean-defense-
reform-307-plan-by-bruce-w-bennett-the-rand-corporation1/.  
39 Hwee Rhak Park, “South Korea’s Failure to Implement ‘Defense Reform 2020,’” Korean 
Journal of International Studies 12, no. 2 (December 2014): 394. 
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Japanese defense manufacturers, the exception being Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries (See Table 7.1).40  South Korea also has three of the top four 
shipbuilding enterprises in the world. Its aim to sustain its competitiveness—
particularly as the shipbuilding industry provides an important cashflow for 
South Korea’s stagnating economy—has further driven its desire to make the 
manufacturing base more export-driven.41  
 
Rank Company Country Defense 
revenue 
(USD mn) 
Total 
revenue 
(USD mn) 
% of 
revenue 
from 
defense 
1 Lockheed-
Martin 
US 43,468 7,248 92 
2 Boeing US 29,500 94,571 31 
3 BAE Systems UK 23,622 25,278 91 
4 Raytheon US 22,384 24,069 93 
5 General 
Dynamics 
US 19,696 31,353 63 
19 Hanwha ROK 4,215 40,523 10 
41 Korea 
Aerospace 
Industries 
(KAI) 
ROK 1,819 2,667 68 
44 LIG Nex1 ROK 1,618 1,618 100 
Table 7.1: Comparison of World and South Korean Defense Manufacturers (2016) 
 
The objective of becoming a leading weapons producer led to acquisitions 
based on agreements for technology transfer to feed indigenous arms 
developments. For example, Seoul has pursued an F-35 JSF technology 
transfer agreement for its KF-X fighter program. In 2015, Seoul requested 
(and was later denied by Washington) the four most significant out of 25 
technologies: AESA radar, electro-optical tracking devices and jammer 
technology. In 2016, Seoul’s minister for the Defense Acquisition and 
                                                
40 Based on figures from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, 2016, 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers; and “Top 100 for 2017,” Defense News, 
2017, http://people.defensenews.com/top-100/.  
41 Mingi Hyun, “Global Insider: South Korea Naval Shipbuilding,” World Politics Review, 
January 5, 2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/7472/global-insider-
south-korea-naval-shipbuilding.  
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Procurement Administration (DAPA) announced the pursuit of other US 
technologies from the F-35 program, and the indigenous development of its 
own AESA radar.42  
 
South Korea has persistently acquired advanced American defense 
technology, such as anti-ship missiles, C4ISR equipment, multiple-launch 
rocket systems, and even components for Aegis.43  In 2015, DAPA listed 
Aegis-equipped warships as one of ten weapon systems to be indigenized 
under a 2015-2019 plan.44 South Korea’s indigenous KF-X program has also 
been driven by the desire to tap into the lucrative arms export market, 
particularly in Southeast Asia. For instance, in 2015 KAI signed contracts 
with the Indonesian defense ministry and the country’s state-owned defense 
company, PT Dirgantara Indonesia, to jointly develop South Korea’s 
indigenous fighter. The Indonesian government agreed to cover one percent 
of the total project costs in exchange for one prototype and technology data.45 
In 2015, South Korea—through KAI—also delivered the first two of twelve 
FA-50 Golden Eagle light combat fighters to the Philippines. The remaining 
jets are expected to be delivered in 2017.46 
 
The North Korea Contingency 
The North Korea contingency has been the primary driver for South Korea’s 
naval and associated air capability development in ballistic missile defense 
and littoral combat. The election of Lee Myung-bak in 2008 reinvigorated the 
ROK’s military modernization in BMD capabilities, however, the decision 
                                                
42 Leigh Giangreco, “Korea Pursuing KFX Technology through Future Offset Deals,” 
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remained to keep the ROK separate from the joint US-Japan BMD system. 
His successor President Park Geun-hye (impeached in December 201647) 
demonstrated an equally hardline stance towards Pyongyang. 48  The 
overarching North Korea policy remained based on retaining robust 
deterrence and defense capabilities with the simultaneous promise of 
unparalleled assistance to the North provided Pyongyang made the “right 
choice.” For instance, in April 2014 Park promised investment and 
humanitarian aid in exchange for North Korea giving up its nuclear program. 
It was rejected by Pyongyang, with the state media calling her an “eccentric 
old spinster” and claiming that the offer was full of “filth” and “deception” 
aimed at destroying the North Korean government.49 Park reaffirmed her 
stance that large-scale assistance was dependent on denuclearization progress 
and North Korea refraining from military provocations. In February 2016, 
Seoul closed Kaesong, the joint North-South Korea industrial complex, in 
response to the launch of a satellite by the North.50 In the meantime, Park 
continued her public calls for South Korea and the international community 
to prepare for and welcome reunification.51 
 
Pyongyang, led by Kim Jong-Un, assumedly feels threatened by the South’s 
own weapons development, economic weight, public rhetoric and alliance 
with the US. As Andrei Lankov argued, “the existence of such a neighbor 
means that any serious political crisis inside North Korea could easily lead to 
regime collapse, followed by South Korea’s absorption of the impoverished 
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North.”52 To this end, North Korea has maintained a large arsenal of SCUD 
short-range, and Nodong and Musudan medium-range ballistic missiles that 
could reach targets in South Korea and Japan.53 After the collapse of the Six 
Party Talks in 2008, Pyongyang restarted its reprocessing facility, and is 
believed to possess enough fissile material for at least six nuclear warheads.54 
It has also declared its intent to develop a nuclear-armed ICBM capability.55 
It is clear however that North Korea’s longer-range missiles that aim to reach 
Guam, Alaska and the continental US remain unreliable and in some cases 
untested. In May 2016, for the fourth time North Korea failed to launch its 
intermediate-range ballistic missile, the BM-25 Musudan, believed to have a 
range of 3,000-4,000km.56 Despite such failures, Pyongyang has remained 
committed to nuclear and ballistic missile tests, including the ambition of a 
submarine-launched ballistic missile. 57  In January 2016, Pyongyang 
announced the success of its fourth nuclear test of an “experimental hydrogen 
bomb.”58 Its fifth nuclear test in September 2016 was accompanied by the 
claim that it had successfully miniaturized nuclear warheads to fit on a 
missile.59 As Jeffrey Lewis has argued, “these aren’t military tests, they are 
military exercises” for a nuclear first strike.60 
 
North Korea has also made several incursions into South Korean territorial 
waters, including South Korea’s inshore SLOC. In May 2010, the Cheonan 
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was sunk just south of the disputed Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow 
Sea, supposedly by a North Korean torpedo.61 In November 2010, North 
Korea also shelled the South’s Yeonpyeong Island, placing the ROK military 
on its highest non-wartime alert.62 The incidents highlighted the failure of the 
policies of “harmonious relations” with the North (the “Sunshine Policy” 
under the Kim Dae-jung [1998-2003] and Roh Moo-hyun governments 
[2003-2008] 63 ). South Korea under the Lee Myung-bak administration 
(2008-2013) initially focused on air defense artillery and reinforced American 
extended deterrence with North Korea, refraining from the acquisition of 
missile defense technologies to avoid provoking Pyongyang.64 The short- to 
mid- and long-term procurements in Defense Reform Plan 307 further aimed 
to strengthen South Korea’s ability to counter localized military attacks and 
asymmetric threats, as well as optimizes military command and control. 65  
 
After the realization that sanctions and other countermeasures had not 
produced any tangible outcomes, the Park Geun-hye government 
strengthened its deterrence posture and began to adopt a more offensive 
posture, particularly against North Korean missile attack.66 The 2014 Defense 
White Paper emphasized the enhancement of response capabilities through 
the indigenous development of three pillars by 2020:  
1. The “Kill Chain”: an offense-oriented defense system that detects 
missiles in real time. It aims to carry out a preemptive strike 
against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile facilities if Seoul is 
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targeted.67 
2. The Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system which aims 
to intercept a ballistic missile stage by stage (See Figure 7.1). 68 
3. The Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR): to 
complement the preemptive and defense strategies of the Kill 
Chain and KAMD, the KMPR aims to launch attacks on North 
Korean leadership upon detection of the impending use of nuclear 
weapons.69 
 
The ROK also began to invest in its indigenous long-range SAM systems (L-
SAM) and medium-range SAM systems (KM-SAM). To support these 
platforms, the ROK Navy also acquired three Aegis-equipped KDX-III 
destroyers equipped with SM-2 Block IIIA/Bs and planned to procure six 
more destroyers armed with SM-6 by 2019.70 In 2012 it deployed two Green 
Pine ground-based radar systems that are jointly developed by the US and 
Israel, which enhances early warning and the accuracy of tracking missiles.71 
Seoul also indicated its desire to purchase the Iron Dome system, which is not 
a BMD system but is able to intercept self-propelled, short-range rockets by 
striking them with guided missiles. However, due to the high cost of the 
system and conflicting reports over its operational effectiveness, Seoul 
instead invested in indigenous developments of similar capabilities for its 
KAMD. 72 South Korea’s arms procurement agency in April 2014 approved 
a USD1.3 billion plan to upgrade the ROK’s PAC-2 air defense system and 
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to buy PAC-3 missiles by 2020.73 In March 2016, Seoul announced that it 
would modernize its Aegis destroyers with SM-6 (replacing the SM-2s) to 
bolster missile defense against North Korea.74 The SM-6 provides extended 
range and incorporates advanced signal processing and guidance control 
capabilities, thus enhancing South Korea’s anti-air warfare, sea-based 
terminal BMD and anti-surface warfare capabilities. 75  Significantly, in 
reaction to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, in July 2016, South Korea 
announced it would deploy the THAAD system,76 which is interoperable with 
its SAMs and Aegis missile defense platforms (See Figure 7.1).77  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Conceptual Layout of South Korean Response Capabilities78 
 
To clarify, South Korea would not possess the THAAD system, but it would 
                                                
73 Karen Montague, “A Review of South Korean Missile Defense Programs,” George C. 
Marshall Institute Policy Outlook (March 2014): 1.  
74 Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea to Deploy New Surface-to-air Missiles for Aegis Destroyers,” 
Yonhap News Agency, June 12, 2013, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/06/12/37/0301000000AEN20130612004900
315F.HTML. 
75 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Anti-Aircraft Missile Sinks Ship: Navy SM-6,” Breaking 
Defense, March 7, 2016, http://breakingdefense.com/2016/03/anti-aircraft-missile-sinks-
ship-navy-sm-6/.  
76 Benjamin Lee, “South Korea’s THAAD Dilemma Continues,” The Diplomat, December 
16, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/south-koreas-thaad-dilemma-continues/.  
77 See “Cheolmae II / Cheongung M-SAM Medium Surface to Air Missile,” 
GlobalSecurity.org, June 26, 2014, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/m-
sam.htm; and “L-SAM Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile,” GlobalSecurity.org, February 
21, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/l-sam.htm.  
78 Graphic by Cho Sang-won in Jun Ji-hye, “3 Military Systems to Counter N. Korea: Kill 
Chain, KAMD, KMPR,” The Korea Times, November 1, 2016, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/11/205_217259.html. 
225 
 
deploy a US THAAD anti-missile battery with US personnel.79 THAAD is 
capable of intercepting short, medium and intermediate-range missiles, 
including North Korean Nodongs, during the terminal phase.80  
 
These investments in naval and associated air capabilities seemingly extended 
beyond requirements for littoral combat and defense. Due to the geography 
of the Korean peninsula and the placement of North Korean artillery, effective 
deterrence of North Korea by the South depends to a large degree on ballistic 
missile and air defense, as well as littoral combat capabilities. These concerns 
were highlighted by Beijing’s reaction to South Korea’s decision to deploy 
THAAD, as it would give the US advantage in early warning and tracking of 
Chinese ICBMs. As Rod Lyon has argued, 
 
China’s right to believe that THAAD surveillance data could be transferred to other 
BMD assets protecting CONUS. Indeed, one of THAAD’s missions would be to 
strengthen US defenses against the possibility of North Korean ballistic missile 
attack on CONUS [continental United States]. So it has to be able to transfer data to 
CONUS-based radars and interceptors. But the United States already has a THAAD 
battery deployed on Guam, two AN/TPY-2 radars deployed in Japan (at Shariki and 
Kyogamisaki), space-based assets, plus a range of ship-borne radars and larger land-
based radars in other parts of the Pacific theatre. Would a THAAD deployment in 
South Korea change much? The short answer is that it could improve early tracking 
of some Chinese missiles, depending on their launch point. Still, that might not make 
actual interception of those missiles much easier. ICBM warheads move fast. And 
sophisticated penetration-aids help to confuse missile defenses.81 
 
In contrast to South Korean naval capabilities, the majority of North Korean 
vessels deployed near the NLL are patrol combatants to protect North Korean 
                                                
79 Bruce W. Bennett, “THAAD’s Effect on South Korea’s Neighbors,” The RAND Blog, 
April 5, 2016, http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/the-effect-on-south-koreas-
neighbors.html; and Jung Sung-ki, “South Korea Eys THAAD Despite China’s Fear,” 
Defense News, January 14, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-
daily/singapore-air-show/2016/02/14/south-korea-eyes-thaad-despite-chinas-
fear/80067558/. 
80 Ankit Panda, “What is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China Mad About It?” 
The Diplomat, February 25, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-
does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it/.  
81 Rod Lyon, “The Hard Truth About THAAD, South Korea and China,” The National 
Interest, February 23, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-hard-truth-about-
thaad-south-korea-china-
15295?page=show&utm_content=buffera4706&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.
com&utm_campaign=buffer.  
226 
 
fishing boats, which often show up in June, the peak season for catching 
prized blue crabs.82 Added to this, North Korea simply cannot compete with 
American global C4ISR of which South Korea benefits. There is no doubt 
that compared to North Korea, South Korea has the overwhelming material 
support and resources to sustain its qualitative and quantitative military 
modernization and force expansion. North Korea’s limited financial resources 
have had a significant impact on what kinds of capabilities it could develop 
and what types of strategies to employ. In comparison, the real dollar value 
North Korea’s military expenditure is far lower than South Korea’s, however, 
the proportion of GDP North Korea allocates for defense spending is 
disproportionately much higher (See Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3). On average, 
whilst South Korea spends USD18.14 billion annually on defense, North 
Korea’s expenditure averages a mere USD4.86 billion. When translated into 
percentages of GDP, South Korean defense spending accounts on average to 
2.5 percent, whilst for North Korea it consumed almost 25 percent. Thus, 
when comparing the “military burden”—military expenditure as a proportion 
of purchasing power parity—it is clear that despite North Korea’s “military-
first” policy83 and the burden it places on its people, South Korea’s market 
economy simply gives it greater wherewithal in investing and sustaining its 
military capability. On a per capita basis, one South Korean can contribute 
twice as much to military expenditure as a North Korean.84 
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of ROK and DPRK Military Expenditure and Platforms (1995-2016) 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Comparison of ROK and DPRK military burden (2004-2014)85 
 
The North Korean qualitative and quantitative improvements have suffered 
from attempts to militarize a crippled economy. Therefore, in terms of the 
DPRK’s capacity for military action its focus is on manpower and land-based 
contingencies. As a study by the IISS noted: 
 
Although it is difficult to know North Korea’s precise intentions or aspirations, its 
forces are deployed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in such a manner that they 
could support an invasion of South Korea. In particular, the percentage of North 
Korean forces deployed within 100km of the DMZ has significantly increased 
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during the past two decades. Currently, North Korea deploys approximately 65% of 
its military units, and up to 80% of its estimated aggregate firepower, within 100km 
of the DMZ. This inventory includes approximately 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery 
systems and 2,000 tanks. Because of these forward deployments, North Korea could 
theoretically invade the South without recourse to further deployments and with 
relatively little warning time. … Thus, it has been argued that North Korea’s 
military strategy is designed around plans to launch an invasion of South Korea. At 
the same time, North Korea’s armed forces are also positioned in order to deter an 
attack, being deployed to deliver a pre-emptive strike against the South if 
Pyongyang believes that an attack is imminent or to retaliate with overwhelming 
force if the North is attacked. This posture is dictated by the doctrine that “attack is 
the best form of defence,” a formulation that defined Soviet forward deployments 
in East Germany during the Cold War. The mass forward deployment of North 
Korean forces also helps to strengthen domestic political support for Pyongyang’s 
“military first” policy and heavy internal security apparatus. 
 
When comparing the South and North’s blue water capabilities (major surface 
combatants in Figure 7.2), the South far overwhelms the North. As well, 
despite the North Korean number of littoral combatants (patrol and coastal) 
increasing, South Korean vessels are qualitatively superior. The North 
Korean navy fields mainly legacy platforms produced in, or based on designs 
of the Soviet Union and China, dating back to the 1950s and1970s, with few 
systems based on modern technology. Overall, it does not train for blue-water 
naval operations and its naval modernization is extremely limited with some 
upgrades to select surface ships and a continued program to construct small 
submarines. 86  Keeping in mind North Korea’s focus on land-based 
contingencies, it stands to reason that South Korea’s significant investments 
in technologically sophisticated blue-water capabilities are reactions to 
regional military modernization programs, particularly Japan’s. The emphasis 
on qualitative improvements at the expense of quantitative numbers of ships 
reflects South Korea’s turn to broader East Asian contingencies. 
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Reacting to China and Japan 
A legacy of the division of the Korean Peninsula, the ROK Navy has been for 
the majority of its existence an adjunct force to the ROK Army. Despite the 
reliance on the sea as a “provider of essential materials and a facilitator of its 
export driven economy,” the modernization of the navy only started in the 
early 1990s when the first civilian-led government made the conscious 
decision to pursue greater naval strength. 87  While still concerned with 
contingencies with the North, Seoul has become more confident in its military 
superiority vis-à-vis Pyongyang. Its strategic objectives have more and more 
included contingencies other than conflict with the DPRK, particularly those 
involving China and Japan. Its 2014 Defense White Paper highlighted as one 
of its primary concerns about the security environment of Northeast Asia the 
“Increasing Influence and Arms Race in the Region.” It further stated that 
“while the United States maintains its military superiority in Northeast Asia, 
China, Japan and Russia have vied to build up their own military strength, 
centering on naval and air forces.”88 Thus the ROK Navy’s mission has 
become two-fold: first, to maintain its traditional deterrent and littoral combat 
role in South Korean waters vis-à-vis North Korea; and second, to have a 
medium force that can operate on a regional level performing blue water 
operations to counter and mirror Chinese and Japanese modernizations.89 
 
The modernization of South Korea’s blue-water capabilities has reflected the 
desire to possess a naval force capable of protecting its national interests, 
including its maritime territories, EEZs and SLOCs. Due to the overlapping 
and competing claims in the East China Sea, the ROK Navy has responded to 
Chinese and Japanese naval modernization through a comprehensive 
modernization of naval and associated air capabilities (for the detailed 
analysis on Japan-ROK relations see Chapter 6: Japan). First, balancing its 
economic ties with strategic concerns regarding China has been difficult for 
Seoul. During the Lee Myung-Bak administration, the strengthening of the 
ROK-US alliance strained Lee’s ability to maintain a consistent and cordial 
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relationship with Beijing. China is South Korea’s largest two-way trading 
partner , accounting for 27 percent of exports and 22 percent of imports, while 
for China90 South Korea is its third largest market for exports (4.5 percent 
share) and its primary export partner (11.4 percent share).91 In August 2012, 
the two countries celebrated the twentieth anniversary of diplomatic 
normalization, a period during which the advancement of political, economic 
and cultural relations   proceeded at a rapid pace.92 However under the surface, 
negative public perceptions of China in South Korea increased and a series of 
bilateral tensions and entanglements heightened Seoul’s discontent with 
Beijing. 93 These included China’s controversial claim to the ancient Korean 
Kingdom of Koguryo in 2004; illegal Chinese fishing in Korean territorial 
waters and the killing of a South Korean Coast Guard (KCG) captain in 2011; 
continued disputes over Socotra Rock; and China’s protective relationship 
with North Korea. Seoul was particularly angered by China’s repatriation of 
North Korean defectors, as well as China’s “enabling response” to North 
Korea’s 2010 provocations of the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of 
Yeonpyeong Island.94  
 
South Korea and China also dispute the sovereignty over the Ieodo/Suyan 
Islands, which is just 149km from South Korea’s Jeju Island naval base.95 
Both Seoul and Beijing claim the main feature, a submerged rock (Socotra) 
approximately 4.6km below the surface, is within their EEZs.96 According to 
UNCLOS, maritime features classified as rocks cannot be claimed by any 
country as territory, however, nations can control and use the sea and natural 
resources around the rock. The reef around Socotra rock might also contain 
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natural gas and mineral deposits. 97  In 2003, South Korea built a raised 
platform on Socotra rock to support an ocean research station, drawing the ire 
of Beijing.98 China’s announcement of a controversial East China Sea ADIZ 
in November 2013, inflamed tensions by extending over the submerged rock 
and its reef. To no avail, South Korea requested China to change its ADIZ to 
eliminate the overlap with South Korea’s.  
 
In response, in December 2013 South Korea expanded its ADIZ by 
approximately 66,480km2 in waters off its south coast to also encompass the 
feature, thus creating an ADIZ overlapping with China’s and Japan’s (See 
Figure 7.4).99 The announcement of China’s ADIZ came at a time when Seoul 
was building stronger ties with Beijing and its relations with Tokyo were 
acrimonious. However, the ADIZ announcement caused a shift in South 
Korea’s perspective on Beijing’s intentions. Although the ADIZ was 
primarily an attempt by China to exert legal and administrative control over 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the move exposed its territorial expansion plans 
and repercussions for South Korea.100 In response, both Seoul and Tokyo 
announced to send military planes through China’s new ADIZ without 
notifying Beijing to display their opposition to China’s moves to assert 
control over regional air space.101 Indeed, South Korea’s Foreign Minister 
Yun Byung-se commented: 
 
the issue of the air defense identification zone is making the already difficult 
regional situations even more difficult to deal with … We see competition and 
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conflict in the region deepening. Things can take a dramatic turn for the worse if 
territorial conflicts and historical issues are merged with nationalism.102 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Air Defense Identification Zones 2015103 
 
China’s declaration of its ADIZ made it impossible for South Korea to 
maintain its desired “neutral” position on China. Without taking a stand on 
Socotra, it would have been difficult to counteract China’s growing 
assertiveness in claiming territories in the region. Three days after China’s 
ADIZ announcement, South Korea announced the acquisition of three more 
Aegis destroyers to complement its fleet of three. The original 2012 
shipbuilding plan claimed the rationale was to enhance “South Korean 
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military capability against the rising threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear 
and missile weapons as well as submarines.” 104  However, the 2013 
acquisition announcement stated that the additional ships were also a response 
to bolster South Korea’s defense against its Asian neighbors, with Seoul 
stepping up patrols in its new ADIZ, particularly around its research station 
on Socotra.105 
 
Added to this, diplomatic relations were further complicated by illegal 
Chinese fishing in South Korean waters. Seoul frequently requested that 
Chinese vessels respect the median line between the two countries in the 
Yellow Sea and restrict fishing to the Chinese side of the median until a 
permanent settlement of overlapping EEZs can be reached.106 Until 2014, 
skirmishes never reached the hostile levels like those between South Korea 
and Japan over Takeshima/Dokdo Islands. That year encounters began to 
escalate. In October, the KCG stopped a Chinese fishing boat illegally fishing 
in South Korean waters. When KCG officials boarded the boat, they were 
attacked with knives and beer bottles, and in an effort to subdue the crew, the 
coast guard fired several warning shots which killed the Chinese captain.107 
By 2015, the cases of illegal Chinese fishing in South Korean waters 
increased, with the number of seized Chinese ships peaking at 600.108 
 
The year 2016 saw a series of clashes, which led to the Korean government 
announcing tougher countermeasures, “using all possible means if needed, 
such as directly hitting and gaining control of those Chinese fishing boats, as 
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well as firing common weapons.”109 In January, South Korea announced it 
would deploy a new 5,000-ton patrol vessel to bolster protection over its 
valuable fishing grounds around Socotra and in the Yellow Sea, with regular 
patrols beginning in April.110 The next month, the ROK Navy fired warning 
shots at a Chinese patrol boat that crossed the NLL between North and South 
Korea. 111  South Korea also bolstered its numbers of patrol and coastal 
combatants (both Coast Guard and Navy) not just to patrol the NLL and 
Socotra, but also to protect its overall territorial integrity. In June 2016, the 
KCG conducted joint operations with the UN Command in reaction to illegal 
Chinese fishing near the mouth of the Han River and the NLL. 112  In 
September, three Chinese fishermen were accidentally killed when the KCG, 
in the process of seizing a Chinese ship in Korean waters, threw grenades that 
ignited. In October, Chinese fishing boats rammed and sunk a KCG vessel 
just outside South Korea’s EEZ.113 Then in November, the KCG fired shots 
at two Chinese vessels fishing illegally in Korean waters. The vessels had 
been warned to stop fishing in South Korea’s territorial waters and tried to 
ram the KCG vessel in response. After opening fire on the ships—reportedly 
the first time such a countermeasure had been used—the two Chinese vessels 
were seized.114 
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Second, compounding its rocky relations with Beijing, has been South 
Korea’s even more complex relationship with Japan. Although both allies of 
the US, they have divergent perceptions on what is the most pertinent threat 
emanating from North Korea: its nuclear and missile program, its 
conventional and special forces, its international smuggling and other 
criminal activities, its human rights abuses and forced abductions, or its 
economic, political and social weaknesses that might release a flood of 
refugees across its borders.115 This has also shaped their divergent attitudes 
towards the roles of US and China in the Asia-Pacific. On the one hand, 
Tokyo views Washington as instrumental in maintaining regional stability. 
On the other hand, for Seoul the American extended deterrent is not the sole 
shield to its regional interests and the threat posed by the “rise of China” is 
not as an immediate concern as it is for Japan.116 
 
Respective military modernization programs exhibit elements of acquiring 
new capabilities to keep up with other navies. This has been influenced by 
not only technical modernization pressures but also the desire to remain 
strategically viable.117 Whilst the primary motivation for Japan has been the 
qualitative improvement in Chinese military capabilities, Japan’s 
“normalization” of its JSDF has also been a key impulse behind South 
Korea’s modernization. Consequently, South Korea’s modernization of its 
naval and associated air capabilities has targeted potential contingencies 
involving both China and Japan, which led to similar requirements regarding 
blue-water power projection and ASW capabilities (see Figure 7.5). 
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Figure 7.5: Interactive Arming Dynamics vis-à-vis ROK Military Modernization 
 
Seoul has displayed increasing concern about Tokyo’s significant blue-water 
assets and evolving power projection capabilities.118 To be sure, much of 
Japan’s capabilities have been acquired out of concern for China’s growing 
power projection capabilities and its need to secure and defend its extended 
interests, including its EEZ and SLOCs. However, these sea-lanes and 
territories are mainly in the disputed territory of the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands, 
which are the objects of concern for Seoul. From South Korea’s perspective, 
Japan’s attempts to secure “its” trade routes and territory—in areas that 
overlap with Seoul’s immediate neighborhood—implicitly poses a threat to 
South Korean economic and strategic interests. Consequently, while the ROK 
Navy has not undertaken any specific operational measures in response to 
Japanese and Chinese actions, its shipbuilding program and the construction 
of the naval base on Jeju Island were partly influenced because of China and 
Japan’s future strategic direction.119 
 
As a result, the ROK Navy initiated significant force upgrades to maintain its 
levels vis-à-vis Japanese modernization and implicitly hedge against Chinese 
intentions, particularly through qualitative and quantitative improvements of 
surface combatants, submarines and aircraft. 120  In 2010, the ROK Navy 
mobilized its first high mobility combat unit, “Mobile Flotilla,” for the 
purpose of enhancing protection of its maritime areas and sea-lanes. 121 
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However, the ROK Navy’s most significant investment has been the Aegis 
KDX-III fleet. In 2010, South Korea commissioned its first of three Aegis-
equipped KDX, and it planned to receive another three   between 2023 and 
2027. 122  The KDX-III Sejong the Great destroyers are the most 
technologically advanced ship in the ROK Navy with a full displacement of 
11,000 tons, and are the largest surface combatants to carry the Aegis system, 
with larger displacements than the US Arleigh Burke-destroyers and the 
Japanese Atago-destroyers.123 It is a multi-purpose vessel equipped with land-
attack, ship-to-ship, air defense and ASW capabilities. Its large hull size also 
gives it greater fuel capacity as well as operational time at sea.124 It has also 
been equipped with the Phalanx CIWS and SPY-1D radar that can track up 
to 1,000 targets and engage close to 20 of them simultaneously.125  
 
Another key weapons platform has been its amphibious assault ship, the 
Dokdo-class, the first of which was commissioned in 2007. With a full 
displacement of 18,000 tons, it is capable of over-the-horizon landing 
operations, can carry up to 5 helicopters on its flight deck, and can 
accommodate six assault amphibious vehicles (AAV), two LCACs, six tanks 
and ten trucks.126 It has acted as the command and control ship for its strategic 
mobile operation fleet and supports three-dimensional landing operations as 
well as maritime air operations.127 Four ships of this class had been planned 
to enter into service by 2020, however, funding for the remaining three was 
cancelled during Lee Myung-Bak’s administration due to high project cost. 
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The funding for the second ship, the Marado, was restored in 2012 off the 
back of rising regional tensions and North Korean incursions into South 
Korean waters.128  
 
The ROK Navy also invested qualitatively and quantitatively in its submarine 
capability beyond targeting the DPRK Navy’s midget submarine fleet that 
dates back to the 1950s.129 In February 2015, it became only the sixth country 
in the world with an independent submarine command.130 The ROK Navy has 
operated a submarine fleet of nine diesel-electric KSS-I Chang Bogo-class 
and six KSS-II Son Wonil-class hybrid diesel-electric/fuel cell vessels with 
an AIP system. The Son-Wonil-class is equipped with indigenous ship-to-ship 
cruise missiles with a maximum range of 1,500km and thus capable of 
carrying out precision strikes. It has a maximum underwater speed of 20knots 
and with AIP it can travel from South Korea to Hawaii and back without 
refueling and resurfacing, boosting South Korea’s intelligence and 
interdiction capabilities. 131  The sixth Son Wonil-class submarine was 
commissioned in May 2015 and planned an additional three   to be delivered 
before 2020, which would bring the ROK Navy force level to 18 operational 
conventional submarines.132 The third phase of its submarine program, the 
KSS-III, concerns a next-generation indigenously developed submarine to be 
launched in 2022. The ROK Navy plans to acquire nine vessels of this class. 
It will have a displacement of 3,000tons and features a vertical launching 
system that can fire land-attack cruise missiles of 1,500km range.133 
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The naval base on Jeju Island (100km south of the Korean peninsula) has 
been critical to strengthening its blue-water capability. It was inaugurated in 
February 2016 and has served as the homeport for the ROK Navy’s Strategic 
Mobile Fleet (SMF), accommodating 20 warships, including submarines and 
three KDX-III destroyers.134 The SMF patrols the area south of Jeju Island to 
cover the entrance to the Korea Strait, west of Jeju to cover the SLOCs in the 
Yellow Sea, and south of Jeju to cover the traffic headed to and from the East 
China Sea.135 The new naval base adds to its existing facilities at Busan and 
Jinhae. The facility is south-facing, offering unobstructed access to South 
Korea’s major SLOCs passing through the Western Pacific.136 The southern 
waters of Jeju are critical to the South Korean economy, with the vast majority 
of its maritime commercial traffic using these shipping lanes.137 Strategically, 
Jeju naval base is significant due to its access to its contested territories in 
both the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. The base is ideal for extended 
missions and has enhanced the ROK Navy’s ability to influence its territorial 
disputes, including Socotra rock and its claim of an extended continental shelf 
EEZ down to the Okinawa trough.138 Jeju naval base significantly helps South 
Korea counter China’s increasingly assertive territorial claims over the buffer 
zone of Socotra reef. If Seoul would cede control of Socotra, South Korea 
would be exposed to the same security challenges faced at its western border 
islands along the NLL.139 
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South Korea has also modernized associated air platforms. In 2000, it 
upgraded its ageing S-2 maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft with eight 
P-3C Orions which substantially improved the ROK Navy’s ocean 
surveillance capability. In 2010, the ROK Navy deployed a further eight 
refurbished P-3CKs and, since 2013, showed interest in purchasing 20 new 
P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to modernize its P-3Cs.140 To bolster its 
ASW and anti-surface warfare capabilities, the ROK Navy also acquired four 
multi-mission Lynx helicopters, with the first to be forward-deployed by 2017. 
Seoul also revealed plans to add 40 helicopters for offshore operations by 
2030.141 In June 2015, it further announced that it would purchase four air 
refueling tanker aircraft, which would increase the operational time of its 
fighter jets, particularly over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands.142  
 
Moreover, in December 2015, the ROK armed forces launched its largest ever 
procurement project, the KF-X stealth jet program, with KAI-Lockheed 
Martin and Indonesia as a development partner.143 Six prototypes of the K-
FX are scheduled for production by 2021, with initial operating capability 
planned for 2026, and 120 fighters to be produced by 2023 to replace the 
ROK’s aging F-4 and F-5 fleets. 144  Despite not receiving four key 
technologies for transfer in the purchase agreement (as previously mentioned), 
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the KF-X program are likely to benefit from 21 other technology transfers 
from the ROK’s 40 F-35A acquisition, which has a conventional take-off and 
landing capability and will be delivered between 2018 and 2021.145 The ROK 
armed forces also purchased four long-range, high-altitude Global Hawk 
unmanned aerial vehicles, set for a 2017-2019 delivery.146 
 
Findings 
South Korean military modernization has two objectives: to maintain its 
traditional deterrent and littoral combat capabilities vis-à-vis North Korea; 
and second, to have a medium force that can at least stay in touch with 
Chinese and Japanese modernizations (H1). The triangular interactive 
dynamic that has emerged between China, Japan and South Korea 
demonstrates that arming and military modernization cannot be simply 
modeled as a bilateral “arms race” relationships (H2). Acquisition decisions 
made by both South Korea and Japan have targeted multiple shifts in their 
strategic environment (H4). Due to the high costs of investing and 
maintaining advanced weapons platforms, these countries have invested in 
capabilities which can respond to a multitude of contingencies (H3). Its 
alliance with the US has not prevented the ROK from reacting to both Chinese 
and Japanese arms acquisitions (H5). Additionally, due to their maritime 
environments many of the capabilities acquired by these three countries have 
been similar. In traditional “arms race” theories this dynamic could be labeled 
as a reactive response and “mirror reaction.”  
 
However, such explanations imply that advanced naval and associated air 
capabilities are proliferating in the East China Sea as regional countries are 
more concerned with mimicking each other as opposed to meeting maritime 
operational requirements to protect territorial waters and national interests. 
Traditional “arms race” theories also do not adequately capture the fact that 
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reactive arming is often asymmetric—as demonstrated by both Japan and 
South Korea—and that arming behavior is likely to be complemented by 
other strategic behavior, such as bolstering self-reliant capabilities and 
defense cooperation. As well, Seoul’s management of multiple shifts in its 
strategic environment, particularly its resistance to integrate into the US-led 
regional BMD network, has demonstrated that modernization is not just about 
adding capabilities, but also about foregoing some major options (H4). 
Decisions of restraint are also acquisitions decisions, and highlight that 
statesmen remain in control over armament policies (H6). The next chapter 
moves the empirical analysis to Vietnam, a Southeast Asian case that 
demonstrates a changing doctrine and increasing capability developments in 
response to the changing balance of power in Northeast Asia. 
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Chapter 8: 
Vietnam 
 
Key Impulses 
The development of Vietnam’s naval and associated air capabilities has been 
driven by two key impulses. First, it has demonstrated the political will to 
tackle major change in its policy settings, adjusting its defense doctrine, and 
implementing numerous complementary measures in the last two decades. Its 
surge in economic growth from the late 1990s allowed the replacement of 
obsolescent equipment. The ability to spend more on defense and replace 
aging equipment fueled investments in military capabilities. The majority of 
Vietnam’s defense investments and expenditure is now focused on 
developing stronger, self-contained naval and associated air capabilities. 
These purchases were sourced not just from Russia but also other foreign 
suppliers such as Japan and India. Hanoi further recognized that its state-
owned indigenous defense industry has been a key weakness in regard to 
reducing foreign dependence and has attempted bureaucratic reform.  
 
Second, Vietnam is reacting to Chinese activities and militarization in the 
South China Sea. Without naval and associated air modernization, the 
capability gap would widen between the VPA and the PLA to the degree that 
Vietnam would risked losing its claimed territories in the South China Sea. 
Such acquisitions have been backed by broad domestic anti-Chinese 
sentiment. To this end, Vietnam is attempting to leapfrog from Cold War-era 
equipment to advanced platforms such as Kilo-class submarines and fourth-
generation fighters. These capabilities have focused on developing a credible 
green-water deterrent for Vietnam’s littoral waters, which are adjacent to the 
South China Sea. In reaction to China, Vietnam has also engaged in land 
reclamation and militarization activities on its occupied islands in the South 
China Sea. Investments in anti-ship and anti-aircraft capabilities, backed with 
investments in ISR, have increased the VPN’s ability to deter other claimants 
from attacking Vietnam’s claimed islands.  
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A Seachange in Doctrine 
Vietnam has both a strong and nationalist military tradition.1 The one party-
state of Vietnam is run by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) which 
exerts strong political influence over the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) and, 
by extension, the Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN). Overall the armed forces 
are integrated closely into the states’ infrastructure, having been  assigned 
political, internal security and economic production roles.2 Conversely, the 
military has held a privileged place in Vietnamese society due to its historical 
role as the “indispensable tool of the worker-peasant class to fight imperialist 
enemies both within and outside the state.”3 The priority of the VCP has been 
to protect Vietnam’s national interests through three pillars: economic 
development; enhancing security and defense; and promoting the country’s 
regional and international standing.4  
 
Shifts in Vietnam’s strategic environment, as well as strong economic growth, 
and popular and nationalistic support for its military, have resulted in 
widespread backing for a growing defense expenditure and focus on defense 
strategy. Improving its naval and air capabilities has become critical for 
Vietnam, with the objective of deterring China due to overlapping claims in 
the South China Sea. The challenge presented by China in the South China 
Sea has “generated pressures on the VPA to modernize its forces, raise its 
professional standards, and step up international defense cooperation with 
regional states in order to better defend Vietnam’s sovereignty.”5 Much of the 
modernization of naval and associated air capabilities from the late 1980s to 
1990s focused on the replacement of outdated platforms inherited from the 
                                                
1 IISS, The Military Balance 2016, 296.  
2 Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Political Role of the Vietnam People’s Army: Corporate Interests 
and Military Professionalism” (Paper to Panel on Understanding Vietnamese Politics: New 
Approaches and Issues from the Field, Association of Asian Studies Annual Conference, 
Toronto, Canada, March 15-19, 2012), 5. 
3 Thayer, “The Political Role of the Vietnam People’s Army,” 2-3. 
4 Tran Truong Thuy, “Vietnam’s Relations with China and the US and the Role of 
ASEAN,” in Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries and Its Implications for the 
Defense Sector, NIDS Joint Research Series No. 14 (Tokyo: The National Institute for 
Defense Studies, 2016), 87. 
5 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Military Politics in Contemporary Vietnam,” in The Political 
Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia, ed. Marcus Mietzner (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2011), 66. 
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United States and the former Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s.6 Recently, 
however, Hanoi  started to invest in qualitatively more sophisticated air and 
naval capabilities in reaction to China’s comprehensive military 
modernization and to protect its national interests in what it calls the “East 
Sea” (South China Sea). In 2009, the VPN’s declared responsibility included: 
to strictly manage and control the waters and islands in the South China Sea 
under Vietnam’s sovereignty; to counter any acts of violating sovereignty; the 
jurisdiction and national interests of Vietnam at sea; to secure the normal 
activities of Vietnam in its waters and islands in conformity with Vietnamese 
and international laws; to ensure maritime safety and participate in search-
and-rescue operations in accordance with Vietnam’s laws and the 
international conventions adopted by Vietnam; and to be ready for joint and 
combined operations to defeat any aggression from and at sea.7  
 
In January 2007, Rear Admiral Nguyen Van Tinh emphasized the critical role 
of the navy in socio-economic development terms: 
 
apart from protecting the nation’s territorial waters and continental shelf, the VPN 
has actively taken part in developing the national economy. We are organizing and 
completing fishing fleets, especially offshore fishing, as well as promoting 
aquaculture activities in coastal areas and the Spratly [archipelago]. Naval forces 
are also ready to play a key role in offshore fishing so that residents in coastal areas 
from northern to southern regions can improve their daily lives and further 
contribute to national economic development.8  
 
Vietnam’s 2009 defense white paper further stated that its national defense 
policy was one of peace and self-defense, “expressed in the guideline of not 
using force or threatening of using force in international relations.” It added 
that “Vietnam advocates the general modernization of the VPA and 
                                                
6 Bob Nugent, “Naval Acquisition Trends in Asia,” in Naval Modernisation in South-East 
Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences, ed. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2014), Google e-book, Chapter 2.  
7 Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam National Defence 
(Hanoi: Ministry of National Defence, December 2009), 73.  
8 Quoted in “Vietnam,” 3.  
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enhancement of the defense potential only to maintain its military power 
sufficient for self-defense capability. Vietnam opposes arms race (sic).”9 
 
That said, Hanoi has devoted increased attention to security partnerships and 
cooperation with regional partners, particularly Russia, India, the US, the 
Philippines and Japan.10 Moreover, by Southeast Asian standards (with the 
exception of Singapore 11 ), Vietnam’s military modernization and vested 
change to its strategic doctrine has been impressive. No other country in the 
sub-region has attempted to “leapfrog” from Cold War-era equipment to 
advanced platforms such as Kilo-class submarines. Hanoi has focused on 
developing capabilities for deterrence and a green-water navy for offshore 
territorial defense.12 
 
However, Hanoi has also faced many challenges in implementing a 
comprehensive defense reform. Despite its significant maritime interests, the 
capabilities of the VPN have remained relatively weak compared to other 
regional navies of China, Singapore, Malaysia or Taiwan.13 Vietnam has not 
taken apart in any unilateral or international naval operations other than 
routine patrols of the territorial waters and EEZ. 14  Its air and maritime 
                                                
9 Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam National Defence, 
19. 
10 Rupakjyoti Borah, “Why India and Vietnam Need Each Other,” The Diplomat, 
September 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/why-india-and-vietnam-need-each-
other/; Carl Thayer, “The Philippines and Vietnam Forge a Strategic Partnership,” The 
Diplomat, March 10, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/the-philippines-and-vietnam-
forge-a-strategic-partnership/; and Pierre Tran, “Vietnam Seeks To Strengthen US, Japan 
Ties,” DefenseNews, April 1, 2015, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2015/04/01/vietnam-
seeks-to-strengthen-us-japan-ties/70777168/.  
11 See Huxley, Defending the Lion City; Swee Lean Collin Koh, “Seeking Balance: Force 
Projection, Confidence Building, and the Republic of Singapore Navy,” Naval War College 
Review 65, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 75-92; Swee Lean Collin Koh, “‘Best Little Navy’ in 
Southeast Asia: The Case of the Republic of Singapore Navy,” in Small Navies: Strategy 
and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace ed. Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders 
and Ian Speller (Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies and Routledge: London 2016), 
Google e-book, Chapter 8; and Andrew T. H. Tan, “Punching Above Its Weight: 
Singapore’s Armed Forces and Its Contribution to Foreign Policy,” Defence Studies 11, no. 
4 (2012): 672-697.  
12 Swee Lean Collin Koh, “Vietnam’s Quest for a Greenwater Navy,” The Diplomat, March 
18, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/vietnams-quest-for-a-greenwater-navy/.  
13 “Vietnam,” IHS Jane’s World Navies, IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security, 2014, 1.  
14 “Vietnam,” 5; and Jane Perlez, “Q and A: Lyle Goldstein on China and the Vietnamese 
Military,” The New York Times, July 5, 2014, 
http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/q-and-a-lyle-goldstein-on-china-and-the-
vietnamese-military/.  
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modernization also remained incremental despite an increasing defense 
budget. It will take years for Vietnam to complete its current round of 
modernization, as well as develop new doctrines and tactics to use its new 
platform. Vietnam has also been highly dependent on foreign supplies for 
advanced military hardware. It has imported the majority of its defense 
equipment from Russia which is likely to remain its primary arms dealer for 
the foreseeable future. Cost constraints and political divisions in Hanoi have 
also curbed Vietnam’s appetite for procuring advanced American 
weaponry.15  
 
In addition, Vietnam has also faced pressing domestic challenges, including 
reducing the poverty rate, as well as fighting bureaucratic inefficiency and 
corruption. 16  Moreover, the VPA has remained a central element of the 
country’s political system due to its historical role in the Indochina wars, 
promoting the view that Vietnam is still a land power in the fight over defense 
resources. It has retained a strong role in the defense modernization process 
as the service responsible for internal security and for managing a huge land 
border with China. 17 An imbalanced force structure is thus highly likely for 
the foreseeable future. Indeed, as Vietnam has developed pockets of naval 
and air capabilities these acquisitions could prove to a double-edged sword 
due to the high costs of maintaining capabilities for what is still a relatively 
small defense budget. Therefore, the quantitative and qualitative edge belongs 
to China, and Vietnamese leaders’ response to deterring Chinese expansion 
and land reclamation in the South China Sea can only be asymmetric.  
 
Economic Growth and Enhanced Self-reliance 
In the post-Cold War era, Hanoi became increasingly aware that the maritime 
domain took on greater prominence for the armed forces and that the 
dominant role of the VPA had to be reconsidered. The overall military 
modernization of Vietnam’s military has been underpinned by its economic 
                                                
15 Phillip Orchard, “The US Opens Its Arms to Vietnam,” STRATFOR, May 26, 2016, 
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/us-opens-its-arms-vietnam.  
16 Keith Griffin, “Preface,” in Economic Reform in Vietnam, ed. Keith Griffin (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1998), ix; and “Vietnam: Overview,” The World Bank, September 26, 
2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/vietnam/overview 
17 Thayer, “Military Politics in Contemporary Vietnam,” 65. 
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growth and the desire for self-reliance. In 1986, Hanoi instituted the Doi Moi 
(“economic renewal”) reforms to transform Vietnam’s socialist economy into 
what it termed a “socialist-oriented market economy,” essentially a transition 
model which “conforms to principles of the market economy, and is based on 
and guided by principles and nature of socialism.”18 These reforms had a 
profound effect on propelling Vietnam’s high growth rates as well as sharp 
reductions in poverty.19  The CPV  placed a high premium on economic 
development, as it recognized that economic growth enhances national 
security but also regime legitimacy. Conversely, economic 
underdevelopment breeds political instability and undermines the mandate of 
the CPV’s one-party rule.20  
 
The past 30 years of Vietnam’s development have been remarkable, with its 
economy transformed from one of the world’s poorest to a lower middle-
income status.21 Since 1990, Vietnam’s per capita growth has been one of the 
fastest in the world, averaging 6.4 percent a year during the 2000s. In 2015, 
the World Bank’s estimated a growth rate of 6.7 percent.22 Hanoi remained 
determined to continue systematic transformation of its economy, which were 
often labeled “stabilization” or “structural adjustment” programs.23 Its 2011-
2020 Socio-Economic Development Strategy promoted hybridizing its 
political system—maintaining its one-party rule and emphasizing collective 
strength, whilst ensuring macroeconomic stability and effectiveness, 
maintaining political stability and national sovereignty, and strengthening 
Party leadership, particularly its management of state-owned enterprises.24 In 
March 2016, Vietnam’s National Assembly (its highest legislative body) 
agreed on a five-year socio-economic development plan for 2016-2020 which 
                                                
18 Radio Voice of Vietnam, “Socialist-oriented Market Economy: Concept and 
Development Solutions,” Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the United 
States of America, November 17, 2003, http://vietnamembassy-
usa.org/news/2003/11/socialist-oriented-market-economy-concept-and-development-soluti.  
19 Brian Van Arkadie and Raymond Mallon, Viet Nam: A Transition Tiger? (Canberra: 
ANU Press, 2004), 1.  
20 Thuy, “Vietnam’s Relations with China and the US and the Role of ASEAN,” 87. 
21 “Vietnam: Overview.”  
22 “Vietnam: Overview.” 
23 Griffin “Preface,” ix.  
24 Vietnam Government, Vietnam’s Socio-Economic Development Strategy for the Period 
of 2011-2020, trans. Economica (Hanoi: Socialist Republic of Vietnam, June 11, 2012, 
http://www.economica.vn/portals/0/maubieu/1d3f7ee0400e42152bdcaa439bf62686.pdf.  
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set five targets: average annual GDP growth between 6.5 percent and 8 
percent; GDP per capita between USD3,200 and USD3,500 by 2020; industry 
and service sectors to account for 85 percent of GDP by 2020; total social 
investment capital between 32 percent and 34 percent of GDP by 2020; and 
a state budget deficit of 4 percent of GDP by 2020.25 
 
Sustained economic growth has facilitated increases in defense expenditure. 
Although its defense spending started from a relatively low base, since 1995 
Vietnam has had the highest increase in defense budget among Southeast 
Asian countries. After the Asian Financial Crisis, its proportion of GDP on 
defense spending actually decreased from 4.2 percent in 1998 to 2.5 percent 
in 2015. However, in terms of real dollar value its military expenditure 
increased from USD1.15 billion in 1998 to USD4.8 billion in 2015, a 254 
percent increase. 26  In 2015, Vietnam had the fourth largest defense 
expenditure in Southeast Asia behind Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand, 
which all have significantly larger economies. Significantly, it also came 
second with regards to the proportion of its GDP allocated to defense (See 
Table 8.1).27  
 
Rank Country Military expenditure 
(USD billion) 
Proportion of GDP on 
Defense (%) 
1 Singapore 9.96 3.4 
2 Indonesia 7.78 0.9 
3 Thailand 6.05 1.5 
4 Vietnam 5.00 2.4 
5 Malaysia 4.03 1.4 
6 Philippines 3.99 1.3 
Table 8.1: Comparison of Military Expenditure in Maritime Southeast Asian Countries (2016) 
 
                                                
25 “Economy Set to Grow 6.5-7% Over Five Years,” Viet Nam News, March 22, 2016, 
http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/294102/economy-set-to-grow-65-7-over-five-
years.html#fjKEQrdTjem614FL.97; and Andrew Harker, “Latest Five-year Socio-
economic Development Plan Launched in Vietnam,” IHS Markit Commentary, April 29 
2016, http://www.markit.com/Commentary/Get/29042016-Economics-Latest-five-year-
socio-economic-development-plan-launched-in-Vietnam.  
26 Based on figures from WMEAT, The Military Balance; and IMF World Economic 
Database. 
27 Based on figures from IISS, The Military Balance 2016, 256, 286, 293, 296; WMEAT; 
and IMF World Economic Database. 
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Some analysts have argued that Vietnam’s real defense expenditure is likely 
to be much higher as the current figures did not include R&D expenditure or 
revenue generated from defense-owned industries, in particular VietTel, 
Vietnam’s largest telecommunications provider. 28  It must be noted that 
Vietnamese defense policy and breakdowns of defense expenditure has 
remained relatively opaque.  
 
There are no official breakdowns of Vietnam’s military expenditure, but 
according to the IISS the Army has 412,000 personnel compared to the 
Navy’s 40,000 personnel (of which 27,000 are naval infantry).29 The VPN is 
also entirely an all-volunteer force with a reserve commitment at the end of 
service.30 Additionally, Vietnam has faced a continuing challenge in securing 
its extensive land border with China, Laos and Cambodia. Whilst the 
Vietnam-China land border was demarcated in 2009,31 Vietnam’s borders 
with Laos and Cambodia remain porous and considerable resources are 
necessary to monitor internal security challenges such as, illegal migration, 
Hmong ethnic minority unrest in the Central Highlands, and organized 
crime.32 
 
The VPA has also played a prominent role in Vietnam’s commercial activities. 
It pursued two major strategic missions: national defense and economic 
production through the form of direct ownership of national defense 
industries and commercial enterprises. 33  These state-owned enterprises 
controlled by the VPA have yet to be privatized and have been problematic 
as the level of kickbacks and corruption remains high. 34  Transparency 
                                                
28 Abuza and Nguyen, “Vietnam’s Military Modernization.” 
29 IISS, The Military Balance 2016, 297-298.  
30 “Vietnam,” 2.  
31 “China and Vietnam Settle Border Dispute,” The New York Times, January 1, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/world/asia/01iht-border.1.19027004.html.  
32 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Security Outlook” (Presentation to International 
Workshop on Asia-Pacific Security, National Institute of Defense Studies, Tokyo, January 
17-18, 2012), 8-9. On the issue of the Hmong people, see “Hmong: Vietnam VPA, LPA 
Troops Attack Christians Villagers in Laos,” Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization, January 26, 2010, http://unpo.org/article/10627.  
33 Thayer, “Military Politics in Contemporary Vietnam,” 71; and Thayer, “The Political 
Role of the Vietnam’s People’s Army,” 14.  
34 Ben Bland, “Vietnam Uncovers $1.5bn of ‘Wrongful Spending,’” Financial Times, April 
6, 2012, https://www.ft.com/content/837a2d08-7fc9-11e1-92d3-00144feab49a. See also 
Thuy Thu Nguyen and Mathijs A. van Dijk, “Corruption, Growth, and Governance: Private 
vs. State-owned Firms in Vietnam” (Working Paper, May 5, 2010). 
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International’s 2016 “Corruption Perception Index” ranked Vietnam 113 out 
of 176 countries, with both its private and public sectors (in particular, public 
administration) impacted by significant bribery, political interference and 
facilitation payments. 35  For instance, the state-owned shipbuilding firm 
Vinashin was declared bankrupt in March 2011 after losing billions of dollars 
due to corruption and lack of government oversight.36 The key exception to 
Vietnam’s inefficient and corrupt SOEs has been the VPA-owned VietTel. 
Another source of military income, the company increased its annual revenue 
from USD2 million in 2000 to USD11 billion in 2015.37  
 
Therefore, two main challenges to Vietnam’s objective of self-reliant defense 
presented themselves. The first concerned the reform, development and 
maintenance of an indigenous defense industry. As aforementioned, many 
defense-owned SOEs suffered significant levels of corruption, graft, 
kickbacks and poor planning. In an attempt to rectify this, the 11th National 
Party Congress Political Report stated in January 2011 that the modernization 
of the armed forces and defense industry was one of five key national 
objectives. It also announced the goal “to further push the development of 
defense and security technology industry,” and to “strengthen scientific 
research in military and security capable of defeating hi-tech wars from 
enemy forces.” 38  Its 2016 Political Report from the 12th National Party 
Congress Political Report further emphasized the need for Vietnam to become 
a “modern industrial country.”39 
 
The second challenge has been how to shift its force structure from a focus to 
domestic security towards maritime contingencies. Towards the end of the 
1990s, the Vietnamese government implemented a series of planned 
                                                
35 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2016,” Transparency International, 
https://www.transparency.org/country/VNM  
36 “Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Vietnam,” Freedom House Report, 2012, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/vietnam.  
37 Tan Quiyi, “Vietnam’s Viettel Harbours Global Ambitions,” Channel NewsAsia, May 20, 
2016, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/vietnam-s-viettel/2788562.html.  
38 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Background Briefing: Vietnam’s Military Modernization and 
National Defence Industry,” Thayer Consultancy, August 20, 2015, 1.  
39 Hong Van, “2016’s Achievements Create Impetus for Future Development,” Vietnam 
Breaking News, January 9, 2017, https://www.vietnambreakingnews.com/2017/01/2016s-
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acquisitions of modern naval platforms to monitor its naval and air domains 
in its territorial zones, continental shelf and EEZ.40 This was marked by its 
significant investment in the Kilo-class submarine program, announced in 
2009, despite a lack of previous experience in maintaining a sophisticated 
submarine capability. In 2011, the Central Committee issued a detailed 
maritime strategy for 2011-2020 in which the protection of maritime 
sovereignty and the maritime economy were two key national security 
pillars.41 In June 2014, the National Assembly endorsed a USD747 million 
plan to boost Vietnam’s maritime surveillance and defense capabilities. There 
were also indications that some of the funds would be used for new 
acquisitions for the Vietnamese Coast Guard and the Vietnam Directorate of 
Fisheries.42  An independent market intelligence report also reported that 
these ships accounted for the largest category of imported defense equipment 
between 2011 and 2015.43  
 
Compared to the growing investments in naval forces, the obsolescent 
equipment for ground forces derived from the Soviet Union from the 1970s 
to 1980s has also been modernized but on a much more modest scale.44 At 
the end of the Second Indochina War, the Soviet Union supplied 
approximately 75 percent of North Vietnam’s military hardware, and by the 
1980s this figure had risen to about 97 percent.45 Without Soviet assistance, 
Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia and its relative success against the 
Chinese in the 1979 land border incursion would not have been possible.46 
However, from the 1980s until recently, Vietnam did not invest in military 
modernization to the same degree as China, leaving Vietnamese military 
                                                
40 Thayer, “Vietnam People’s Army,” 9.  
41 Murray Hiebert and Phuong Nguyen, “Vietnam Ramps Up Defense Spending, But its 
Challenges Remain,” CSIS: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, March 18, 2015, 
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42 “Vietnam,” 2. 
43 “The Vietnamese Defense Industry – Market Opportunities and Entry Strategy, Analyses 
and Forecasts to 2015,” Strategic Defence Intelligence, August 2011, 37.  
44 Wendell Minnick, “Vietnam Pushes Modernization as China Challenge Grows,” 
DefenseNews, August 30, 2015, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/2015/08/30/vietnam-pushes-
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45 “Vietnamese People’s Army (Ground Forces) – Modernization,” GlobalSecurity.org, 
August 17, 2014, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/vietnam/army-
modernization.htm.  
46 Minnick, “Vietnam Pushes Modernization as China Challenge Grows.” 
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equipment woefully inadequate compared to its Chinese neighbor.47 Indeed, 
some Cold War equipment has remained in use until today. For instance, its 
600-850 Soviet-made main battle type-T-54/T-55s tanks have not been 
replaced due to high costs. Instead, to save costs, with the assistance of Israel 
and Slovenia, Vietnam extended the operational life of the tanks through 
upgrades to combat capability, including sensors and targeting systems.48 
Overall, Hanoi’s long-term focus has turned gradually towards naval and 
associated air procurements, and the establishment of a self-reliant defense 
posture sustained by its local industry. As will be discussed below, a major 
driver for this development has been Hanoi’s reaction of the perceived threat 
to its national sovereignty from China. 
 
Reacting to China 
Vietnam’s biggest challenge has been how to maintain its sovereignty and 
political autonomy while preserving stable relations with its powerful 
neighbor, China. 49  Memories of the 1979 Chinese “lesson teaching” 
invasion,50 which was followed by more than a decade of hostility with China, 
and Beijing’s intentional policy of isolating Vietnam have framed Hanoi’s 
attitude towards Beijing. 51  The conflicted relationship has been further 
compounded by the maritime territorial dispute in the South China Sea. The 
two occasions (1974 and 1988) in which China used military force in the 
South China Sea both involved Vietnam and both involved a significant loss 
of life. The first was the short but intense 1974 clash involving the Chinese 
and South Vietnamese navies near the disputed Paracel Islands.52 During the 
                                                
47 See Bitzinger cited in Minnick, “Vietnam Pushes Modernization as China Challenge 
Grows.” 
48 “Vietnamese People’s Army (Ground Forces) – Modernization.”  
49 For historical accounts of China-Vietnam relations see: Ang Cheng Guan, “Vietnam-China 
Relations Since the End of the Cold War,” Asian Survey 38, no. 12 (December 1998): 1122-
1141; and Brantley Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
50 See King C. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1987); Harlan W. Jencks, “China’s 
‘Punitive’ War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment,” Asian Survey 19, no. 8 (August 
1979): 801-815; and Xiaoming Zhang, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A 
Reassessment,” The China Quarterly 184 (December 2005): 851-874.  
51 Tran “Vietnam’s Relations with China and the US and the Role of ASEAN,” 89.  
52 Toshi Yoshihara, “The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle: A Campaign Appraisal,” Naval War 
College Review 69, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 41. 
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1970s, China was Vietnam’s only competitor in the Paracel Islands.53 In 1974, 
the South Vietnamese Navy detected two Chinese fishing trawlers in the 
Crescent Group in the western Paracel Islands. Chinese crewmen had planted 
flags on islands over which Vietnam had established nominal control and set 
up a logistics team on Duncan Island. This latter act particularly angered the 
Vietnamese, as a decade earlier in 1959 the South Vietnamese Navy had 
forcibly evicted Chinese fisherman from Duncan Island, thereby conferring 
South Vietnamese control over the Crescent Group.54  
 
The unsuccessful battle to retake Duncan Island led to an unspecified number 
of Vietnamese casualties, with extensive fire and machine-gun damage to 
naval vessels and civilian “freighters.”55 Up until today, the return of Duncan 
Island has remained Hanoi’s top priority in the South China Sea.56 As Ngo 
Minh Tri and Collin Koh have argued, this scenario has continued to inform 
Vietnam’s maritime strategy towards China: 
 
The Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 highlighted the need to not just deny an 
adversary from blockading the South China Sea features but also to secure 
Vietnam’s own access to those exposed and vulnerable garrisons. Only a shift from 
sea denial to sea control can hope to attain that. Given the durable peace along the 
land borders with her neighbors, Vietnam should logically emphasize air-sea 
warfighting capabilities. For status quo-oriented Vietnam, much akin for what 
Saigon was back in 1974, the foreseeable combat scenario in the renewed South 
China Sea clash will encompass the need for Vietnamese forces to recapture seized 
features, or at least reinforce existing garrisons in the face of hostile attack.57 
 
Ngo and Koh further highlighted that Vietnam would require similar 
capabilities and doctrine to the Japanese navy due to similar operational 
requirements for recapturing islands in the East China Sea: 
 
                                                
53 Michael G. Gallagher, “China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea,” International 
Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 169. 
54 Yoshihara, “The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle,” 46. 
55 Marko Milivojevic, “The Spratly and Paracel Islands Conflict,” Survival 31, no. 1 (1989): 
70. 
56 Ha Hoang Hap, in discussion with the author, 17 November 2016, Singapore. 
57 Ngo Minh Tri and Koh Swee Lean Collin, “Lessons from the Battle of the Paracel 
Islands,” The Diplomat, January 23, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/lessons-from-
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Under this scenario, Vietnam’s defense predicament is perhaps no different from 
Japan’s with respect to the East China Sea dispute … Certainly Vietnam cannot 
hope to muster the same range of capabilities as Japan could, given economic 
constraints. To build at least limited sea control capabilities, Hanoi ought to focus 
on improving early warning and expanding amphibious sealift capacity.58 
 
The second, more recent incident, was a clash with Chinese forces in the 
Spratly Islands in March 1988. The Chinese Oceanographic Bureau had 
conducted extensive surveying operations in 1983, supported by a 20,000-ton 
PLAN vessel and 2,000-ton troop carrier. By 1987, after months of surveys, 
China concluded that Fiery Cross Reef was the best location for an oceanic 
observation station. Vietnam contested Chinese authority in the Spratlys and 
deployed troops to occupy islands and reefs and conducted frequent military 
exercise. Repeated confrontations led to an armed clash at Johnson Reef in 
1988,59 in which Vietnam lost more than 60 men and three vessels.60 
 
Both countries have remained claimants over the Spratly and Paracel Islands 
in the South China Sea (See Figure 8.1), and the question of territorial 
sovereignty has continued to stoke Sino-Vietnamese enmity.61 The outcome 
of the 1974 and 1988 incidents has been consequential, as for Vietnam the 
only acceptable resolution of the Paracel Islands territorial dispute would be 
the return of Duncan Island, which is rather unlikely.62 Moreover, China has 
been building an unchallenged military hold on the Paracels, while asserting 
sovereignty over the Spratlys. The PLA has fortified its artificial structures at 
Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, including with early warning 
radars and point-defense systems.63  
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Figure 8.1: Vietnamese and Chinese Claims in the South China Sea64 
 
Indeed, Vietnam has been at the forefront of China’s slow expansion through 
the South China Sea which has been ongoing since the 1970s, when the PLAN 
began survey operations in the Amphitrite Group in the eastern Paracel 
Islands.65 This expansion has consisted of a 
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seamless web of military buildups, establishment of administrative and logistic 
networks, military exercises and clashes, and diplomatic manoeuvres. However, 
more important than military instruments [are] the construction activities which 
[create] a physical base for ongoing Chinese control. Military moves [are] closely 
tied to the advance and consolidation of this infrastructure and the concomitant 
Chinese administrative control. These advances [serve], in turn, as bases for the next 
military advance, with an overriding political objective of consolidation of Chinese 
sovereignty over the South China Sea.66 
 
Consequently, there has been much public discussion in Vietnam over how 
to defend the country’s interests and deter further Chinese reclamation and 
militarization activities.67 According to a Pew Research Center poll, only 16 
percent of Vietnamese had a favorable view of China in 2014, rising only to 
19 percent in 2015. In contrast, 76 percent had a favorable view of the United 
States in 2014, which rose to 78 percent in 2015.68 The notion that Vietnam 
and China are natural partners based on shared Marxist-Leninist ideologies 
and historical experiences as socialist regimes has proven unsubstantiated.69 
According to Vietnamese media, in 2009 China detained or impounded 33 
Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 Vietnamese crew.70  In May 2011, the 
Haikou municipal government in Hainan province announced that it was 
imposing China’s 1999 unilateral fishing ban in the South China Sea, 
supposedly71  to promote sustainable fishing practices and protect marine 
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resources.72 Vietnamese media pointed out that “China’s unilateral execution 
of a fishing ban in the East Sea is a violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty over 
the Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago, as well as [Vietnam’s] sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.”73  
 
Anti-China rallies in Vietnam took place for approximately three months in 
2011, and in 2012 a series of anti-China protests took place over the detention 
of 21 Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese vessels in waters around the Paracel 
Islands as well as China’s claim that Sansha City (in the Paracel Islands) was 
China’s new municipality.74 In 2014, an anti-Chinese movement escalated 
into riots and violence, with 15 Chinese factories in Vietnam set on fire and 
looted, leading to over 3,000 people being evacuated.75 Fighting then broke 
out between Vietnamese and Chinese workers in central Ha Tinh province, 
killing two people and wounding 140.76 This was in response to Beijing’s 
deployment of the oil rig, Haiyang Shiyou 981 into waters south of the Paracel 
Islands, and 70nm inside Vietnam’s 200nm EEZ.77 The oil rig moved away 
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from the Paracel Islands in August 2014, but returned to the South China Sea 
in June 2015, where it was deployed west of the Paracel Islands and closer to 
Hainan Island.78 There were also tensions over Chinese vessels cutting the 
cables of Vietnamese exploration ships. In May 2011, Chinese Maritime 
Surveillance ships were filmed cutting the cables of a Vietnamese seismic 
survey ship, the Binh Minh 02, that was towing seismic monitoring equipment 
within Vietnam’s EEZ.79 In June 2011, a Chinese fishing boat   also attempted 
to cut the cables of another of Vietnam’s seismic survey ships, the Viking II, 
which was operating in the vicinity of Vanguard Bank in the Spratly Islands.80 
 
Adding to the issues of detained fishermen, anti-Chinese sentiments, the oil 
rig incident and cable-cutting incidents, in 2016 Chinese staged military 
exercises in the contested area around the Paracel Islands.81 The Chinese 
media claimed that the exercises were in response to the June 2016 Permanent 
Court of Arbitration “Philippines vs. China” ruling and that “China is a peace-
loving country and deals with foreign relations with discretion, but it won’t 
flinch if the US and its small clique keep encroaching on its interests on its 
doorstep.”82 The China Daily added that those in the US who saw the tribunal 
as invalidating its territorial claims had “underestimated China’s 
determination to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity … The days 
have long passed when [China is seen] as the “sick man of East Asia” whose 
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fate was at the mercy of a few western powers.”83 In response, a Vietnamese 
foreign affairs spokesperson stated in unusually stark terms:  
 
such activity once again seriously violates Viet Nam’s sovereignty over Hoang Sa 
Archipelago and goes against the common viewpoint of high-ranking leaders of 
both countries. It also violates the international law including the 1982 UNCLOS 
and the DOC. Viet Nam strongly opposes the above-said action and demands China 
to respect Viet Nam’s sovereignty, behave in a responsible manner, immediately 
stop the activity and restrain from further actions that threaten the security and safety 
of navigation in the East Sea or escalate tension in the region.84 
 
These factors have contributed to the emergence of interactive arming 
dynamics, in which Vietnam has reacted to Chinese capabilities deployed in 
the South China Sea, while China has bolstered its capabilities to defend its 
maritime territorial claims vis-à-vis its opposing claimants (See Figure 8.2). 
While China has adopted a strategy of building up naval capabilities to 
counter the US Navy, Vietnam has employed a strategy to exploit asymmetry 
vis-à-vis the PLAN, especially since the sea-lanes used by China for the 
passage of global imports and exports passes by Vietnamese waters enroute 
to and from the Straits of Malacca.85 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Interactive Arming Dynamics vis-à-vis Vietnamese Military Modernization 
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Both China and Vietnam still rely significantly on Russian armaments—
submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft—to accelerate defense 
modernization efforts.86 This has led to the argument of a “mirror reaction” 
of capabilities.87 However, while there has clearly been a reactive element, 
Hanoi and Beijing have not been mimicking each other’s procurements. 
Hanoi has demonstrated concerted efforts to create a long-term maritime 
defense capability, mainly based on sea denial within 200nm of Vietnam’s 
littoral coast.88 To this end, the VPN has planned to acquire at least 20 green-
water vessels for littoral operations, and has also planned to modernize its 
Hong Ha and Ba Son shipyards.89 China’s military modernization, on the 
other hand, has been targeted at blue-water power projection. Furthermore, 
Russia has been a historical provider of arms to both countries and Russian 
armaments and support for maintenance has been relatively cheap. Indeed, as 
aforementioned, Vietnam’s acquisition pattern is similar to Japan’s even 
though both are not in a “mirror” action-reaction dynamic.  
 
Moreover, Vietnam’s investments in naval and associated air capabilities 
have focused on deterring China’s encroachment on Vietnam’s claimed 
territories in the South China Sea. This has overwhelmed the concerns for 
procuring cheaper platforms to replace its aging platforms. If Vietnam’s 
primary concern was about cost-effective advanced weapons platforms, it 
would have invested in Chinese-produced acquisitions. The export-versions 
of the J-10 (the FC-20) and the J-20 (FC-31) are significantly cheaper than 
Russian jets of the same class, yet not of the same quality.90 Instead, Vietnam 
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has preferred Russian procurements, and pursued second-hand acquisitions 
from the US and Japan, as well as targeted defense cooperation with India.  
 
The submarine acquisition is a case in point. Since 2008, there had been 
rumors about Vietnam’s intentions to acquire submarines, with one option to 
buy second-hand boats from Serbia.91  At the July 2009 IISS Shangri-La 
Dialogue, Vietnam officials confirmed their potential interest in buying Kilo-
class submarines and Sukhoi fighters from Russia. 92  In December 2009, 
Hanoi indeed purchased six diesel-electric Russian Project 636 
Varshavyanka-class (enhanced Kilo) boats at a cost of USD2 billion.  It also 
announced the delivery of eight Sukhoi Su-30Mk2 fighters in 2010.93  In 
December 2013, Vietnam reported the delivery of the first Kilo-class 
submarine to Cam Ranh Bay. The second was delivered in early February 
2014, two more in 2015 and the last in 2016.94 Hanoi’s bold move to leapfrog 
generations of weapons platforms—from obsolescent Soviet-era equipment 
to Kilo-class submarines and advanced Sukhois—is testimony to its 
determination to give China pause to think.  
 
Vietnam also acquired additional two Russian Gepard 3.9 (Dinh Tien 
Hoang)-class frigates to bring their total to six—two of which were optimized 
for surface attack and two were designated for anti-submarine warfare.95 The 
Gepard-class ships are particularly suited for littoral operations—it is a 
relatively small ship with a short-to medium range but features a stealth-
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enhanced ship design, equipped with anti-ship missiles and capable of air 
defense as well as ASW.96 In 2014, Vietnam also took delivery of the first 
two of six Molniya-class fast attack craft from Russia and licensed four more 
for domestic construction. It came alongside an additional agreement to 
license-build and equip the ships with Russian Kh-35 ship-to-shore missiles 
which will boost Vietnam’s ability to target Chinese installations in the 
Spratly and Paracels Islands.97 In 2014, Hanoi also purchased two Canadian 
Next-Gen DHC-6 Twin Otter maritime patrol aircraft equipped for 
amphibious operations. The acquisition could boost Vietnam’s ISR 
capabilities to monitor its 200nm EEZ, and could be used for transport, 
resupply, and search and rescue operations in Vietnam’s coastal regions.98 On 
8 July 2014, the Japanese government announced that it would provide 
Vietnam’s coast guard with six naval ships to patrol the South China Sea.99 
Vietnam also considered the purchase of Dutch SIGMA-class corvettes100 as 
well as maritime patrol craft from India.101  
 
To boost its maritime denial capability, Vietnam has also investigated the 
possibility of importing India’s anti-ship supersonic cruise missile, the 
Brahmos. Although the current variant of the Brahmos can only be used as a 
surface and aircraft launched weapon, versions are being tested for 
submarine-launches. 102  Currently, Vietnam’s most robust deterrent is its 
missile force, which includes 40 Russian SS-N-26 Yakhont shore-to-ship 
cruise missiles. It has negotiated with Russia licenses for domestic production 
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of three classes of advanced anti-ship missiles, including the P-5 SS-N-3 
Shaddock, P-15 Termit and Kh-35E SS-N-25 Switchblade. Other anti-ship 
missiles in its arsenals include French-built Exocets and Russian built SS-N-
27 Sizzlers, which reportedly will be deployed on its Kilo-class submarines.103 
In January 2016, it also increased its air combat capabilities through receiving 
an additional 2 Su-30MK2 combat aircraft from Russia, bringing the current 
number of combat capable fighters to 101. In 2016, it possessed 11 Su-
27UBK Flankers, 32 Su-30MK Flankers and 28 Su-22M3 Fitters, all 
equipped for anti-ship and maritime operations.104 Hanoi also contemplated 
the replacement of its third generation 144 MiG-21 fighters from the 1960s, 
with fourth-generation Russian MiG-35 multirole fighters, the French Rafale 
and the Swedish Gripen in the mix.105 However, due to the high cost of 
modern fourth-generation fighters, it is unlikely Vietnam will be able to 
afford a one-to-one replacement of these aircraft any time soon. 
 
These procurements have turned Vietnam into one of the world’s top arms 
importers (See Table 8.2), and no other country in Southeast Asia has been as 
quick as Hanoi to bring such a large number of weapons platforms online. To 
further boost its capabilities and access to advanced weapons platforms, 
Hanoi lobbied the US government to lift its weapons ban in order to purchase 
an unspecified number of P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft for ASW.106 In 
May 2016, in the process of strategic and economic normalization between 
the two countries, the Obama administration lifted the arms embargo to 
Vietnam.107  Although Obama stated that arms sales would have to meet 
certain human rights requirements, he added that the decision supported the 
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objective of strengthening Vietnam’s ability to defend itself, and that there 
was mutual concern over maritime issues and the importance of maintaining 
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.108 The lifting of the US’ arms 
embargo on Vietnam sent a signal that Hanoi was now in a position to access 
advanced US defense technologies and experience,109 such as F-16 fighter 
aircraft and refurbished P-3C Orions armed with torpedoes.110 The US and 
Vietnam also enhanced military cooperation, including annual joint naval 
exercises. However, practical cooperation remained limited to areas such as 
military medicine, search and rescue and shipboard damage control.111 
 
2016 Rank 1995-2016 Average Rank Country 
1 3 Saudi Arabia 
2 13 Algeria 
3 1 India 
4 19 Iraq 
5 10 Egypt 
6 4 South Korea 
7 6 UAE 
8 18 Vietnam 
9 11 Australia 
10 2 China 
Table 8.2: Top Arms Importers Based on Total Import Value (2016)112 
 
In reaction to China’s militarization of islands in the South China Sea, 
Vietnam also undertook militarization of islands it occupies in the Spratlys, 
though not on the same scale. In August 2016, it became public that Vietnam 
had fortified five bases in the Spratly Islands with new mobile rocket 
launchers capable of striking China’s runways and military installations in 
this island grouping.113 The launchers form part of Vietnam’s EXTRA rocket 
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artillery system and ACCULAR precision guided rockets acquired from Israel. 
They have a range of 150km, carry 150kg warheads and can attack multiple 
targets.114 In the future, these weapons could operate with targeting drones 
and compact radars enabling strikes amphibious and land targets, placing 
China’s 3km runways and installations on Subi, Fiery Cross and Mischief 
Reef within range of many of Vietnam’s tightly clustered holdings on 21 
islands and reefs.115 By November 2016, Vietnam had also nearly completed 
its upgrades of air infrastructure on Spratly Island, including a 1.2km runway 
which would be able to accommodate most planes in the Vietnamese air 
force.116 
 
To protect its claimed islands, Vietnam has also invested in maritime 
surveillance capabilities, focused on ISR.117 After a year of experimenting 
with communication satellites, Vietnam successfully launched its first “earth-
observing” satellite in May 2013, the VNREDSat-1, reducing Vietnam’s 
dependence on foreign-sourced images. 118  To support Vietnam’s ISR 
capabilities, the Indian Space Research Organization has announced to fund 
and set up a satellite tracking and data reception center in Ho Chi Minh City. 
This would bolster India’s space program but also provide Hanoi with access 
to data from Indian earth observation satellites that cover the region, including 
China and the South China Sea.119 Additionally, after three years of testing 
indigenously produced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in December 2015 
Vietnam’s Academy of Science and Industry and the Ministry of Public 
Security with design assistance from Belarus unveiled its largest indigenously 
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produced high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAV.120 Vietnamese state 
media suggested it would be used for patrols in the South China Sea.121 Such 
upgrades have not only reduced Vietnam’s dependence on foreign purchases, 
but have also advanced Hanoi’s objective of complicating Chinese activities 
in the region and its ability to expand its sphere of influence. Vietnam’s 
overall military modernization has demonstrated a clear reaction to Chinese 
military modernization, as well as attempts to counter Chinese attempts to 
overwhelmingly tip the balance of power in favor of the PLAN in the South 
China Sea. 
 
Yet many of the VPA’s acquisitions also have exceeded cost expectations as 
in most instances Hanoi did not adequately factor in the long-term expense of 
maintaining advanced naval and associated air capabilities. Indeed, Vietnam 
still lacks modern operational experience, doctrine and command and control 
systems. Its armed forces will for the foreseeable future face major challenges 
in using and supporting these systems as capability development has not kept 
pace with acquisitions.122 Hanoi, for instance, had to cancel the purchase of 
the P-3 Orion due to costs. Reportedly, it signaled interest in acquiring 
second-hand weapons platforms from Japan, in particular the Kawasaki P-3C 
maritime patrol aircraft.123 Chinese analysts  also noted that Vietnam still 
lacks any operational experience with submarines.124 In particular, translating 
the Kilo-class submarine platform into a full military capability will pose 
enormous challenges, as Vietnam’s only experience with submarines rests on 
two Yugo-class midget submarines acquired from North Korea in 1997.125 Its 
modernization is also heavily reliant on foreign, particularly, Russian military 
technology. Whilst its fighter fleet has been upgraded, the Vietnamese air 
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force still lacks an aerial refueling capability, severely limiting its ability to 
extend its operational reach to the Spratlys. As well, the Sukhoi combat 
aircraft has remained under the purview of the air force and not the naval 
aviation wing.126  
 
Consequently, with many procurement programs announced, but the majority 
falling through due to funding constraints, and the lack of training and 
operational experience to build and maintain capability, Vietnam has headed 
towards a haphazard force structure with critical capability gaps. The 
dynamic between Vietnam and China will remain asymmetric, thus, 
Vietnam’s only option has been to develop the capabilities to exploit 
asymmetrical advantages. For instance, it will certainly seek to use its Kilo-
class submarines to exploit Chinese weaknesses in ASW.127 
 
Therefore, Vietnam has had limited options in both defense and diplomacy 
towards Beijing. On the one hand, Hanoi often accused China of “bullying” 
behavior towards its neighbors, but maintained regular meetings and visits 
between high-level officials from both countries.128 As well, trade between 
Vietnam and China was estimated in 2015 to be USD95.8 billion, growing 
14.6 percent since 2014, with Vietnam poised to become China’s biggest 
ASEAN trade partner. 129  Yet due to China’s comprehensive military 
modernization and the minimal possibility of China concluding a binding 
code of conduct for behavior in the South China Sea (which is Vietnam’s 
objective), Vietnam has turned towards strengthening ties to regional partners. 
Russia and India remain the main sources of advanced weapons, as well as 
the main partners for training and intelligence cooperation. In September 
2016, India provided a USD500 million credit for the acquisition of Indian 
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defense systems.130 The deal follows a similar 2004 agreement, where India 
provided Vietnam a USD100 million defense credit to buy naval patrol 
boats.131 
 
Hanoi also diversified its foreign relations by building ties with the US, Japan 
and Australia. In October 2016, Vietnam’s vice defense minister, Senior Lt. 
Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh stated that “Vietnam will support the US and other 
partners to intervene in the region as long as it brings peace, stability and 
prosperity.”132 Earlier in the month two US warships made a port call to Cam 
Ranh Bay.133 In September 2015, Japan and Vietnam signed an economic and 
strategic partnership. 134  In March 2015, it also signed with Australia a 
“Declaration on Enhancing the Australia Viet Nam Comprehensive 
Partnership,” and agreed to establish a strategic partnership.135  
 
Findings 
The case of Vietnam demonstrates many characteristics of interactive arming 
behavior that does not fit traditional “arms race” theories. Vietnam’s military 
modernization is an asymmetric response to China’s military transformation, 
as these upgrades have increased the costs the VPN can impose on an 
opponent (H4). Additionally, land reclamation and militarization activities 
which support advanced weapons platforms have also been interactive 
elements of broad-based military modernization (H3). Traditional 
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explanations which focus on the number of acquisitions and planned upgrades 
overlook these supporting yet critical activities such as significant changes in 
doctrine, investments in supporting logistics and facilities, ISR and training. 
As previously identified in the Japan and South Korea chapters, “arms race” 
theories also cannot adequately account for increasing security cooperation. 
As part of Vietnam’s attempts to create a favorable balance of power—and 
stymie changes by China—Hanoi has sought closer security and strategic 
cooperation with regional partners and even former enemies (H5).  
 
Lastly, arms race theories do not factor in decisions of restraint. Vietnam’s 
concern about the changing balance of power in the South China Sea in 
China’s favor has outweighed its fiscal concerns regarding the expense of 
advanced weapons platforms. Hanoi’s concerted political adjustments in its 
strategic doctrine to increase focus on maritime contingencies demonstrate a 
response to a darker security outlook (H1). A key example is its decision to 
overlook cheaper Chinese-produced export-versions of fighter aircraft in 
favor of procurements from Russia and second-hand acquisitions from the US 
and Japan, as well as targeted defense cooperation with India. Overall, 
however, as with the previous case studies, the domestic processes of 
Vietnam determine the scale and timing of its reactions, providing restraint 
over many armament decisions related to disputes and tensions (H6). The 
concluding chapter follows, which summarizes the findings, extends the 
framework for an “interactive arming” dynamic,” argues for a return to the 
strategic studies approach to understanding armaments, and proposes cases 
and areas for future research. 
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Chapter 9: 
Conclusion 
 
This concluding chapter first summarizes the findings of the theoretical 
analysis of “arms races” and the empirical investigation. Second, it 
extrapolates the findings into an extension of the “interactive arming” 
framework. In doing so, it highlights the results of the tested hypotheses. This 
framework recognizes military modernization as arming, focuses on the 
political intent of actors, and examines interactive dynamics as opposed to 
“competition,” “action-reaction,” or “races.” It also demonstrates that arming 
is a strategic behavior. Consequently, third, this chapter proposes a return to 
examining armaments through the strategic studies lens. In essence, “arms 
race” theories (predominantly now an occupation of the international 
relations discipline) have overlooked the strategic studies literature and its 
primary focus on the use of force for political objectives. Lastly, it identifies 
cases and areas for future research. 
 
Summary of Findings 
In the survey of the literature, the examination of the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to understanding “arms races” has demonstrated their 
limitations. For one, these “arms race” theories cannot adequately account for 
the range of variables that contribute to arming dynamics and govern its 
progression. In both the qualitative and quantitative literature, a tendency 
exists to regard these impulses as quantifiable fixed values. Yet the 
motivation to find a pattern of “arms competition” or “arms race” dynamics 
to extrapolate a predictive theory has been “no more successful than the 
search for such theories in other areas of human existence … Similar causes 
do not always produce similar effects, and causes interact in ways 
unforeseeable even by the historically sophisticated.” 1 Such approaches, 
despite attempting to model “a mad rush for armaments,” deflect inquiry 
toward objective factors such as raw indices of military expenditure. However, 
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strategy involves an understanding of the uncertain variables of “human 
passions, values, and beliefs, few of which are quantifiable.” 2 Even if the 
“arms race” concept may initially have had some analytical utility in 
identifying “abnormally intense military competition”—such as in the cases 
of the Dreadnoughts and the Cold War nuclear competition—it has suffered 
from “conceptual stretching” and other shortfalls discussed in the previous 
pages, leading to impoverished analytical outcomes.3 The “arms race” label 
in current debate has often impeded analytical thinking about the relationship 
between a state’s strategy and its armament decisions.4 The literature survey 
has demonstrated that theories of “arms race or arms racing,” although widely 
employed and the subject of voluminous literature, are in fact a rather weak 
analytical device. The concept is not invalid—although the charge that it 
strips states of any reasoned and purposeful involvement in the armament 
process is a serious one. The essence of the problem might best be 
characterized as a case of tasking a concept to do nearly everything when, in 
reality, it is applicable only in very specific and therefore rare circumstances. 
 
The empirical investigation has discovered the recurrence of important 
explanations that the “arms race” paradigm has suppressed. Labelling all 
arming dynamics as “races” or “competitive” has not explained the reasoning 
behind key political decisions to use the armed forces. All armed forces have 
military modernization programs since as “a military establishment it has to 
be provided and equipped, and it must develop and refine plans for its possible 
commitment to action.” 5  The modernization of naval and associated air 
capabilities has been impacted by a range of variables that encompass both 
material and ideational influences—including a changing balance of power; 
alliance commitments; issues of sovereignty arising from maritime territorial 
disputes; requirements for surveillance and protection of EEZs; economic 
growth and increased financial investment in defense capabilities; technology 
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acquisition or reverse engineering for defense industrial needs; and national 
prestige (See Table 9.1).  
 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Military Modernization 
 China US Japan ROK Vietnam 
Balance of Power      
Alliances X    X 
Maritime Disputes  X    
EEZs  X X X  
Economic Growth   Restraint Restraint   
Defense Industry     X 
National Prestige  X Restraint   
Table 9.1: Impact of Independent Variables on Dependent Variable 
 
While some variables have had a different influence from one country to the 
next, and from one period to another, a small number of variables recurred 
regularly.6 All military modernization necessitates a reaction to the strategic 
environment, and this often overrides political concerns of, for instance, pork-
barreling and constitutional constraints. As evidenced in the case studies of 
selected Asia-Pacific countries, despite political transitions and a quickening 
pace of technological change in weaponry, the strategic objectives of 
responding to a changing balance of power has largely remained constant. 
The perception of a changing balance of power, increasing maritime 
requirements and historical rivalries between many Asia-Pacific countries 
have led to a constant focus on bolstering naval and associated air capabilities 
for not only self-reliant defense and defense industry, but also to protect 
SLOCs, EEZs and claimed maritime territories. However, concerns for 
national identity and the allocation of economic resources can also be 
restraining influences on a country’s military modernization. Overall, 
“interactive arming” in the Asia-Pacific has been largely influenced by the 
changing balance of power accorded to China’s rapid military transformation, 
the assertion of territorial claims in the region, and the impact of technological 
innovation. Armaments remain directly related to a state’s ability to secure its 
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national interests and this involves responding to perceived shifts in the 
geostrategic environment to best ensure state survival. 
 
The network of relationships that emerges from the case studies reflect 
multilateral dynamics in which some relationships are reciprocal and others 
are not, while some relationships are asymmetric and others are not (See 
Figure 9.1). However, all arming involves interaction. Such dynamics occur 
because all countries bring their respective frames of reference to bear on 
changes in the armament of others and respond accordingly. This reflects the 
Richardson and Rapoport’s findings in their models of interlocking nature of 
weapons decisions and the basic interdependence of political decisions 
concerning the use of force in states with overlapping strategic visions. 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Interactive Arming Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific (Results from Empirical Study) 
 
While arming dynamics involve both quantitative and qualitative 
improvements, the emphasis is on the latter. This is due to the demands for 
cost-effectiveness, as well as the pursuit of military innovation to achieve a 
technological edge in warfare.7 This has been evident in the push for self-
reliant defense industries in the Asia-Pacific where countries decreased their 
dependence on foreign purchases and aimed for cost-effective, country-
specific weapons platforms that are capable of specific operations.  
 
Upon further examination of the platforms acquired and the capabilities being 
developed, many military modernization programs appear to be mimicking 
each other. However, labeling this dynamic a “mirror-reaction” would mean 
that those countries are prioritizing copying each other as opposed to reacting 
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to the necessary requirements of operating in a maritime domain and 
protecting maritime territories. The foremost naval functions have 
historically been and continue to be to exercise control over selected maritime 
spaces to ensure that critical SLOCs remain open for friends and allies, and 
to project naval power against hostile shores. 8  Sea control facilitates 
international commerce, an essential element of national power and 
prosperity. Offshore presence near flashpoints and critical areas puts naval 
forces in a position to respond expeditiously if crises occur.9  
 
These requirements have necessitated capabilities, such as blue-water power 
projection (China, the US, Japan and the ROK), ASW (China, the US, Japan, 
ROK and Vietnam), sophisticated C4ISR (China and the US), and maritime 
constabulary (China, Japan, ROK and Vietnam). Each of the countries 
examined in the empirical investigation to varying degrees have invested in 
self-reliant defense and the capability to produce indigenous defense 
technologies without reliance on foreign purchases. The modernization of 
naval and associated air capabilities are reactions and attempts to counter or 
effect changes in the regional balance of power, as all countries had to 
constantly develop their armed forces in response to perceived changes in 
their strategic environments. As well, the peer competition between China 
and the US demonstrates that their military modernization is not a “status quo 
interactive arming,” but rather, “belligerent interactive arming.” Both 
countries perceive each other as a real and present danger, are both conscious 
the defense of their interest involves a risk of conflict, are both sufficiently 
undeterred from defending their interests, and both have the political 
objective to use force to affect the strategic environment.  
 
The results of the empirical study also demonstrate that there is no detectable 
propensity for arms dynamics to generate their own momentum and to spill 
into blind competition or conflict, as assumed in the “arms race” literature. 
Armaments were not sought simply to counter an opponent’s acquisitions. 
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Rather, the decision to arm remained within the realm of the statesmen, and 
has often been complemented by other strategic behavior to ensure survival. 
This has also been demonstrated through decisions of restraint. That is, it is 
not just about developing capabilities, but also what is not being done—
decisions which are not factored into the traditional “arms race” theory. This 
is evident in South Korea’s case, which has resisted full integration into the 
US-led regional BMD network in which Japan plays a large role, and instead 
has decided to enhance self-reliant defense options as its overarching goal is 
reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Such dynamics are also evident in the 
case of Vietnam. Due to its perception of China’s threat in the South China 
Sea, Hanoi’s arms acquisitions have preferred system from Japan, the US and 
Russia over cheaper options made in China.  
 
This link between armaments and policy has been also demonstrated through 
competitive security behavior that does not directly involve the armed forces. 
In Vietnam's case, the closer embrace of the US has been politically difficult 
but a move that has exerted more immediate pressure on Beijing than 
increasing investments in sophisticated weaponry. Similarly, in the case of 
Japan, the competitive response to a darker security outlook was embodied in 
its constitutional revision. This was a clearer indicator of significant change 
in Japan’s threat perception than movement in, for instance, the combined 
tonnage of its surface combatants. While it is significant to understand the 
contribution of technology to modern warfare, it is more imperative to 
understand the motivations driving changes to strategic doctrine and force 
structure, and the demand for advanced weaponry. Factoring in this behavior 
provides a clearer picture of how interactive arming manifests, and what 
reciprocal reactions by actors might be. 
 
In the Asia-Pacific, behavior that does not directly involve the use of force 
(such as, bolstering strategic cooperation with partner countries) is actually 
an acknowledgement that, for most regional countries, the ability to 
modernize their own forces would at best result in an asymmetric response—
this is true of China vis-à-vis the United States, as well as Japan, the ROK 
and Vietnam vis-à-vis China. Land reclamation and militarization of islands 
occupied by China and Vietnam, defense technology transfer agreements 
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between countries, the formalization of security cooperation and intelligence-
sharing agreements, and other responses of this kind are certain to be missed 
by any quantification associated with “arms race” theories. These results 
confirm a major finding of the thesis, namely that the approach taken here 
results, at the very least, in a concise set of propositions on arming dynamics 
that is analytically richer and of greater utility as a guide to policy.  
 
Media and increasingly the academic discourse tend to label any change in 
military programs as an “arms race” or “competition.” Yet, this is inaccurate 
and misleading in nearly all cases, particularly if the intent is to support policy 
prescriptions. This dissertation has shown that the dynamics in the Asia-
Pacific are better explained as interactive arming, with the US and China 
engaged in strategic competition. China, the US, Japan, the ROK and 
Vietnam are arming to achieve favorable balances of power. Not all countries 
are evaluating the same balance of power—each actor frames their arms 
acquisitions as a component of the broader national aspiration to achieve a 
favorable balance of power. Therefore, there are strong similarities between 
military modernization objectives identified in each case studies.  
 
Interactive Arming: An Extension 
The summary of the findings confirms the six key hypotheses, as well as 
demonstrates the utility of the new framework of “interactive arming” (See 
Table 9.2). The arming behavior of the five case studies were effectively 
accounted for by the six hypotheses. The two exceptions are first, H4 was not 
apparent in the China case study as China does not have any formal alliances 
or security guarantees. Second, H2 was not present in the Vietnam case study 
as their strategic concerns regarding the maritime theatre are solely focused 
on Chinese military transformation and actions in the South China Sea. 
Overall, the results of the empirical case study analysis demonstrate the utility 
of the new framework of “interactive arming.” Such a framework 
encompasses the understanding of (1) a state’s decision-making process 
regarding its own capabilities and objectives, and that of potential adversaries; 
(2) the likelihood of an adversarial response; (3) the impact of a mutual build-
up on the countries’ capabilities to achieve their objectives; (4) the impact of 
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strategic competition on states’ relationships; and (5) how the anticipated 
changes over time impact a state’s current arming behavior. 
 
 
Hypotheses Case Studies 
 China US Japan ROK Vietnam 
H1       
H2     X 
H3      
H4      
H5 X     
H6      
Table 9.2: Results of Tested Hypotheses against Case Studies 
 
First, interactive arms dynamics are driven by both material and ideational 
impulses: that is, a state’s threat perception which, in turn, is shaped by its 
domestic institutions and preferences. Any armament behavior inherently 
implies an interactive process, previously explained by international relations 
theorists as a “security dilemma.” Responding to one or more opponents’ 
armaments implies that decision-makers have deemed an armaments policy 
necessary to secure state survival in response to a perceived threat (whether 
this is instead of, or additional to bandwagoning or external balancing). 
Because of the dynamic interactive of a number of explanatory variables that 
contribute to interactive arming, such a phenomenon is a spectrum of strategic 
behavior. That is, from a status quo position of responding to changes the 
strategic environment, to the purposeful intent of using force to fulfil political 
objectives and affect the strategic environment. 
 
Second, interactive arming is a process that must involve two or more actors. 
States are reacting to their broader strategic environment rather than a single 
adversary. It can be a one-way or two-way process due to the gradation of 
capabilities and resources of the actors involved. This can range from 
multiples of mutually exclusive pairs to a more complex system, such as the 
one depicted in Figure 9.3: 
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Figure 9.2: Example of Interactive Arming 
 
These first two propositions are informed by geography and historical 
experience. The size and location of a country are crucial determinants of the 
way its policy-makers think about strategy, and about the choices among 
weapon systems.10 Likewise, historical experience has profound effects on 
the strategic behavior of states. Due to incomplete information about one 
another’s intentions, relationships between states are influenced by past 
grievances and the advantages or disadvantages conferred by geography. 
 
Third, qualitative and quantitative changes in armaments must be present. A 
quantitative decrease in armaments does not necessarily mean the subsiding 
of interactive arming, but could reflect a technological change that allows the 
pursuit of political objectives through lower levels of armaments and 
expenditure. The cycle of military modernization fuels the need to replace 
obsolescent equipment, and often significant qualitative leaps in capabilities 
are signals of increased preparedness for warfighting.  
 
Fourth, the defining feature of interactive arming becoming belligerent is 
political rivalry, when two opponents are attempting to gain superiority to 
compel the other to do their will. That is, an ambition that goes beyond 
seeking parity or maintaining the status quo to one that seeks superiority in 
warfighting capabilities to achieve a political objective. Arming—like war—
cannot be divorced from policy but serves the state’s political objectives. 
Although it can be considered as preparation for warfighting, the outcome is 
not necessarily conflict. Therefore, although the military expenditure and 
economic burden of arming are transparent indicators for states in an 
anarchical system, the level of political enmity and grievances are key 
impulses for interactive arming to occur. 
                                                
10 Murray and Grimsley, “Introduction,” 1.  
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Fifth, an interactive arming dynamic exhibits highly competitive security 
behavior that does not directly involve the armed forces. This can take the 
form of enhanced strategic partnerships, intelligence-sharing and defense 
technology transfers. This is often a response to a perceived asymmetry in a 
relationship, in which a country acknowledges that its armed forces will never 
be equal to a potential opponent’s. Therefore, other strategies such as 
balancing or bandwagoning are pursued.  
 
Lastly, interactive arming in itself does not generate its own momentum 
towards conflict. For arming to become belligerent, strategic competition and 
political rivalry must be present, and thus a calculus is made that arming 
fulfills political objectives and are adequate preparations for warfighting. 
This is compounded by the “effect of fear” and the perception of threat, which 
often exaggerates inaccuracies. Armaments are often not perceived as 
targeting deficiencies in defense or deterrence, but as offensive measures. The 
argument that numerical advantage of an opponent can be the sole motivation 
for increasing the quantitative levels of armaments ignores the considerations 
of the advantages conferred by terrain and weapons technology, as well as 
other non-quantifiable factors such as alliances.11  
 
Strategic Behavior and the Politics of Force 
The analysis of the modernization of naval and associated air capabilities of 
China, the United States’ forces in the Western Pacific, Japan, South Korea 
and Vietnam has demonstrated that arming is a normal strategic behavior of 
states and not an abnormal phenomenon as assumed by “arms race” theories. 
Regional countries in the Asia-Pacific are not reacting to singular arms build-
ups in bilateral relationships. Rather, they are responding to changes in their 
strategic environment and perceived shifts in the balance of power. This 
arming takes the form of military modernization—both acquisitions and 
enhancements. However, the traditional “arms race” literature’s attempt to 
identify arming dynamics as a unique phenomenon often isolates the decision 
to arm from other strategic behavior such as hedging, balancing or 
                                                
11 Handel, Master of War, 89. 
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bandwagoning. Therefore, arming is almost always perceived as competitive. 
This ignores the significant decision-making process involved in assessing a 
country’s requirements to ensure its survival, and the necessary planning for 
the modernization of an armed force. The dynamics emerging between these 
countries can be described as “interactive arming,” that is arming which 
responds to a country’s own self-defense requirements, as well as changes to 
its strategic environment. However, the decisions to acquire armaments and 
modernize the armed forces are always attached to political objectives and 
are not arms purchases generating their own momentum. As Sun Tzu 
famously argued, “a sovereign cannot raise an army because he is enraged, 
nor can a general fight because he is resentful.”12 Similarly, arms acquisitions 
cannot occur in an “apolitical mad momentum model.” Based on the 
theoretical and empirical findings, this section argues for a return to the 
strategic studies approach for understanding “strategic behavior” and the 
politics of the use of force. 
 
Arming is a strategic behavior as by nature it involves the use or the threat of 
the use of force. Although “arms race” theories emerged from strategic 
thinking about conventional naval warfare in the 19th and 20th centuries, and 
the US-USSR Cold War relationship, its current formulation in the 
international relations discipline has often disregarded its strategic studies 
roots. That is, the study of the use of force for political objectives. Strategy 
and understandings of strategic behavior informs considerations of 
armaments, policy, the use of force and how they are linked. As Robert J. Art 
argues, the use of force is integral to policies related to security and foreign 
affairs because military power has effects even when it is not used forcefully: 
 
The forceful use of military power is physical: a state harms, cripples, or destroys 
the possessions of another state. The peaceful use of military power in intimidating: 
a state threatens to harm, cripple, or destroy, but does not actually do so. Only when 
diplomacy has failed is war generally waged. Mainly in the hope that war can be 
avoided are threats usually made. For any given state, war is the exception, not the 
rule, in its relations with other countries, because most of the time a given state is at 
                                                
12 Mark R. McNeilly, Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 139.  
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peace, not war. Consequently states use their military power more frequently in the 
peaceful than in the forceful mode.13 
 
Thus, governing the use of force remains firmly in the realm of politics and 
the “statesman” where key decisions on armaments relating to a strategic 
environment are made during peacetime. As Bernard Brodie argued: 
“Strategy in peacetime is expressed largely in choices among weapons 
systems, which are of course not bought ready-made off the shelf but 
developed selectively by a process which itself involves heavy costs and 
many pitfalls.” 14 The use of force is an instrument of the state that does not 
exist in a vacuum, but which is affected by politics, ideology, geography and 
economics. Strategy is a process that involves domestic political influences 
and idiosyncratic behavior, as well as the external pressures of threats.15 As 
Merze Tate’s methodical history of the attempts at The Hague Conferences 
to effect substantial disarmament famously noted, arms are the primary 
instrument that a sovereign state has to ensure its survival: 
 
States will not disarm so long as they insist upon maintaining their national 
sovereignty intact; for the idea of absolute sovereignty involves in the last resort the 
right to do anything which may be held to serve the national interest, regardless of 
the consequences of such action upon the rest of the world. A sovereign state 
invariable asserts the power to be the ultimate judge in its own controversies, to 
enforce its own conception of rights, to treat its own nationals as it sees fit, to 
regulate its immigration policy and economic life, and to increase its armaments 
without limit. Moreover, sovereignty necessarily implies the right to make war in 
the national interest.16 
 
The decisions to maintain the armed forces to ensure survival, maintain 
national sovereignty, and protect national interests, remain in the realm of 
policy-makers and defense-planners. As Clausewitz famously argued, 
 
                                                
13 Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” in The Use of Force: Military Power and 
International Politics, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, 5th ed. (Maryland: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 1999), 3.  
14 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 361 
15 Williamson and Murray, “Introduction,” 21.  
16 Merze Tate, The United States and Armaments (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1948), 3-4. 
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No major proposal required for war can be worked out of ignorance of political 
factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on 
the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel 
should be with the policy itself, not with its influence.17 
 
Jomini similarly expounded that “we will suppose an army taking the field: 
the first care of its commander should be to agree with the head of state upon 
the character of the war.”18 And in the light of the Cold War, Bernard Brodie 
argued that “the fact that a general war will be fought and swiftly decided 
with forces in being at the outset indicates that most strategic decisions 
concerning that war must be made in the preceding period of peace.”19  
 
These decisions to arm are part of the strategic behavior of a sovereign state 
to ensure its survival, and survival entails preparedness for warfighting. When 
states hedge, balance or bandwagon, the military modernization must align 
with those objectives. Moreover, arming—broadly understood as military 
modernization—cannot be classified a “peacetime” activity, or one that 
upholds the peace, simply because it occurs during times of relative absences 
of major power conflict. Rather, 
 
Peace in military mouths to-day is a synonym for “war expected” … Every up-to-
date dictionary should now say that “peace” and “war” mean the same thing, now 
in posse, now in actu. It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp 
preparation for war by the nations is the real war, permanent, unceasing; and that 
the battles are only a sort of public verification of the mastery gained during the 
“peace” interval.20 
 
Interaction between two opponents occurs at the political roots of military 
modernization (the level of statesmen), as well as at the sharp end of tactical 
operating detail. 21  This latter detail was evidenced in the results of the 
empirical study, as well as being a characteristic identified in some of the 
                                                
17 Clausewitz, On War, 608. 
18 Antoine Henri, Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. 
Craighill, rev. ed. (Mineola and New York: Dover, 2007) 59.  
19 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 360. 
20 William James, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” in Representative Essays in Modern 
Thought, ed. Harrison Ross Steeves (1913), online edition. Emphasis in original. 
21 See Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham: Hamilton Press, 1986), 
210 and 220. 
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literature. Desmond Ball, Charles Glaser and Geoffrey Till have argued that 
armaments can become reactive as a result of operational requirements and 
tactical objectives. 22  As Clausewitz noted, armaments must necessarily 
respond to perceived threats:  
 
If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your effort against his power 
of resistance, which can be explained as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. 
the total means at his disposable and the strength of his will. The extent of the means 
at his disposal is a matter – though not exclusively – of figures, and should be 
measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only 
be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it.23 
 
That is, arming and the decision to develop specific capabilities are made to 
meet political objectives in an actor’s strategic environment, and are 
considered again when deploying the capability to meet operational 
requirements. These decisions involve assessing the needs for advanced 
weapons platforms, examining regional trends, and funding and allocating 
resources to these costly and often long-term modernization programs. 
 
It is these political motivations which spur reactions from states in the form 
of bolstering their own modernization programs or revising foreign and 
defense policy. The traditional “arms race” theory emphasizes the “action-
reaction” process—overriding political purpose and domestic decision-
making processes—in the considerations of how to distribute and apply the 
use of force. In light of the empirical investigation, the strategic objectives of 
states in relation to their armaments are well-defined. Military modernization 
encompasses the process of arms acquisitions and enhancements and is a 
primarily peacetime activity that requires state resources. Consequently, the 
correlation of these material means to political ends is a constant process that 
does not lend itself to “spiraling out of control” or the “momentum of a race.” 
The character of armaments remains dependent on the intensity of the 
political rivalry. The interaction between opponents is, effectively, the 
politics of using force, as Sun Tzu argued, “the political, diplomatic, and 
                                                
22 See for instance, Ball, “Arms or Affluence”; Charles L. Glaser, “When are Arms Races 
Dangerous?”; and Till, Asia’s Naval Expansion. 
23 Clausewitz, On War, 77.  
 285 
logistical preparations for war and fighting itself [are] integral parts of the 
same activity.”24 
 
 
 
Cases and Areas for Future Research 
Due to the breadth of the Asia-Pacific region, other potentially informative 
case studies could not be included due to space constraints, primarily 
Singapore, Taiwan and North Korea. The case of Singapore, for instance, 
demonstrates one of the most significant examples of the modernization of 
sophisticated naval and associated air capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. The 
primary role of the SAF “has been to maintain a favorable sub-regional 
balance of power in maritime Southeast Asia.”25 The city-state’s survival 
relies on its access to the sea. The SAF has pursued a small version of 
“capability superiority,” that is, having the best equipment but with a 
numerically small force to deter potentially aggressors. Singapore’s deterrent 
capability is a “regional doomsday machine—intended to manipulate 
Singapore’s regional threat environment by forcing neighboring states to treat 
the city-state with a degree of respect and caution which might otherwise be 
absent.” 26  Its consistent investment in defense procurement, its growing 
defense research and industrial establishment, and emphasis on doctrinal 
development has made the SAF the best-equipped military in Southeast Asia. 
There is a clear element of maintaining sufficient deterrent capabilities to 
address a Malaysia or Indonesia contingency, but more significantly, the 
focus for Singapore’s modernization is to address Sino-US strategic 
competition in the Asia-Pacific. Its strategic objectives are twofold: it is 
arming to enhance self-reliant defense, but also to hedge with the US against 
China.27 
 
Second, the examination of Taiwan’s military modernization would reveal 
how a country’s armed forces adjusts to an extreme shift in the balance of 
                                                
24 See Handel, Masters of War, 37.  
25 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 70 
26 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 31-32.  
27 Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 712.  
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power across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s acquisitions are an attempt to 
counter growing Chinese capabilities to force unification with the mainland, 
and Chinese capabilities are targeted at preventing American interference in 
contingencies such as the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese defense planners continue 
to hope for a symmetrical response to China’s military build-up which 
includes developing capabilities for air-to-air, naval-to-naval and ground-to-
ground defensive interdiction, as well as acquiring counterforce and 
countervalue offensive weaponry.  
 
However, Taiwan’s 2013 National Defense Report highlighted the impact of 
the PLA’s growing strength on US’ ability to assist the island should Beijing 
decide to mount an offensive campaign, stating that by 2020 the PLA could 
be in a position to invade and occupy Taiwan.28 Additionally, Taiwan faces a 
multitude of problems across various fronts. In contrast to China’s robust 
military expenditure, Taiwan’s defense budget fell to an all-time low of 
approximately 2 percent of GDP in 2014—well below Taipei’s bipartisan 
goal of budgeting at 3 percent. Taiwan’s defense expenditure is also strained 
by its dual imperatives of military reform and major procurement programs. 
It has lost the quantitative and qualitative edge against China, and faces the 
problem of aging aircraft and ships. Its declining demographics have added 
to the huge costs associated with setting up an all-volunteer force by 2017. It 
also faces the persistent issue that the US remains reluctant to supply Taipei 
with advanced weaponry, such as next generation combat aircraft and the 
Aegis combat system, mainly due to the fear of espionage.  
 
Third, North Korea has had significant influence on the development of 
ballistic missile defense for the US, South Korea and Japan, as well as 
influencing the force structure development of the PLA. The North Korean 
armed forces field a large, conventional and forward-deployed military, 
capable of inflicting damage on South Korea, as evidenced by the 2010 
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents. 29  North Korea relies on deterrence 
                                                
28 ROC Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Review 2013 (Taipei: Ministry of 
National Defense, October 2013), 66 
29 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015: Report to Congress (Washington DC: 
Department of Defense, 2015), 1. 
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through its “nuclear weapons program and supporting delivery systems and 
conventionally by maintaining a large, heavily-armed, forward-deployed 
military that presents a constant threat to South Korea, especially the greater 
Seoul metropolitan area. These two aspects of its military strategy are meant 
to be mutually supporting: the threat posed by one is employed to deter an 
attack on the other.” 30  Although North Korea faces immense resource 
challenges and the US-ROK alliance enjoys a military capability advantage—
including in the nuclear domain—Pyongyang has been successful in deterring 
alliance military responses to its provocations by its ability to inflect 
unacceptable consequences on South Korea.31 Pyongyang’s unpredictability, 
willingness to use force, and commitment to the development of its nuclear 
technology and capabilities have led to regional reactions to adjust military 
doctrine, for instance South Korea’s “proactive deterrence” policy.32 
 
Furthermore, there are two key areas identified for future research. First, as 
mentioned in the previous section, a better understanding is needed of the 
distinctions between military power, military capability and weapons 
platforms. The conflation of weapons platforms and capabilities has often led 
to contradictory assessments of a country’s military power and wherewithal. 
The academic discussion of armaments often overlooks capability with regard 
to understanding personnel figures, readiness, organization and doctrine, 
maintaining technical advantage, and the ability to equip and train the armed 
forces. There is also further misunderstanding in assessments of military 
power. These indices often focus on capabilities without quantifying soft 
power and reputation—dynamics which are central to the ability to threaten 
the use or use of force. Moreover, many assessments which use raw indices 
of military budgets, tonnage or weapons counts, do not take into account the 
broader military modernization cycle. In essence, Brodie’s dictum that 
“strategy in peacetime is expressed largely in choices among weapons 
                                                
30 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015, 9.  
31 Michael McDevitt, “Deterring North Korean Provocations,” Brooking East Asia 
Commentary, February 7, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/research/deterring-north-
korean-provocations/.  
32 See Hong Kyudok, “Option I: Enhancing Military Deterrence,” The Asan Forum: Special 
Forum, June 11, 2015, http://www.theasanforum.org/option-1-enhancing-military-
deterrence/.  
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systems” could be rephrased as “strategy in peacetime is expressed largely in 
the development of capabilities.” The training, planning, organizing and 
implementation of arms acquisitions are better signals of political intent and 
wherewithal. Consequently, there is great scope for an examination of the 
linkage between strategy and military capabilities. For instance, a comparison 
of the impact of torpedoes, Dreadnoughts and submarines on naval warfare.33 
 
Second, a number of key events occurred in early 2017 that are likely to 
further contribute to the narrative of arming in the Asia-Pacific. January 2017 
kicked off with China indirectly retaliating against South Korea for its 
deployment of the US THAAD system.34 This “indirect action” included 
rejecting applications by South Korean commercial carriers to add charter 
flights between the two countries, and blocking South Korean sales of toilet 
seat bidets.35  There was also concerted effort by Japan’s Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe to bolster ties in Southeast Asia, visiting the Philippines, 
Australia, Indonesia and Thailand, in the face of rising tensions with China.36 
In the same month, China’s only operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, 
and its accompanying fleet sailed through the Taiwan Strait after conducting 
drills and tests in the South China Sea.37 This prompted Taiwan to scramble 
F-16s and dispatch a frigate to shadow the carrier group through the strait.38 
The move also came days after PLA bombers and reconnaissance planes were 
                                                
33 See for instance, Katherine C. Epstein, Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial 
Complex in the United States and Great Britain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2014). 
34 Shin-hyung Lee and Christian Sheppard, “South Korea Minister Says China Indirectly 
Retaliating Against THAAD,” Reuters, January 6, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
southkorea-china-idUSKBN14P2I8.  
35 Shin Kyung-Jin, “Retaliation by Beijing Extends to Bidet Imports,” Korea Joogang 
Daily, January 20, 2017, 
http://mengnews.joins.com/view.aspx?aid=3028897&cloc=joongangdaily%7chome%7cne
wslist1.  
36 Junko Horiuchi, “Abe Asia Tour to Focus on Bolstering Ties Amid Rising Chinese 
Assertiveness,” The Japan Times, January 11, 2017, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/11/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-asia-tour-
focus-bolstering-ties-amid-rising-chinese-assertiveness/#.WIE45vl97RY.  
37 Michael Martina and J. R. Wu, “China Says its Aircraft Carrier Leaves Taiwan Strait,” 
Reuters, January 11, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-carrier-
idUSKBN14W0D5.  
38 Michael Forsythe and Chris Buckley, “Taiwan Responds After China Sends Carrier to 
Taiwan Strait,” The New York Times, January 10, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/world/asia/china-taiwan-strait-aircraft-carrier-
trump.html.  
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detected flying over the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan.39 By the end of 
the month, the JSDF carried out a simulated exercise of how the US military 
and JSDF would respond to a China-Taiwan military clash.40 
 
Such actions point to irreversible shifts in the regional balance of power. Even 
before the announcement of the rebalance, many regional countries—
particularly US allies—were increasingly uncertain about American 
commitments to the region as well as China’s intentions.41 The inauguration 
of President Trump will certainly not help the situation. On the one hand, due 
to American strategic and economic interests in the region, it is likely that 
Washington will maintain its presence in the Asia-Pacific as its key 
partnerships in the region are instrumental for maintaining a favorable 
balance of power. 42  President Trump has repeatedly stated that “history 
shows that when America is not prepared is when the danger is greatest. We 
want to deter, avoid and prevent conflict through our unquestioned military 
dominance.”43 He also pledged that upon taking office he would end defense 
sequestration (presumably the BCA and its multi-year caps), build a 350-ship 
navy, and expand military investment.44 Two of his advisers, Alex Grey and 
Peter Navarro, have advanced a vision for US presence in the Asia-Pacific 
which seeks to maintain “primacy” to limit China’s increasing influence.45 
 
                                                
39 Jesse Johnson, “Japan Scrambles Fighters as Chinese Bombers Transit Tsushima Strait 
for First Time Since August,” The Japan Times, January 9, 2017, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/09/national/japan-scrambles-fighters-chinese-
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40 “Japan Drill to Simulate China Clash with Taiwan,” The Straits Times, January 20, 2017, 
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41 Benjamin Soloway, “Under Trump, US Allies in Asia May Look to Themselves for 
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Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific,” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 1 (2016): 8.  
43 Seth McLaughlin, “Trump Calls for Massive Military Buildup,” The Washington Times, 
September 7, 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/7/donald-trump-
wants-bigger-military-bigger-defense-/.  
44 Joe Gould, “Trump’s Big League Defense Buildup Would Face Hurdles in Congress,” 
DefenseNews, November 10, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/articles/trumps-big-
league-defense-buildup-would-face-hurdles-in-congress.  
45 Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Deciphering Trump’s Asia Policy: What “America First” Will 
Mean for Regional Order,” Foreign Affairs, November 22, 2016, 
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On the other hand, due to his campaign pledges of fiscal-mindedness, Trump 
has called on Japan and South Korea to pay more for their own defense46 and 
expressed openness (and later denied he did) to the idea of nuclear 
proliferation among American allies.47 Three days after his January 2017 
inauguration, Trump also fulfilled his campaign promise to end American 
participation in the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a central 
pillar of Obama’s pivot.48 Moreover, the Trump administration could prove 
to be a double-edged sword with regards to Sino-US relations: 
 
On the one hand, Trump threatens a break from long-standing US commitments to 
alliances, free trade and diplomacy with China. This risks producing strategic 
instabilities in an Asia riven by great-power rivalries and the insecurities of lesser 
states. On the other hand, some of the US president-elect’s proposed policies may 
actually put him in sync with Asian powers that take a more nationalistic line on the 
uses of military power and economic statecraft. Perhaps the most significant 
potential shift in US policy concerns China. Trump takes a more hawkish line on 
China’s militarization of the South China Sea, its military buildup, and its unfair 
trade practices than has President Barack Obama … Trump has also promised to 
ramp up US defense spending after its relative decline during the Obama years. His 
advisers have criticized the Obama administration's “pivot to Asia” as more talk 
than action and have pledged to rectify this by substantially increasing the US 
military presence through an accelerated naval buildup. The combination of 
standing up to China's neo-imperialistic behavior and expanding America's ability 
to project power could be a source of reassurance to Asian allies who lately have 
questioned US staying power in their region.49 
 
The Trump administration will be a time of “intense polarization in 
Washington and continuing savage political struggles.” 50  Trump’s 
                                                
46 Ankit Panda, “Donald Trump Won. Prepare for Uncharted Geopolitical Waters in Asia,” 
The Diplomat, November 9, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/donald-trump-won-
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47 Stephanie Condon, “Donald Trump: Japan, South Korea Might Need Nuclear Weapons,” 
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48 William Mauldin, “Donald Trump Withdraws US From Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The 
Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2017, http://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-withdraws-u-s-
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49 Daniel Twining, “Pros and Cons of Trump’s Emerging Asia Policy,” Nikkei Asian 
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protectionist and isolationist rhetoric 51 could advance regional arguments 
that American primacy in Asia is over. American primacy in the region is not 
just founded on military capabilities but also mutual understandings of power 
and the shared ideals of liberal democracies. With a populist in charge of the 
White House from 2017, trading away shared values could arguably lead to 
accelerated pushes for enhanced self-reliance and the indigenization of 
defense industries, and a transformation of the regional balance of power. 
 
                                                
51 David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, “50 GOP Officials Warn Donald Trump Would 
Put Nation’s Security ‘at Risk,’” The New York Times, August 8, 2016, 
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